Volume III — Issue I — Spring 2010

The Agonist

A Nietzsche Circle Journal

NIETZSCHE CIRCLE

The Agonist
A Nietzsche Circle Journal

Volume III Issue I Spring 2010

Letters to the editors are welcome and should be emailed to: nceditors@nietzschecircle.com.

The Agonist is published seasonally by Nietzsche Circle, Ltd. P.O. Box 575, New York, NY 10113, U.S.A.
Website: http://nietzschecircle.com.
For advertising inquiries, e-mail Andre Okawara: ncinfo@nietzschecircle.com.

Exegeses of Nietzsche for The Agonist

To further practice reading as an art and to foster rumination, what Nietzsche believed "modern man" has not properly cultivated, *The Agonist* is seeking exegeses of Nietzsche's texts. "An aphorism, properly stamped and molded," Nietzsche urged, "has not been 'deciphered' when it has simply been read; rather, one has then to begin its exegesis, for which is required an art of exegesis" (GM: P §8).

The Agonist is interested in exegeses of individual aphorisms, bearing in mind that they fold into Nietzsche's entire corpus and are not entities that one can consider in complete isolation. We are particularly interested in exegeses of aphorisms from *Morgenröthe* and *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, two of the more neglected books of Nietzsche's oeuvre, but welcome exegeses on all the published works as well as the *Nachlass.* In this act of ruminating on individual aphorisms within the orbit of Nietzsche's entire philosophy, we want to promote careful philological reading, the art of "reading well, that is to say, reading slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and aft, with reservations, with doors left open, with delicate eyes and fingers" (D: P §5). If Nietzsche demanded for his work "only perfect readers and philologists," it is incumbent upon us to learn, as he insisted, to read him well. For a section strictly devoted to exegesis, we seek work that strives to fulfill this task.

"A book like this, a problem like this, is in no hurry; we both, I just as much as my book, are friends of *lento*" (D: P §5).

For all submissions of exegeses, the editors can be contacted at:

nceditors@nietzschecircle.com.

The Agonist
A Nietzsche Circle Journal

Table of Contents

CAMBRIDGE

Special
20% Discount



The Death of Nietzsche's Zarathustra

By Paul S. Loeb

In this study of Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* Paul S. Loeb proposes a new account of the relation between the book's literary and philosophical aspects and argues that the book's narrative is designed to embody and exhibit the truth of eternal recurrence. Loeb shows how Nietzsche constructed a unified and complete plot in which the protagonist dies, experiences a deathbed revelation of his endlessly repeating life, and then returns to his identical life so as to recollect this revelation and gain a power over time that advances him beyond the human. Through close textual analysis and careful attention to Nietzsche's use of Platonic, Biblical, and Wagnerian themes, Loeb explains how this novel design is the key to solving the many riddles of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* – including its controversial fourth part, its obscure concept of the *Übermensch,* and its relation to Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals.*

CONTENTS

"It is difficult to overstate the magnitude of the challenge this book poses to the standard and currently authoritative interpretations of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra.* Paul Loeb's careful exegesis and persuasive argumentation will oblige most of the leading Nietzsche scholars working today to revisit – and, in many cases, to revise – their interpretations accordingly. An impressive achievement by any measure."

–Daniel Conway, Texas AM University

"This is a provocative, novel, and erudite attempt to thread a philosophical path through the enigmatic and labyrinthine work that Nietzsche consistently considered to be his masterpiece. Paul S. Loeb establishes one of the strongest readings yet of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* arguing in a spirited, polemical, and rigorous manner that Zarathustra's story interweaves narrative and concept to develop a startling idea of post-human temporality. Readers will find here new and powerful views of Nietzsche's thoughts of eternal recurrence and the *Übermensch,* and suggestions of how these illuminate the program of overcoming ressentiment in his *Genealogy of Morals.*"

–Gary Shapiro, University of Richmond

Paul S. Loeb is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Puget Sound. He is the co-translator and co-editor (with David F. Tinsley) of Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and *Unpublished Fragments from the Period of Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in volumes 7, 14, and 15 of *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche* (forthcoming, Stanford University Press).

PROMOTIONAL CODE: **LOEB10**

288 pages | ~~List Price: $85.00~~ | Disc.: $68.00 |
Hardback 978-0-521-51923-6
Available from May 2010

The Agonist
A Nietzsche Circle Journal

Invisibly Revolving— —Inaudibly Revolving:

The Riddle of the Double Gedankenstrich

by Rainer J. Hanshe

> *I still have the right to say of myself,* cogito, ergo sum*, but not* vivo, ergo cogito*. Empty 'being' is granted me, but not full and green 'life'; the* ***feeling*** *that tells me I exist warrants to me only that I am a thinking creature, not that I am a living one, not that I am an* animal *but at most a* cogital*. Only give me life; then I will create a culture for you out of it!*—Nietzsche, UM: II.10; KSA 1, 329

> *He who knows how to keep silent discovers an alphabet that has just as many letters as the ordinary one . . .*—Kierkegaard, *Repetition*

> *Whoever will have much to proclaim one day, must long remain silent unto himself: whoever intends to ignite lightning one day, must long be—a cloud*.—Nietzsche, KSB 8, 597

The world, Zarathustra first declares, revolves not only around inverse auditory events, but also around inverse *visual* events: "Around the inventors of new values the world revolves—invisibly it revolves" (Z: I.12; KSA 4, 65).[1] What the Stillest Hour, who Zarathustra calls his "angry mistress," speaks *without voice* to Zarathustra correlates to the inverse auditory and visual events that he proclaims drive the world, too: "Then it spoke to me again like a whispering: 'It is the stillest words that bring on the storm. Thoughts that come on doves' feet direct the world' " (Z: II.22; KSA 4, 189). To articulate thoughts in a voice that, inexplicably, though inaudible is still somehow discernible, Nietzsche illustrates that there are certain thoughts which he wants to communicate but cannot, or refuses to convey through explicit modes of transmission. While still expressed linguistically the thoughts that "direct the world" in *Also sprach Zarathustra* are often textually performed as inaudible. To animate Zarathustra's experience, it is necessary to imagine the reality that Nietzsche creates. If the words in the text are clearly legible to the reader, to

1 This line is repeated with two alterations when Zarathustra announces that, "Not around the inventors of new noise, but around the inventors of new values does the world revolve; *inaudibly* it revolves" (Z: II.18; KSA 4, 169). In the first utterance, a colon and a *Gedankenstrich* precede "invisibly" (Parkes omits the colon) whereas in the second, a semicolon precedes "inaudibly," which Nietzsche italicizes, perhaps to signal the alteration from inverse visual events to inverse auditory events. All English passages of *Also sprach Zarathustra* are from Graham Parkes' translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Zarathustra certain passages are spoken "without voice." To hear the utterances of the Stillest Hour even though its speech is silent—perhaps Zarathustra hears it with a different organ of perception, or with his *third* eye (D §509; KSA 3, 297) or *third* ear (BGE §246; KSA 5, 189)—is to experience something uncanny. The voiceless voice of *die stillste Stunde* so frightens Zarathustra that he screams in terror at its whispering, which drains the blood from his face. If it may then not be surprising that he is able to hear such a voice, his ability to hear it is the result of a unique perceptual capacity. *Zarathustra* is rife with *unheimlich* experiences and the reader must struggle to register them, as the reader must struggle to hear the eerie silent voice of the Stillest Hour. To hear that voice 'with one's eyes' is to hear the inaudible wisdom that is not proclaimed through speech but which, though mute, still rises over the roaring sea *speaking* revelations (Z: III.4; KSA 4, 207).

It is not however only the world that revolves around what is invisible and inaudible—*texts* are correspondingly driven just as they may be compelled by thoughts that come on doves' feet. Zarathustra's edict to hear with the organ of sight is not only an order given to his abyss-deep thought: it is a furtive clue for the bold searchers, tempters, and experimenters who engage with Nietzsche's texts. In particular, it is a clue about *Zarathustra* and some of the texts published subsequent to it, if not perhaps all of them. They contain something that cannot be pronounced, something inaudible that one can hear only with one's eyes, something nearly invisible around which the world is to revolve. If the world revolves not only around what is inaudible but also, as Zarathustra *first* announces, around what is invisible, it is crucial to observe and interpret what in the book is "invisible." One of the reader's tasks is to achieve the challenging synaesthetic aspiration Nietzsche advances; without accomplishing it, we will remain unknown to ourselves due to lacking knowledge of the rich value our senses have as equally important organs of knowledge. For the philosopher who proclaimed, and seriously, that his genius was in his nostrils, knowing is not the result of cognition alone; as Kofman emphasizes, in stressing rumination "as the imperative for any serious reading, he reintroduces intelligence into animality, just as he reinscribes the meaning of a text and its clarity into the senses: hearing, smell, sight, taste, without privileging any single one as a model of knowledge."[2] In the sublime state of intelligent animality we unify our senses, cleanse the doors of perception, learn to see eternity in an hour or even shorter duration of time. It is then that we are stung in the heart and "suddenly, with unspeakable certainty and subtlety" (EH, "Zarathustra" 3; KSA 6, 340), the invisible becomes visible, the inaudible becomes audible, and something shakes and overturns us to the very depths— —

Nietzsche's Avowal: Contesting Heidegger

In the *Nachlaß*, Nietzsche makes the striking revelation that what he loves in his books more than what is expressed with words is the dashes; they are superior he proclaims to his communicated thoughts (KSA 11, 34 [65; 147]). In 1884, shortly after "finding" the third book of *Zarathustra* "under the halcyon sky of Nizza" (EH, "Zarathustra" 4), Nietzsche also vowed that everything he had written hitherto

2 Sarah Kofman, "Nietzsche and the Obscurity of Heraclitus" in *Diacritics*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Autumn, 1987): 39-55. See 49-50.

was foreground, an utterance to which, as is well known, Heidegger lent particular interpretive force and made enduringly if not blindingly famous.[3] Nietzsche's avowal is one of the primary textual sources Heidegger uses to substantiate the *Nachlaß* over and against the published work as the "background" of Nietzsche's thought, where he might say its foundation or unconcealed "truth" is contained. Yet, Nietzsche says everything that he has written hitherto, which would include the notes, "is foreground." He does not say that only what he has published is foreground. If Heidegger interprets "writing" as published writing, then what destabilizes this possibility is that he ignores the rest of Nietzsche's avowal. The statement on foreground is only the prelude; the denouement follows, and it is crucial to observe. It is a truly revelatory conclusion:

> "Everything I have written hitherto is foreground;
>
> for me the real thing begins only with the dashes."[4]

Nietzsche's declaration is explicit—it is *only* with the dashes that "the real thing" begins! This compelling formulation demands vigilant attention yet, as far as I am aware, no scholar has heeded it, nor has any scholar interrogating Heidegger's use of it noted that Heidegger omits its most illuminating aspect. Of the numerous books and articles that quote Nietzsche's letter, they cite only the first half of the sentence as if the concluding statement about the dashes was too stupefying or absurd to consider with the slightest degree of seriousness.[5] Surprisingly, even Kofman, who is

3 See Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, tr. by David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins, 1991). Heidegger's paraphrase of Nietzsche's avowal: "What Nietzsche himself published during his creative life was always foreground" (8-9). Heidegger's direct paraphrase of Nietzsche's letter contains no reference.

4 Venice, 20 May 1885. Letter to Elisabeth Nietzsche. *Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*, tr. by Christopher Middleton (New York: Hackett, 1996): 241. KSB III.3, 53, letter 602. Middleton mistakenly lists this date as 1884.

5 Oddly, Krell, who is sensitive to such textual abuses, makes no mention of the omission of the latter half of Nietzsche's avowal in his introduction or in the notes to his translation of Heidegger's *Nietzsche*. See also Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Viroid Life* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1997): 109; *The Nietzsche Reader*, ed. by Keith Ansell-Pearson, Duncan Large (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005): 306; *Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. by Keith Ansell-Pearson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006): 20; Wayne Klein, *Nietzsche and the Promise of Philosophy* (New York: SUNY Press, 1997): 41-42; Sarah Kofman, *Explosion I: Of Nietzsche's Ecce Homo*, tr. by Duncan Large, *Diacritics*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1994): 57; Bernd Magnus, "Nietzsche's Philosophy in 1888: '*The Will to Power*' and the '*Übermensch*' " in *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 24, No. 1, January (1986): 82; *Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. by Bernd Magnus, Kathleen Marie Higgins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 67; William Müller-Lauter, *Nietzsche: His Philosophy of Contradictions and the Contradictions of His Philosophy*, tr. by David Parent (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1999): 125; Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 1985): 16; Rose Pfeffer, *Nietzsche*: *Disciple of Dionysus* (Pennsylvania: Bucknell University Press, 1972): 20; Alan Schrift, *Nietzsche & the Question of Interpretation* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1990): 15; Gary Shapiro, *Nietzschean Narratives* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1989): 3, 34; Douglas Thomas, *Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically* (New York: Guilford Press, 1999): 9, 71, 114; Linda L. Williams, *Nietzsche's Mirror* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001): 69; and Linda L. Williams, "Will to Power in Nietzsche's Published Works & *Nachlass*" in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 57, No. 3 (July, 1996): 455. For a more recent example: Max Whyte, "The Uses and Abuses of Nietzsche in the Third Reich: Alfred Baeumler's 'Heroic Realism' " in *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (2008): 180. Not *one* of these authors records this significant omission or includes Nietzsche's sentence in its entirety.

one of Nietzsche's most careful readers, neglects to include Nietzsche's conclusion about the dash in her *Explosion I*. Ellipses follow the word "foreground" in her footnote and Nietzsche's avowal is left unheard, relegated to textual oblivion, where it has languished until today. If, as Kofman declared, the dialogue between Heidegger and Nietzsche was a dialogue between deaf ears,[6] even she was deaf to certain tonalities and visions, as all of us can be. The fact of our not perceiving what is directly before us, or of seeing and hearing only what we choose to, is an intriguing phenomenon, illustrative of a failure of perception, a simple refusal to perceive, or a failure due specifically to our refusal to reintroduce animality into intelligence.[7] It is logical to think this in terms of the predominant refusal of the body in modern post-Cartesian/post-Christian culture, an instrumental aspect of Nietzsche's larger critique of the philosophical trajectory from Platonism to modernity. What Nietzsche thereby forces us to ask is, do we wish to persist as purely *cogital* figures, or will we struggle to grant ourselves full and green lives by truly wrestling with the tasks of his philosophy?

Although it is well known that Nietzsche's use of dashes is astonishingly manifold, they are still largely ignored,[8] that is, rarely read or interpreted, and it is clear how negligible this has been and remains. It is careless philology, a neglectful act we are not free to commit. As Klein emphasized, when refusing to read Nietzsche's dashes, there is "much that is potentially misread and misunderstood."[9] Further, it

6 Kofman 1987, 51. For other passages on deafness: 48, 49, 54. It is all too easy to distort texts through ignoring context or selective quoting, or to be completely blind to the rich abundance of certain motifs, such as the sea, which figures throughout Nietzsche's oeuvre despite Irigaray's odd insistence against that fact. Let us recall the *soothlaugher's* own words: "And if Zarathustra's words *were* even a hundred times right, by my words *you* would always—*do* wrong!" (Z: III.7; KSA 4, 225)

7 On the animal in Nietzsche's philosophy, see: Vanessa Lemm, *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy: Culture, Politics, and the Animality of the Human Being* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009).

8 There is but scant material on Nietzsche's use of dashes. While the following brief chronologically ordered list may seem extensive for an *apparently* insignificant element of Nietzsche's philosophy, his use of dashes is not the focus of any of these works; they make only cursory comments on them, generally no more than a sentence, though a few are lengthier. Karl Löwith, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same* (California: University of California Press, 1935; 1997): 87, 262; Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, *Nietzsche: His Philosophy of Contradictions and the Contradictions of His Philosophy* (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1971; 1999): 118, 221; Mazzino Montinari, *Nietzsche Lesen* (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1982): S.81; Richard Roos, "Rules to a Philological Reading of Nietzsche" in Rudolph Berlinger/Wiebke Schrader (Hg.), *Nietzsche: Controversial VI* (Wuerzberg, 1987): 7-42; Peter Newmark, "Paragraphs on the Translation of Nietzsche" in *German Life and Letters*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (July 1990): 327, 331; Eric Blondel, *Nietzsche: The Body and Culture – Philosophy as a Philological Genealogy* (London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 1991): 19, 86, 263, 269; Gary Shapiro, *Alcyone* (New York: SUNY Press, 1991): 92; Rudolf Fietz, *Medienphilosophie: Musik, Sprache und Schrift bei Friedrich Nietzsche* (Königshausen & Neumann, 1992): 380-381; William Klein, *Nietzsche & the Promise of Philosophy* (New York: SUNY Press, 1997): 63, 64, 214; Paul van Tongeren, *Reinterpreting Modern Culture* (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2000): 94-95, 144, 216; Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche's Task: An Interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001): 84; Gary Shapiro, *Archaeologies of Vision* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003): 190; Georges Liebert, *Nietzsche and Music*, tr. by David Pellauer and Graham Parkes (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2004): 4. The most extensive examination of Nietzsche's use of syntax has been done by Blondel, Newmark, Roos, and van Tongeren. My gratitude to Keith Ansell-Pearson, Arno Böhler, Horst Hutter, and Mattia Riccardi for a few of these references.

9 Klein, 63. While the focus herein concerns Nietzsche's use of *Gedakenstriche*, in particular the *Gedankenstriche* as emblem, his punctuation in general should be confronted with particular sensitivity.

is necessary to distinguish between the hyphen (*Bindestrich*), which Nietzsche uses to form compound words, and the dash (*Gedankenstrich*), which has a completely different function.[10] At the close of the first chapter of *Explosion I*, Kofman implores that we must read Nietzsche differently than Heidegger, which requires going "beyond all metaphysical reappropriations and return[ing] to the actual literality of the text."[11] If we are to seek what is "unthought" in Nietzsche then it is not necessarily in the *Nachlaß* as Heidegger claims, obscuring Nietzsche's explicit avowal, certainly not in the *Nachlaß* alone, but it is also in the *Gedankenstriche*, where Nietzsche himself confesses "the real thing begins."

Interpreting Nietzsche's Dashes

To a *Gedankenstrich*, there is far more than meets the eye-ear; it is no mere sign, not in Nietzsche's supple blade, certainly not a sign with a single meaning. It is not only employed to conceal certain thoughts and to keep others silent, but to refrain from pronouncing some thoughts for either they can't be pronounced, should be sung instead of spoken (Z: III.16; KSA 4, 291), or words are insufficient for communicating them (BGE §296, KSA 5, 239; GS §383, KSA 3, 638). It also functions as a caesura with different musical effects. Löwith interprets one use of a dash as the announcement of a break in Nietzsche's thought, but Müller-Lauter contests that interpretation and asserts that the dash is actually a transition.[12] In his examination of Nietzsche's use of a dash in "On Truth and Lies," Wayne Klein concurs, "the dash signifies the distinction between the figurative (the "poetic") and the literal (the "philosophical") parts of the essay."[13] He argues further that it functions also as a transitional device, a marker of difference and a bridge from sphere to sphere, that is from the figurative to the philosophical spheres of "On Truth and Lies." Van Tongeren posits that the dash functions as an indication of the presence of an unexpressed thought, the signal of new ground opening, an aporia, a textual division, or more simply as a breath or the marking of an interjected clause.[14] More recently, Loeb proposed that a dash could indicate a deduction from a general to a specific claim.[15] These varied interpretations of Nietzsche's use of the *Gedankenstrich* demonstrate the significantly variable quality a single dash can alone embody.

10 For an illuminating analysis of one instance of Nietzsche's use of a *Bindestrich*, see Shapiro, 2001. Part of that essay is included in "High Noon: Hyphenating the Augen-Blick," a subchapter of Shapiro's elegant and sophisticated text, *Archaeologies of Vision: Foucault and Nietzsche on Seeing and Saying* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003): 187-192. For another analysis, albeit brief, see Keith Ansell-Pearson's comment on the *Bindestrich* in human-superhuman in his article "The Transfiguration of Existence and Sovereign Life: Sloterdijk and Nietzsche on Posthuman and Superhuman Futures" in Environment and Planning D: *Society and Space*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2009): 139-156.

11 Sarah Kofman, "*Explosion I*: Of Nietzsche's *Ecce Homo*," tr. Duncan Large, *Diacritics*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Winter, 1994): 51-70. See 68-69.

12 Löwith, 87. Müller-Lauter, 118. The passage in question: "My doctrine says: to live in such a way that you must wish to live again is the task—you will in any case!" As cited in M-L: *Nachlass*, XII, pp. 64f.

13 Klein, 63.

14 Van Tongeren, 94-95.

15 Paul S. Loeb, "Identity and Eternal Recurrence" in Ansell-Pearson 2006, 171-188. See 174. While the context of this interpretation is specific to the demon's deduction in GS §341 (KSA 3, 570), it may be applicable to other usages of the dash.

However, in many translations, Nietzsche's punctuation is frequently dishonored, whether by being eliminated entirely, or altered—this can create considerable distortion of its subtleties and borders on being an abuse of the texts.[16] If Nietzsche's use of dashes is of such extraordinary significance that they are more admirable to him than what is linguistically expressed in his texts, and that, as he confessed, they are where the "real thing" begins it is incumbent upon us to attend to them with the greatest care. While the words before, between, or after those manifold signs are of unquestionable import, it is through the abyss sustaining the tension between two dashes or thought-strikes (*Gedanken-striche*) that we will aurally perceive something with our eyes that since the publication of *Zarathustra* has remained invisible. What that exceedingly pregnant abyss symbolizes is of paramount importance, and it will enable us to hear Nietzsche's use of dashes anew and to attempt to decipher his visual riddle, a riddle that for over 100 years has remained an unheard and unseen enigma. It is time to smash our ears in order to hear with our eyes . . .

The Riddle of the Double *Gedankenstrich*

When translating *Also sprach Zarathustra* into English from the text of the third edition published by C. G. Naumann (Leipzig, 1894), Graham Parkes faithfully reproduced "its paragraph structure and—in most cases—its punctuation, as well as repetitions of words, phrases, and sentences" (xxxv). In the near exact replication of Nietzsche's punctuation, Parkes restored a fundamental element of the text not found in any other English edition: Nietzsche's use of two long dashes (*Gedankenstriche*) with a strong space between them.[17] I refer to this configuration as Nietzsche's

16 What is this but an empty disregard for *der kleinen Dinge*—they are *just* dashes, *just* ellipses, and not of any real significance thus, they can be eliminated or altered in translation, or simply ignored. To alter the dashes and ellipses in Nietzsche's texts however is like altering the major and minor signs of the notes of a symphony, or eliminating its rests. If Nietzsche's texts are works of music as he proclaims they are and if *Zarathustra* is a symphony as he declares it is, in not honoring the punctuation of those texts, translators have altered their key and tempo and thus how they are heard. If some of us as readers cannot hear the music of Nietzsche's texts, clearly our ears are not as acute as Mahler's and it would therefore be wise not to mistake our own interpretive failures for a "failure" on Nietzsche's part, as is too often done. To alter Nietzsche's syntax is to deform it, that is, to distort the form of his texts and thus their content, an abuse we are not free to make. To those with insensate nerves who still balk at this and think the case overstated, Nietzsche has the best retort. If in *Beyond Good and Evil* he castigates Germans in particular for lacking the ability to listen to what is art and purpose in language, it is not they alone that suffer from that deficiency of refined senses. "In the end," Nietzsche continues, "one simply does not have 'the ear for that'; and thus the strongest contrasts of style go unheard, and the subtlest artistry is *squandered* as on the deaf" (BGE §246; KSA 5, 189). To hear what is inaudible and to see what is invisible requires the most superior perceptual abilities; if we lack those abilities, that is hardly cause for marring Nietzsche's texts. To "have weaned ourselves from the sound-effects of rhetoric" (HH §218; KSA 3, 193-194) is our loss. To develop the ears to hear the music of Nietzsche's texts, which is a task that every Nietzsche reader must wrestle with, we must accustom ourselves to those sound effects once again. We have to *earn* the right to the "*grand* period" (BGE §247; KSA 5, 190). The delivery of such a period as Nietzsche points out, and thus of reading it, is rare and difficult. The same is to be said of the *Gedankenstrich*.

17 I examined facsimiles of the original hand written manuscripts of *Also sprach Zarathustra* (located in the New York Public Library) and the emblems are present *in Nietzsche's own gestures* just as they are in the collected works, and even in cheap German editions of Z. In their corrected (digital) version of the *Kritischen Gesamtausgabe Werke*, Nietzsche Source Organisation retains the emblems as they are in all of Nietzsche's texts: http://nietzschesource.org.

"emblem." The translations of *Also sprach Zarathustra* by Tille, Common, Kaufmann, Hollingdale, Martin, and, surprisingly, Del Caro do not contain a single emblem.[18]

In his introduction to the book, Parkes does not make note of his recuperation of the dashes, nor of Nietzsche's significant and striking use of them within the text though in a private correspondence he stated that, "sensitive to Nietzsche's sensitivity about the dash, I always included them as published."[19] The emblem occurs a total of 39 times in *Also sprach Zarathustra* and every usage of it is unequivocally intentional. It is the result of design, of an architecture of thought, something that makes Nietzsche feel "from his arm down to his toes the dangerous delight of the quivering, ever-sharp blade that desires to bite, hiss, cut" (BGE §246; KSA 5, 189). There are 19 uses of it in part three and 20 in part four.[20] Significantly, the first occurrence of the emblem is in "Vom Gesicht und Räthsel," the greatest number occurs in "Der Genesende" and in "Von alten und neuen Tafeln," and the last usage of it is in "Das Zeichen," on the final page of the book.

18 Del Caro expresses particular concern for faithfully observing Nietzsche's use of punctuation in his review of Marion Faber's translation of *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, which he rightfully criticizes her for abusing, and emphasizes that "he prefers N.'s style, dashes and all" (507). See Adrian Del Caro, *The German Quarterly*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (Summer, 1986): 506-509. Klein is also sensitive to the abuse some translators have exercised against Nietzsche's texts through predetermining what is and is not of importance (63). The translation of *Also sprach Zarathustra* into Turkish by Mustafa Tuzel contains some emblems but not all of them; unfortunately, he omits some of the most significant usages of the emblem, such as in "On the Vision and Riddle." See *Böyle Buyurdu Zerdüst: Herkes ve Hiçkimse için Bir Kitap* (Istanbul: Türkiye Is Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2004). Kaufmann and other translators ignore dashes, change paragraph structure, and virtually every translation in English of all of Nietzsche's texts eliminates his deft use of ellipses—these are real abominations!

19 Despite this exceptional sensitivity, and considering the abuses Nietzsche's texts have suffered it truly is exceptional, at least in English translation, Parkes neglected to include at least one very important use of a *Bindestrich*. He does not retain the *Bindestrich* in the word *Augen-Blick* in Z: IV.10; KSA 4, 343. On the hyphenation of this word, see Shapiro, 2001. Parkes also neglects to include the second emblem at the end of "On the Vision and Riddle." It should read: "Oh, my brothers, I heard a laughter that was no human laughter— —and now a thirst gnaws at me, a yearning, that will never be stilled" (Z: III.2 §2; KSA 4, 197). He also neglects to include an emblem at the end of the second section of "Von alten und neuen Tafeln," and an emblem in the first section of "Die Zauberer." The first should read: "Must there not exist, for the sake of the light and the lightest, moles and heavy dwarves?— —" (Z: III.12 §2; KSA 4, 248), and the second, "To me—*yourself!*— —" (Z: IV.5 §1; KSA 4, 316).

20 There are no emblems in Books I and II. The sections (with page numbers to the Parkes edition) where the emblem occurs in Part III: (III: Vision and Riddle 2, 136) [2x]; (III: Passing By, 153); (III: Spirit of Heaviness 1, 166); (III: Old and New Tablets 3, 172) [2x]; (III: Tablets 8, 175); (III: Tablets 27, 186); (III: Tablets 30, 188); (III: Convalescent 1, 189) [4x]; (III: Convalescent 2, 192); (III: Convalescent 2, 193); (III: Yearning, 195); (III: Yearning, 196); (III: Second Dance Song 2, 198). The emblem occurs 6 times in Convalescent, which is the most of any chapter in the book. It occurs five times in Tablets.

The sections where the emblem occurs in Part IV: (IV: Honey Sacrifice, 209); (IV: Cry of Need, 212); (IV: Kings 2, 216); (IV: Leech, 217); (IV: Sorcerer 1): 221; (IV: Sorcerer 2, 224); (IV: Sorcerer 2, 225); (IV: Retired from Service, 227); (IV: Retired from Service, 228); (IV: Ugliest Man, 233) [2x]; (IV: Shadow, 240); (IV: Midday, 242); (IV: Superior Human 4, 251); (IV: Superior Human 6, 252); (IV: Song of Melancholy 3, 262); (IV: Song of Melancholy 3, 263); (IV: Drunken Song 1, 278); (IV: The Sign, 287).

The bracketed number indicates the number of times an emblem occurs on that page, except for in "Vom Gesicht und Räthsel"—see note 18 about the missing emblem in that chapter. In "Der Genesende" there is an emblem with *three* dashes with a space following the first and second dashes—representing two deaths, two returns? It is the only occurrence of this in the book as far as I am aware. Nietzsche uses the exact same emblem in a variant of "Aus hohen Bergen: Nachgesang," the poem concluding BGE, and in many notes as well as in his letters.

Undoubtedly, Nietzsche's dashes are not to be ignored nor are they to be thoughtlessly excised from translations, let alone mutated into parentheses as Faber did in her translation of *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*. It is our obligation as readers to treat them conscientiously. In particular, Nietzsche may be using the emblem as a silent code to communicate with select readers for a properly esoteric teaching cannot be communicated directly.[21] Far from being a stable signifier, the emblem is a kind of "divine lizard" (EH, "Daybreak" 1; KSA 6, 330) that needs to be interpreted anew whenever one encounters it. As illustrated earlier, a single dash can alone embody significantly different functions. I propose that Nietzsche's emblem generally functions as *a graphic illustration* of the Moment or *Augenblick*, the Eternal Return, and the Great Midday while it may also be an illustration of summit, abyss, and summit if not other triads.[22] It is probable that Nietzsche also uses the emblem in the books published subsequent to *Zarathustra* as an invisible and inaudible code alerting astute readers to his allusions to the Eternal Return and the Overhuman.[23] A large number of the passages in other works that contain emblems concern one or the other if not both concepts, as do the poems in *Dionysos-Dithyramben*, Nietzsche's final work.[24] For those who still continue to assert that Nietzsche abandons the

21 On the notion of the *complot* or conspiracy in Nietzsche, see Pierre Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle* (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1997), and Geoff Waite, *Nietzsche's Corps/e* (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1996). For Waite on Klossowski: 273-275.

22 In regards to reading Nietzsche's dashes graphically, Klein is one of the few commentators to do so. Shapiro also reads Nietzsche graphically. I will only pursue the first two propositions listed above.

23 Hollingdale's translation of *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) contains emblems in §§ 5, 6 of the preface (1886) to the second edition but in the German they are in §§ 2, 7 of the preface. His translation of *Morgenröthe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) contains the emblems as they are in §§ 1, 4 of the preface (1886) as in the German. Kaufmann's translation of *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (New York: Vintage, 1966; 1989) contains one emblem in the German version of "Aus hohen Bergen: Nachgesang," but it is not retained in his translation of the poem (song) that concludes the book. Other emblems in the book have been replaced with closed double dashes, which Kaufmann sometimes uses in place of ellipses, or eliminates entirely, as he does in his edition of GM (New York: Vintage, 1967; 1989). In her translation of *Zur Genealogie der Moral: Eine Streitschrift* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; 2006), Carol Diethe retains the four emblems that are in that book. Hollingdale's translation of *Ecce Homo* (New York: Penguin, 1979; 1992) contains emblems in Clever §§ 8, 9 though not in "Thus Spoke Zarathustra" 6, "Twilight of the Idols" 2, and "Destiny" 8 as in the German. Large's more recent translation of *Ecce Homo* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) contains the emblems as they are in the German. What follows is a list of the other texts in which Nietzsche uses the emblem: HH: II, AOM §98, HH: II, WS §259; D Preface §§ 1, 4, and §§ 201, 207, 538; GS §§ 60, 335; BGE §§ 22, 29, 30, 51, 56, 278, 280, 296, "Aus hohen Bergen: Nachgesang"; GM: I §§ 8, 17, III §24; FWag §§ 1, 3, 4, 5, 7; TI, "The Hammer Speaks"; AC §§ 7, 10, 13, 19, 34, 36, 37, 38, 44, 46, 50, 53, and 59; KSA 1, 666, 671. In Nietzsche's final text, *Dionysos-Dithyramben*, there are emblems in the poems "Das Feuerzeichen" [Firesign] and "Ruhm und Ewigkeit" § 4 [Glory and Eternity]. Hollingdale's translation (Connecticut: Black Swan Books, 1984) retains the emblems as in the German. James Luchte and Eva Leadon transcribe the emblem only in "Firesign" yet because of the typeface employed it is not so legible. See their translation of Nietzsche's poems, *The Peacock and the Buffalo* (Llanybydder: Fire and Ice, 2003): 91, 96-99. Turkish poet Oruç Aruoba's translations of *Der Antichrist* and *Dionysos-Dithyramben* contain the emblems as they are in the German. For the latter, see Friedrich Nietzsche, *Dionysos Dithyramboslari* (Istanbul: Kabalcı Yayınevi, 1988; 1993).—There are also emblems in other poems and in numerous letters during the time of the composition of *Zarathustra* and up until one of Nietzsche's final letters.

24 Hollingdale 1984, 47; 61-67. For instance, the section on the Eternal Return in BGE (§56; KSA 5, 75) contains an emblem.

thought of the Eternal Return and the figure of the Overhuman in his later works, the inaudible though not entirely invisible emblem should eradicate such claims once and for all.[25]

"Emblem" as *Augenblick*

When functioning as a graphic illustration of the *Augenblick*, the first dash may signify the past, the second the future, and the abyss between them, *that which is invisible*, the moment. The abyss separating but holding together the *Gedankenstriche* is no mere empty space devoid of sense but "eighteen months pregnant." It is the "invisible" and the "inaudible" around which the world revolves, the instant where two ways "confront one another head on . . . and where they come together" (Z: III.2 §1; KSA 4, 199). It is an ingenious representation of something seemingly beyond representation, something that perhaps is more visible in the East, the land from where Zarathustra hails and where emptiness is not predominantly seen as negative, or not seen at all as in the West, but is seen as a nothing that *is* which demands interpretation. That ever so pregnant abyss is not a strict absence but something we may interpret as what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the "no longer time that exists between two instants; it is the event that is *un entre-temps*: *un entre-temps* is not part of the eternal, but neither is it part of time—it belongs to becoming." It is a dead time "where nothing takes place, an infinite awaiting that is already infinitely past, awaiting and reserve."[26] When experiencing the *Augenblick*, Zarathustra speaks of the world becoming "Still! Still!" (Z: IV.10; KSA 4, 342) and that unique temporal moment, that *entre— —temps*, seems akin to what Deleuze and Guatarri refer to as "dead time"—it is not of eternity or time, but is the moment *in between*, a profound interstice. Zarathustra refers to this *Augenblick* as the becoming perfect of the world, which Stambaugh interprets as the world becoming totally or completely real.[27] In that moment, the distinction between the past and the present dissolves—it is a *dimensional* shift and a transition to another level or realm. During that experience, for Stambaugh, there is nothing for the will to do except to participate in the perfection of the world.[28]

25 To Babich, "Nietzsche's doctrine is not only difficult to grasp but properly said *esoteric*" (1994): 350. For explicit passages by Nietzsche on the esoteric, see: GM III §10 (KSA 5, 359), BGE §§ 30, 40, 194, 270, 278, 289 (KSA 5, 48, 57, 115, 225, 229, 233), TI, "Improvers" §5 (KSA 6, 102). For different explorations of the esoteric in Nietzsche: Babette E. Babich, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Ground of Art and Life* (New York: SUNY Press, 1994): 23, 27, 56, 71, 102-105, 203, 210, 212-214, 243, 249, 261, 268, 278, 284, 341, 350; Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche & Modern Times: A Study of Bacon, Descartes, and Nietzsche* (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1995): 276-277, 306-310; Laurence Lampert, *Leo Strauss & Nietzsche* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996): 29-30, 38, 44-45, 124; Geoff Waite, *Nietzsche's Corps/e: Aesthetics, Politics, Prophecy, Or, The Spectacular Technoculture of Everyday Life* (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1996): 30-34, 64-66, 155-156, 160-161, 198-242. 298-300; Daniel W. Conway, Peter S. Groff, *Nietzsche* (New York: Routledge, 1998): 139-141, 147; Babette E. Babich, Robert Sonné Cohen, *Nietzsche and the Sciences* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999): 3, 134, 255, 257; and Adrian Del Caro, *Grounding the Nietzsche Rhetoric of Earth* (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2004): 35-36, 175, 177, 182, 196, 198, 252, 332, 337. These texts are representative of different and conflicting interpretations of the esoteric in Nietzsche.

26 Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy*? (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 158.

27 Joan Stambaugh, *The Other Nietzsche* (New York: SUNY Press, 1994): 141-146.

28 Ibid., 26-27.

BECOMING LOYAL TO THE EARTH:

Nietzsche's Teachings as a Therapy for Political Culture

Monday March 29-Wednesday March 31

Wilkommen zum Eselsfest!

This three-day conference on the works of Friedrich Nietzsche will offer students and members of the public the opportunity to attend lectures and interactive workshops led by world-renowned Nietzsche scholars.

Presented by the Political Science Students' Association (PSSA) and the Students of the Philosophy Association (SoPhiA), with support from the Departments of Political Science and Philosophy, Arts and Science faculty and ASFA.

Speakers:

Dr. Keith Ansell-Pearson, Warwick University, England. **Dr. Babette Babich,** Fordham University, New York. **Dr. Lawrence Hatab,** Old Dominion University, Virginia. **Dr. Graham Parkes,** Cork University, Ireland. **Dr. Horst Hutter,** Concordia University. **Dr. Bela Egyed,** Concordia University. **Dr. Natalie Lachance,** McGill University. **Mr. Denis Madore,** Carleton University, Ottawa. **Mr. Eli Friedland,** McGill University. **Ms. Willow Verkerk,** Catholic University of Leuven, Holland. **Rainer J. Hanshe,** Nietzsche Circle, New York.

Details:

Workshops and Lectures will be held in rooms H-1220 and room H-767, Hall Building, 1455 De Maisonneuve Ouest.

Monday: 9:30-12:30, 14:00-18:00
Tuesday: 9:30-12:30, 14:00-18:00
Wednesday: 9:30-12:30

The complete program is available at: http://www.pssa.com and on Facebook. For more information, or to register for a workshop, email internal.pssa@gmail.com.

Brought to you by:

PSSA Concordia

SoPhiA
Students of the Philosophy Association

"Emblem" as Eternal Return

When functioning as the Eternal Return, the emblem may be a graphic illustration of how the past, the future, and the moment, though they contradict themselves, are all knotted together or entangled (*Ineinander*) and exist as a single entity. It is not possible to separate them. If one element is eliminated, the emblem ceases to function or collapses, which is to say the future does not exist without the past, the past does not exist without the future, and the moment does not exist apart from the past and the future. Both past and future hinge upon the moment, which is the gateway from where both shoot like arrows stretching backwards and forwards eternally only to return to the abyss from where they were originally jettisoned. Yet, for Nietzsche, there is no single past or single future, nor is there a single origin. Infinite recurrence entails endless causes. It is the complete and definitive victory of atheism in particular that will aid the severing of our ties to any single origin or first cause (GM: II §20; KSA 5, 330), and the Eternal Return is the ultimate and most powerful concept for severing any remaining tie to those origins. What differentiates the emblem as Eternal Return versus as *Augenblick* is that the former is the ecstatic *experience* of the *Augenblick*, which, as is evident from the narrative, the dwarf does not undergo. Instead of being actively involved in the *Augenblick*, he perceives it from a myopic perspective and therefore never falls into the well of eternity. For him, time is just one single circle instead of an infinite array of entwining circles, like fractals spinning out of one another, multiplying beyond our comprehension and grasp.

Thinking Nietzsche's Typography

"*Only the strongest can bend its bow so taut*— —" (BGE, "FHM: A"; KSA 5, 242).

These seemingly speculative interpretations will gain greater force through a close examination, which must in part be visual, of other moments in the narrative when Nietzsche uses each emblem. If the different interpretive suggestions offered above destabilize the plausibility of each single interpretation, these hypotheses should at very least generate receptivity to more ludic engagements with Nietzsche's typography. As stated above though, Nietzsche does not use the *Gedankenstrich* as a stable signifier. Let us however permit a friendly but firm oppositional voice to enter and protest: *Isn't it possible to read any triad into this emblem*? Answer: The emblem is distinctly characteristic of Nietzsche's thought due precisely to its protean and metamorphic qualities. It isn't reducible to a predetermined interpretive schema but forces us to read punctuation like gesture and feint, to remain vigilant readers who struggle to capture the divine lizard anew. Thus, each time we encounter it, we face a necessary interpretive anxiety that destabilizes us, plunging us into the groundless abyss between the *Gedankenstriche*. At that moment, our identity is fractured, and we become abyssal figures struggling to celebrate our way to evening, for that is our highest hope and the way to the new morning. Compelled to enter into a state of deep rumination, the inscrutable lizard, whose eyes are able to rotate in multiple directions, forces us to remain awake, to struggle to also hear with our eyes instead of continuing to read only with our ears as if we've clearly understood and incorporated

the event of the text with such ease. This isn't a matter of simple cognition.—

To propose one other interpretation, or alignment, it is probable that the emblem is to some degree analogous to Hölderlin's notion of *Innigkeit*. As that which unites things through holding them at a distance, *Innigkeit* seems related to the experience of the Eternal Return wherein the past and the future are brought together in the lightning flash of the *Augenblick* but remain separate, oscillating like two poles in tension around a magnetic center. Ansell-Pearson's characterization of the *Augenblick* as the situation "where time *qua* transience is conceived as the moment that both gathers and splits up the past and future,"[29] is reminiscent of *Innigkeit*, too. The —— is the direct confrontation of the separate eternities of the past and the future, which abut one another at the gateway yet are held apart, like wrestlers in agonistic engagement in a ring. One might call it *intimate estrangement*. It is a moment of perfection, an ecstatic unity wherein the entirety of the past and the already occurred future intimately flow together. "*Innigkeit* is not absorption of the external into the internal, but rather the indirect intimacy that, within limits, allows the poet a glimpse into life and grants the poet the joy of that glimpse, as well as the mourning of its loss."[30] This harmonization of all dissonances is the instantaneous moment of death,[31] a lightning flash wherein life ends and returns again without us ever noticing it, like the death of Zarathustra that has escaped the notice of so many commentators. It is the becoming perfect of the world, a tragic moment wherein joy and suffering are experienced as inextricable.

The Emblem and the Eternal Return Redux

Significantly, Nietzsche first uses the emblem in "Vom Gesicht und Räthsel," the presentation of the *vision* of the Eternal Return. It occurs in the second section of the chapter, during the confrontation at the gateway with the dwarf, which while dramatized as an actual encounter is in fact an *inner experience* or vision that erupts in Zarathustra's soul. As Shapiro has noted, "the term *Augenblick* often has a specifically visual sense or dimension" (2001, 20) and Nietzsche plays upon this in a myriad of ways not only throughout the entire book but also specifically in "Vom Gesicht und Räthsel."[32] The initial presentation of the Eternal Return is recounted as a visual riddle to Zarathustra's fellow passengers on board the ship that recently departed the Isles of the Blest but, in keeping with its esoteric character, Zarathustra

29 Keith Ansell-Pearson, "The Eternal Return of the Overhuman: The Weightiest Knowledge and the Abyss of Light" in *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, 30 (Autumn, 2005): 1-21. See 13.

30 Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, *Heidegger, Hölderlin, and the Subject of Poetic Language* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004): 139.

31 Deleuze outlines a similar movement of Eros to Thanatos in the progression from the second synthesis of time to the third. See "Repetition for itself" in *Difference and Repetition* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2004): 90-163.

32 The word eye (*Auge*) for instance is figured in many different ways and occurs in Parkes' translation over 160 times. There is however no listing for it in the index to his edition of the book. The word glance (*Blick*), which is also not listed in the index, occurs 21 times in his edition. In the original German edition, *Auge* and or cognates of it occur over 100 times and *Blick* and or cognates of it occur nearly 200 times. There are of course other more complex figurations of the visual throughout the text.

never once refers to it in name as the Eternal Return or Eternal Recurrence.[33] The task that Zarathustra sets for those "bold searchers, tempters, [and] experimenters . . . who are drunk with riddles" (Z: III.2 §2; KSA 4, 197) is to guess and interpret his visual riddle. It is, as Zarathustra says, a vision and a premonition, thus both inaudible and in a sense invisible, for visions are singular events and only perceptible to those who witness them. When transmitted orally as in the narrative and linguistically to us as readers, the vision loses some of its force as a vision if it is merely read as text, thus, it is all the more imperative to recall that it is a vision, which some if not many commentators ignore. *How* the concept is communicated is essential to the concept itself and our understanding of it. If riddles intoxicate, to wrestle with them is to engage with an ecstatic mode of knowing, and that demands the greatest perceptual effort, the introduction of intelligence into animality. Within the vision itself, the dwarf is challenged by Zarathustra to exert great perceptual effort in order to guess and interpret the gateway, an object he doesn't seem to see but to which Zarathustra has to direct his vision. Perception as Nietzsche observes isn't natural but an art that one must learn: "seeing needs practice and preschooling, and he who is fortunate enough will also find at the proper time a teacher of pure seeing" (D §497; KSA 3, 293).

Once aware of the gateway, the Spirit of Heaviness interprets it from his dwarfish perspective, reducing the sublime vision of the *Augenblick* to his circumscribing "evil" eye, which does not glance, but gazes in hegemonic imperiality as if its perspective were the only one. His is the leveling eye that blinks, the cold and dry eye of the scholar that strips every bird of its feathers (Z: IV.13 §9; KSA 4, 361). As Zarathustra implies however, the past and the future do not contradict themselves eternally: " 'But whoever shall walk farther on one of them—on and on, farther and farther: do you believe, dwarf, that these ways contradict themselves eternally?'—" In the gateway Moment, there is no contradiction of eternities or *Gesichter* as Nietzsche names them, employing a word that means both faces and visions. These visions or ways *do* come together at the gateway; it is just that no one has ever taken them to their end, which, since they are visions, is a *visual task*. One has to take them to the points at which they terminate *with one's eyes*, as does Zarathustra, whose eye is able to flee "from now to the past" (Z: II.20; KSA 4, 178) and to roam or to be cast into distances (Z: III.11 §2, KSA 4, 245; Z: IV.1, KSA 4, 298-99).[34] When he turns his eye inward, Zarathustra is said to resemble a person "looking into far distances" (Z: II.17; KSA 4, 165). Thus, Nietzsche indicates in several different ways that it is *the eye itself* that must traverse vast expanses of space, expanses that comprise eternities. This journey, as the latter passage denotes, is an inner perceptual journey. In the *Nachlaß*, Nietzsche seems to confirm this view when describing the alteration

33 Zarathustra's animals state that he is the teacher of the Eternal Recurrence (Z: III.13 §2; KSA 4, 275). "Der Genesende" is the first and only chapter where the phrase "eternal recurrence" appears in the book. "Eternal" and "recurrence" appear separately, but nowhere else together. The only other places where the phrase Eternal Recurrence occurs in the works published subsequent to Z are: TI, "Ancients" §§ 4, 5 (KSA 6, 159, 160) and EH, "Wise" 3 (KSA 6, 268), "The Birth of Tragedy" 3 (KSA 6, 313), and "Thus Spoke Zarathustra" §§ 1, 6 (KSA 6, 335, 345). In "Ancients" 4 (KSA 6, 159), Nietzsche uses "ewige Wiederkehr" whereas he uses "ewigen Wiederkunft" in the other sections. In GS §341 (KSA 3, 570), when first presenting the concept, Nietzsche does not use the phrase eternal return or eternal recurrence either.

34 Another version of this might perhaps be the act of what is in our century referred to as "remote viewing." For one source, see Russell Targ, Jane Katra, *Miracles of Mind: Exploring Nonlocal Consciousness & Spiritual Healing* (California: New World Library, 1999).

of the sensations of space and time. When that occurs, "tremendous distances are surveyed and, as it were, for the first time apprehended; the extension of vision over greater masses and expanses; the refinement of the organs for the apprehension of much that is extremely small and fleeting; *divination*, the power of understanding with only the least assistance, at the slightest suggestion: 'intelligent' *sensuality*—" (WP §800; KSA 13, 295). It is only with the strength of the most high-spirited, alive, and world-affirming human being's *spiritual eye* and insight that distance and space grows around man; at that moment, the "world becomes more profound" and "ever new stars, ever new riddles and *images*" at last become visible (BGE §57; KSA 5, 75).

The transmission of the teaching of the Overhuman may be predominantly perceptual, too. In the prologue, after attempting to present the teaching of the Overhuman to the people of the Motley Cow and failing, Zarathustra laments that he is not the mouth for those *specific* ears, then inquires to himself though it sounds more like a proclamation: " 'Must one first smash their ears before they learn to hear with their eyes?' " (Z: P §5; KSA 4, 18) This presages the climactic moment in "Der Genesende" when after summoning his abyss-deep thought from out of his depths Zarathustra commands it to hear with its eyes. Once that thought grasps his hand and refuses to let go, Zarathustra collapses and lies for seven days like a dead man.

> Hail to me! Come! Give me your hand— —ha! let go! Haha— —
>
> Disgust, disgust, disgust!— — —woe is me! (Z: III.13 §1; KSA 4, 271)

In his synaesthetic command, Zarathustra clearly indicates that the teaching of the Overhuman and the Eternal Return is something that is not accessible through any standard mode of consciousness, single sense, or "reason." Instead, it must also be *sensed* as opposed to strictly cogitated over; it must be apprehended synaesthetically, through Nietzsche's new mode of *sensus communis*, in a way wholly alien to our usual mode of sensing. When Zarathustra reveals that his sense does not speak *to the senses* of the people of the Motley Cow, it is clear that one's senses must be calibrated differently in order to receive his teaching. It is not that Zarathustra is a failure as a teacher as many protest, but that those who receive his teaching try to comprehend it via reason alone instead of thinking *and* sensing it. Now, let us glance at the illustration of the *Innigkeit* of the two eternities in "Vom Gesicht und Räthsel."

Here, in the very first presentation of the emblem in the book it functions as a dramatic visual or pictorial symbol of the gateway Moment and the two visions, "faces," or "paths":

> "And are not all things knotted together so tightly that this moment draws after it *all* things that are to come? *Thus*— —itself as well?" (Z: III.2 §2; KSA 4, 200)

It is evident from the placement of the emblem within this sentence that it is a

graphic or pictorial illustration of the *Augenblick*, something inaudible that cannot be pronounced and is to be heard only with the eyes. The first dash signifies a past, the second a future, and the abyss between them a moment, which is the propulsive force drawing itself and everything else after it.

The Invisible & the Inaudible: Zarathustra's Dialogue with his Soul

Another instance of Nietzsche's use of the emblem occurs in "Von der grossen Sehnsucht," a conversation that Zarathustra has with his soul directly after recovering from the experience of the Eternal Return in "Der Genesende." The emblem occurs twice in this chapter and the first usage of it is the most revealing if not dramatic. What must be emphasized about "Von der grossen Sehnsucht" is that, as a conversation between Zarathustra and his soul, it occurs *within* Zarathustra and is not visible or audible to the outside world. While as Parkes comments in his notes Nietzsche may be alluding to Plato's *Sophist* and the soul's silent conversation with itself, it seems more specifically that he is depicting the act of incubation. It is not that Zarathustra is merely sleeping when the serpent and the eagle discreetly steal away from him, but that he is in an incubatory state and free from rational control as he lies on the ground in perfect stillness. In "Mittags," Zarathustra also lies on the ground in secret in perfect stillness and though he falls asleep *his eyes remain open*. He reveals that sleep does not press his eyes closed and that it leaves his soul awake. In that sleeping but still wakened state he speaks to his heart in stillness and silence, outside the confines of rational discourse. It is during this particular *Augenblick* that Zarathustra experiences the flying away of time and falls into the well of eternity:

> 'Precisely the least, the softest, the lightest, a lizard's rustling, a breath, an instant, **a flickering eye-glance**—*a little* makes for the *best* happiness. Still!
>
> '—What happened to me: hearken! Did time just fly away? Am I not falling? Did I not fall—hearken! into the well of eternity?
>
> '—What is happening to me? Still! I am stung—woe—in the heart? In the heart! O shatter, shatter, heart, after such happiness, after such a sting!
>
> '—What? Did the world not just become perfect? Round and ripe? Oh the golden round hoop—whither does it fly? Do I run after it! Quick!
>
> 'Still— — (and here Zarathustra stretched himself and felt that he was sleeping). (Z: IV.10; KSA 4, 343, translation augmented)

As Zarathustra knows, "The greatest events—those are not our loudest but our stillest hours" (Z: II.18; KSA 4, 169): the softest, the lightest, a lizard's rustling, a breath, etc. It is around what is inaudible and invisible that the world revolves, not around the bluster made or worshipped by the flies of the marketplace.— Again, this is not a matter of quotidian cognition. To confront the lizard is to confront a wholly

different kind of thinking and sensing.

After being instructed in the previous chapter by his animals to speak no further but instead to fashion a lyre and to sing and foam over in order to heal his soul, Zarathustra ceases speaking and does not speak again until the fourth book. His conversation with his soul is an inaudible inner dialogue as the final chapters that close the third book are both *songs sung in silence*. Zarathustra himself states that singing is the comfort that he has devised for himself and the making of the Eternal Recurrence into a hurdy-gurdy song by his animals his convalescence (Z: III.13 §2; KSA 4, 275).[35] "Das andere Tanzlied" is sung to Life and "Die sieben Siegel" is sung to Eternity. It is therefore highly probable that the last three chapters of the book occur in complete silence while Zarathustra is incubating. If as Loeb proposes the fourth book takes place *within* the third,[36] then the narrative of *Zarathustra* ends with a series of dithyrambic songs that are sung in silence within Zarathustra's soul as he is in an incubatory state. Further weight is lent to this possibility by the fact that there is no indication in the narrative that Zarathustra ever ended the state of wide-awake sleep that his animals left him in.[37] In that state, he informs his soul that he has given it new names, including 'Fate,' 'Circumference of Circumferences,' 'Umbilical Cord of Time,' and 'Azure Bell.' He also informs his soul "there is nowhere a soul that would be more loving and more comprehensive and encompassing! Where," he asks, "would future and past be closer together than in you?" To state this is to proclaim that the future and the past exist within us, or that the soul is the place where they are more closely entangled than anywhere else. The soul, which is equal to the body for Nietzsche (Z: I.4; KSA 4, 39), is then where time is experienced and or where we can gain power over it.[38]

If that is the case, how are the past and the future to be *experienced* in the soul-body? What is it that releases the future and the past from their quotidian contradictoriness and draws them together in tension while simultaneously holding

35 In referring to his animals as pranksters and smiling at them, Zarathustra responds to them differently than he does to the dwarf. He also says that they *know well* what comforts he devised during his inner journey, which further indicates that his judgment of their interpretation is not negative. Prankster is I believe a positive figuration. Zarathustra never refers to the superior humans as pranksters but as jesters when they misunderstand his teaching, thus aligning them with the character of the jester. The only other use of the word pranksters is in "Das Honig-Opfer" and it has a positive valence. It is used to refer to the animals after they claim that Zarathustra is "lying in a sky-blue lake of happiness." " 'You pranksters,' Zarathustra replied and laughed. 'How well you chose that image!" (Z: IV.1; KSA 4, 298-299) See footnote 44 below for another proposal on the animals.

36 See Paul S. Loeb, "The Conclusion of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*" in *International Studies in Philosophy*, 32/3 (2000): 137-152.

37 Sleep and wakefulness are important motifs in *Zarathustra* but they have not received sufficient analysis and I am at work on a paper concerning them. "On the Professorial Chairs of Virtue" is a key chapter regarding this and it resounds in multivalent ways throughout the book. How Zarathustra sleeps is different from how all others sleep: his is a wide-awake form of "sleep" (he often talks to himself in his sleep, receives visions in his sleep, etc.), lucid dreaming perhaps, and his wisdom and virtue is of the kind that *keeps him from sleeping comfortably*. Zarathustra sleeps on a hard pallet in his cave, a place of incubation, and is in an almost continuous state of vigilance throughout the book. For a recent philosophical examination of sleep, see Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Fall of Sleep* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009). Unfortunately, if not oddly, Nietzsche does not figure in this work.

38 For an astute and thorough exploration of gaining power over time, see Paul S. Loeb, "Finding the Übermensch in Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morality*" in *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, 30 (Autumn 2005): 70-101.

them apart in intimate estrangement?

> —your great releaser, O my soul, the nameless— —for whom only future songs will find names! And verily, your breath is already fragrant with future songs—
>
> —already you glow and dream, already you drink thirstily from all deep resounding comfort-wells, already your heavy heart reposes in the blissfulness of future songs!— —

It is the nameless — — that is the "great releaser" or "vintner, who waits with his diamond vintner's knife" to *cut* the soul-body, which Zarathustra compares to a vine, and *release* it so that the past and the future can dance together within it. As Alenka Zupančič notes, "Nietzsche's eternity refers not to the endless circling of time, but to those rare moments when this circularity *appears*, becomes tangible for us in the encounter of two temporalities—the encounter that distinguishes the event as such."[39] This is the becoming perfect of the world or *Innigkeit*, an ecstatic event wherein the soul is *released* like wine shooting forth from grapevines in an ecstatic explosion. And it is the act of being released (*Löser* or *Herauslasse*) that Nietzsche sets over and against the act of *Erlösung* (redemption). Nietzsche uses the word *Erlösung* (redemption) nine times within *Zarathustra* while he uses *Löser*, a coinage that in German is not common, only in the chapter "Von der grossen Sehnsucht" (KSA 4, 280).[40] Intriguingly, this is also the single appearance of the word *Löser* in his entire published corpus. Similarly, *Löser*, which essentially means 'absolver' or 'freedom giver,' occurs in at least one note in the *Nachlaß*. "*Herauslasse*," which Parkes also translates as "release," is used in "Auf dem Ölberge" to refer to the releasing of the "Heavens." This is the only appearance of the word *Herauslasse* in Nietzsche's entire published corpus—these specific unique word usages have not been pointed out until now.[41] If a philosopher's frequent use of a word can indicate its degree of importance to the thinker, the rare and very specific usage of a word can indicate an equal if not even greater degree of importance. Finally, in "Von alten und neuen Tafeln," Nietzsche uses the word "*los*" ("und die Welt los-") to refer to the release and "unrestrained and fleeing back" of the world to itself. It is when describing "the nameless — —" as the "great releaser" of the soul that Nietzsche uses the coinage *Löser*. And in the *Nachlaß*, Nietzsche declares, "I teach you release from the eternal flow, the stream that flows back into itself again and again, and you enter the same stream again and again, as the Same" (*Nachlabß*, Winter 1882, KSA 10, 205, 5 [1] 160). What might we make of this notion of release?

After Zarathustra cultivates his soul with sun, night, silence, and yearning, it grows so ripe that it is ready to perish. While playing on his new lyre, Zarathustra

39 Alenka Zupančič, *The Shortest Shadow* (Boston: MIT Press, 2003): 21.

40 It is possible that Nietzsche bases the coinage of *Löser* on *ho lysios*, the cult name of Dionysus, as a way of invoking Dionysus. See footnote 42.

41 Nietzsche does use *Herauslassen* in D §337 and in GM: III §7, but he uses the word in both passages in its common sense whereas the use of *Herauslasse* in Z is conceptual and rather distinct.

sings to his soul: "You grape-vine! Why do you praise me? *I have cut you after all!* I am cruel, you are bleeding—what means your praise of my drunken cruelty? 'What has become perfect, all that is ripe—wants to die!' thus you speak. Blessèd, blessèd be the vintner's knife! But all that is unripe wants to live: woe!" (Z: IV.19 §9, emphasis added) The cutting of the soul-body by the nameless — — is an ecstatic Dionysian event that cannot be reduced to words. To undergo this passionate incision is to be released from the eternal flow and to be thrust back into it again and again.[42] It is not *Erlösung* that humanity needs, or which Zarathustra offers, but *Löser*, and Dionysus is the god who offers release. For Nietzsche, "the *infinitely small moment* is the highest reality and truth, a lightning-image that emerges from the eternal river" (KSA 9, 11 [156]), and that highest reality and truth is reached through Dionysian experiences. As Marsden characterizes it, in soaring from self-presence, Zarathustra "voraciously lusts for the ring of recurrence and in his rapture it is the body that is undone," or, *cut*. "Yet this is not a flight from the body, rather a re-encountering of corporeality at a physiological frequency different to that of the day and its regular pulse of the 'clock in the head.' "[43] It is in the incubatory state of stillness that Zarathustra experiences precisely such physiological frequencies, which are completely different than those experienced during his regular waking hours—they are the frequencies of his new *sensus communis*, the frequencies of a synaesthetic epistemology. " 'Inexpressible and nameless," declares Zarathustra, "is that which is torment and delight to my soul and is even the hunger of my entrails, too.' May your virtue be too lofty for the familiarity of names' " (Z: I.5). Due to the extraordinary intensity of this sublime incident, which is the most exalted and superior event one can experience, signifying it with speech would only be reductive. Instead, it is graphically represented by the nameless — —, which is perhaps symbolic of the very cut vine that releases the past and the present within the body. When experiencing the release of the light-abyss of the Heavens, which makes Zarathustra "shudder with godlike desires" (Z: III.4; KSA 4, 207), he does not speak for he knows too many things. He as well as the Heaven he beholds is mutually silent; instead of speaking they "smile their knowing to one another." The cleverest of the silent are also "those who are clear, and upright, and transparent . . . for their ground is so *deep* that even the clearest water does not—betray them—" (Z: III.6; KSA 4, 218), as the nameless — —, despite its striking clarity, did not betray itself until today.

Conclusion: On Listening

When whispering into Life's ear, it now seems necessary to ask, is Zarathustra whispering into her ear, or is he whispering into her *eye*? If Zarathustra also

42 In "Die dionysische Weltanschauung" Nietzsche speaks of Dionysus with his cult name, ο λυσιος [*ho lysios*], which means 'he who gives release': "The god *ho lysios* has transformed everything, redeemed and released everything from itself" ["Der Gott ο λυσιος [*ho lysios*] hat alles von sich erlöst, alles verwandelt"] (DW 1). Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Dionysiac World-view" in *The Birth of Tragedy And Other Writings*, tr. Ronald Spiers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 123.

43 Jill Marsden, "Lunar Rapture: Nietzsche's Religion of the Night Sun" in *Nietzsche and the Divine*, eds. Jim Urpeth, John Lippitt (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000): 252-268. See 258.

commands his soul to listen to time flying away as well as to him falling into the well of eternity, it can only listen to those events with its eyes. The issue of which organ one actually hears with throws into question everything that is heard in the book. If writing and print have "reduced the oral-aural world to a world of visualized pages,"[44] then by imploring us to hear with our eyes Nietzsche is, in both senses of the word, amplifying a logos that has been confined to print through a sight that hears. Through his gesture, he seeks to recuperate the auditory dimension of logos. For if sight isolates and sound incorporates,[45] then in imbuing his text with auditory qualities, in compelling us to hear it with our eyes as if we were reading sheet music, Nietzsche constructs his text so that it is not something that one just reads but *incorporates* specifically through hearing. His text possesses the immediacy of performed music, and he wants it to be digested, embodied, and taken into our very *physis* as only music can.

From now on it is necessary to ask whether each passage that is spoken in the book is heard not only with the ear but also with the eye. Further, when Nietzsche asks if we have heard him, is it not the eye that he wants to be heard with, too? If we have misunderstood him, is it not in part because of our lack of training, of our refusal to learn from the teacher of pure seeing or immaculate perception? When Zarathustra and the Last Pope converse, the latter says that they speak in confidence, *under their three eyes only* (Z: IV.6; KSA 4, 323). If Being wants to become word and Becoming wants to learn from Zarathustra how to speak, down there, in the abyss of solitude, where all is still and silent in the act of incubation, "all talking is in vain!" (Z: III.9; KSA 4, 232). Are not words made for those who are heavy? Do they not lie for those who are light? (Z: III.16 §7; KSA 4, 291) Words are not heard, but spoken without voice and seen—does that not recall Nietzsche's "moral code for deaf-mutes and other philosophers" (TI, "Skirmishes" §26; KSA 6, 128)? If, as Nietzsche believed, music liberates the spirit and gives wings to thought, if "one becomes more of a philosopher the more one becomes a musician" (FWag §1; KSA 6, 14), must he not sing and speak no more, at least when communicating profound experiences? Yet, when the world becomes perfect, singing too is to be refrained from, even if the songs one sings are sung within oneself in silence— —"Verily, *with different eyes*, my brothers, shall I then seek my lost ones; with a different love shall I then love you" (Z: I.22 §3, emphasis added; KSA 4, 101-102).[46]

44 Walter J. Ong, *Orality and Literacy* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006): 73.

45 Ibid., 71. Ong posits that while "sight situates the observer outside what he views, at a distance, sound pours into the hearer." Vision, he asserts, quoting Merleau-Ponty, dissects. If this is true of hegemonic sight, or the gazing eye, Nietzsche's glancing eye is perspectival and certainly makes for a less distant observer. While sight for Nietzsche is not a cold dissecting sight, sight remains sight and Nietzsche imbues his texts with auditory or musical qualities too, for, to him, logos is also musical. As should be clear though, Nietzsche is not an ocularcentric thinker for vision is not the only paradigm of knowledge that is of value to him—*all* the senses are for him paradigms of knowledge. Heidegger further pursues the overcoming of the metaphysics of vision, but we still seem to be mired in Cyclopean epistemologies.

46 Nietzsche emphasizes the importance of this line through making it the epigraph to the second part of the book. In his footnotes, Parkes includes an excerpt from a letter Nietzsche sent to Peter Gast wherein he states that "from this motto there emerge—it is almost unseemly to say this to a musician—different harmonies and modulations from those of Part One. The main thing was to *swing oneself up to the second level*—in order from there to reach the *third'* (*B* 13 July 1883). In the epigraph to the third book, Nietzsche speaks of a figure who, after reaching an extraordinarily sublime height is able to laugh at the tragic, at all tragic plays and tragic wakes, which may be the third level he mentions to Gast. Is that to become a comedian of the ascetic ideal? To become Hanswurst? Or to become pranksters like Zarathustra's

It is reasonable to assume that, although Nietzsche wanted to be understood—evident in part through his oft-repeated question, *Hat man mich verstanden?*—he was equally wary of any too immediate accommodation of his thought. To other '*edle Geister*,' Nietzsche communicates through less explicit and indirect modes of writing as well as through his new mode of *sensus communis*. It is in this way too that one may interpret *Also sprach Zarathustra* as a book for "nobody." After all, not all are bridges to the *Übermensch*, to an altogether different "everyone" of the future, and not all have trained themselves to become synaesthetic epistemologists. Nietzsche's book is addressed to those whose virtue is too lofty for any familiar names, for those whose torment and delight are inexpressible and evade conceptualization. The synaesthesia demanded of words that speak through silence relates to Nietzsche's strategic employment of *Gedankenstriche*, especially of the double configuration of the tensely spaced dashes as an emblem. In the abyssal silence of the *Augenblick*, emblematized by the dashes, lies the invisible and inaudible revolution or *Umwertung* of the world. It is through that moment that we unite with eternity in intimate estrangement; that moment is the becoming perfect of the world in which we take creative part. To hear that silence is, then, to learn that there is more "reason" in our bodies than in our finest wisdom. To hear that silence is to seek with the eyes of the senses and to listen with the ears of the spirit, to experience what Nietzsche calls "true ecstasies of learning" (EH, "Books" 3).

Dedication: To the Laughing One

animals, who are able to make a hurdy-gurdy song of even the Eternal Return??? Or?—

2nd Nietzsche Symposium in Jyväskylä, Finland

AFTER NIETZSCHEAN NARRATIVES:
BIOGRAPHY, HISTORY, POETICS AND PHILOSOPHY
Organized by
the Hungarian Studies Program, Jyväskylä University

Honorary Patron:
Professor GARY SHAPIRO (University of Richmond, USA)

Keynote speakers:
Professor TARMO KUNNAS (Jyväskylä University, Finland)
RAINER J. HANSHE (Graduate Center, City University of New York; Nietzsche Circle, USA)
Professor JARMO VALKOLA (Tallinn University, Estonia)
Professor CAMELIA ELIAS (Roskilde University, Denmark)
dr. PATRICIO BRICKLE (The Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaiso, Chile)

Participants:
dr. Adrián BENE (Pécs University, Hungary),
ANTHONY DURITY (NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND, GALWAY),
Mohsen EMADI (JYU), Kristóf FENYVESI (JYU),
Jaana JANHILA-ANTTONEN (JYU), Sándor KLAPCSIK (JYU),
Noémi LŐRINCZ (JYU), Phd Risto NIEMI-PYNTTÄRI (JYU),
Giovanna di ROSARIO (JYU), Henna SEINÄLÄ (JYU),
Filip SIKORSKI (Helsinki University, Finland), Taneli VIITALA (JYU)

17 March: Conference Sessions from 2 PM to 8 PM at JT 120 Juomatehdas
18 March: Conference Sessions from 9 AM to 12 PM at JT 120 Juomatehdas

18 March, 3 – 6 PM
Writer's House (Seminaarinkatu 26 B, Jyväskylä)
THE DIONYSIAN LABYRINTH
A LITERARY FESTIVAL 'AFTER NIETZSCHEAN NARRATIVES'
Hosts: Jaana JANHILA-ANTTONEN and Risto NIEMI-PYNTTÄRI

Full Program is Available at www.kristoffenyvesi.hu
under the 'Nietzsche Symposium' Menu.

Organizer and Contact: Kristóf Fenyvesi, PhD Student,
Hungarian Studies, Jyväskylä University
fenyvesi.kristof@gmail.com

The Agonist
A Nietzsche Circle Journal

Not a bad metaphysics, eh?

An Interview with Oruç Aruoba
conducted by Yunus Tuncel
and Rainer Hanshe

Though he trenchantly refers to himself as "only a writer of sentences," Oruç Aruoba is not only a respected writer he is also a prolific translator of poetry and philosophy into Turkish. His first translation, David Hume's *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, was published the year he gained his master's degree. Aside from translating books of Hume, Nietzsche, Rilke and others, he has made compilations of Celan, Kant, and even Basho, making him one of the few philosopher-poets to navigate both in Western and Eastern waters. His translation of Basho, *kelebek düşleri* (Butterfly Dreams), is his most recent (Istanbul: Metis, 2008). He also has the honor of being the first translator of Wittgenstein's works into Turkish, including the *Tractatus*, and selections from his *Vermischte Bemerkungen*.

Born in 1948 in a farmhouse across from the sea in Karamürsel, Turkey, Aruoba is the son of Muazzez Kaptanoglu, a poet/novelist/journalist, and Fahir Aruoba, one of the last representatives of a traditionally military family. After his family moved to Ankara, he studied psychology at Hacettepe University, which is where he also earned his Ph.D. in philosophy, writing his dissertation on Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein. While at Hacettepe, he was an assistant to İoanna Kuçuradi (*Max Scheler ve Nietzsche'de Trajik*, *Nietzsche ve İnsan*, *Schopenhauer ve İnsan*, etc., UNESCO Chair of Philosophy of Human Rights), who introduced him to Nietzsche. At Tubingen, he was a student of logicist Bruno Baron von Freytag-Loringhoff, Ernest Bloch, and others. From 1973 onwards he taught at Hacettepe, Tübingen and Victoria-Wellington universities. When studying at the Goethe Institute in Germany in 1976, Aruoba intended on visiting Heidegger, but the philosopher died during the second week of his arrival. Though Turkish bios of Aruoba we found neglect to note this, through our personal correspondence with him we learned that he worked as an 'apprentice' in the craft of writing and translating under renowned writer Bilge Karasu, who is often referred to as the 'sage of Turkish literature.' Ending his academic career and severing all ties with such institutions in 1983 because of the military regime of 1980 (the year of one of Tur-

key's worst coups) and the YÖK-administration it brought to the universities (he could have easily died as an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy), Aruoba settled in İstanbul Kanatlarımın Altında and worked in different publishing houses as a director and editor. He was also a member of a publishing committee and served as a publishing consultant. His works have appeared in numerous journals including *Free Man*, *Text*, *Formation*, and *East-West*, and he also made and conducted a radio program for Açık (94.9) called "Philosopher's Gossip" (*Filozof Dedikoduları*).

Aruoba is the author of numerous books, including *uzak* (far), *yakın* (near), *yürüme* (walking), *kesik esin/tiler* (broken muses), *ol/an*, (be/ing), *Geç Gelen Ağıtlar* (belated elegies), and *sayıklamalar* (Deliriums), amongst others. As noted on Metis, his publisher's website, his works have "played a pivotal role in familiarizing younger generations in Turkey with philosophy by giving it new life outside the strict confines of the academy," yet, Aruoba never panders to the timely whims of his age and, as this interview will make clear, he is not prone to concessions of any kind, nor does he mince words. If this mere writer of sentences has given philosophy a new life outside its ivory confines, it is certainly not through diluting, popularizing, or compromising it in any way.

Aruoba lives in Turkey and continues to work as an independent writer when not tending to his dogs and cats. His most recent book of poems is *Meşe Fısıltıları* (Oak Whisperings). When we contacted him to discuss his work as a poet and translator and engage in a dialogue with him, he generously agreed. The interview below is the result of a series of e-mails dispatched throughout 2009, spanning New York, Leigné-sur-Ussau, Gümüşlük, and Istanbul.

Translation Work

Q: *Your translations clearly reflect a diversity of interests: into Turkish you have translated books of Hume, Nietzsche, Rilke, von Hentig, Wittgenstein, and made compilations of Celan, Kant and Basho. In your own books, there are translations from Spinoza, Herakleitos, Hegel, Nietzsche, Shelley, Arnold, Dowson, Pound, e.e. cummings, Stefan George, Rilke, Hölderlin and many others as epigraphs. In translating this broad scope of material, all of which is certainly challenging, you must have developed particular viewpoints about translation. What can you articulate of your own translation practices and your relation to other views of it, such as Benjamin's?*

A: The epigraphs (mottoes, I would call them) are easy to explain: In the course of my writing I encountered sayings—sentences—of other writers, which were sometimes much better renderings of my thoughts—these I adopted as mottoes. Further others are from texts I had read *before* I wrote and hadn't registered as such. At one point I had to compile a historical 'Retrospective Source Index' for one of my books (*yer, yön, yol,* in the volume *yürüme*) with quotations from other writers, which contained the relevant concepts ("place", "direction", "way") dealt with in the book. I did this as a sort of tribute, and perhaps also to show that I was not the first and only writer who had treated of these issues.

I don't recall reading Benjamin on translation; but, in general I think 'theories' of translation are both useless, and in the long run, harmful to the practice of translation itself. It is alright for academicians to ruminate about pseudo-concepts like 'object-language', etc, but all of that is neither here nor there when it comes to going into the work and doing it. —I never tried to 'theorize' about translation; I just did it...

Q: *It's not so much a theory of translation we have in mind but more a* method, *or certain viewpoints, even things that you* don't *do. Benjamin's essay was surely not a strictly academic exercise but born of his own experience translating Proust and Baudelaire. To him, real translations are transparent, meaning they don't obscure the original, nor obstruct its light, but allow "the pure language, as though reinforced by its own medium, to shine upon the original all the more fully. This may be achieved, above all," he avows, "by a literal rendering of the syntax which proves words rather than sentences to be the primary element of the translator. For if the sentence is the wall before the language of the original, literalness is the arcade."*

A: I don't know the full article, but I don't agree with the "syntax ... proves words rather than sentences to be the primary element" bit. That "rather" is wrong. The sentence *is* the "primary element" of translation, simply because it is the "primary element" of writing itself, of constructing meaning. Also, words have meaning only as components of a sentence; the "wall/arcade" metaphor does not work—"literalness", O.K.; but, syntax, too, is meaningful only in the framework of the sentence...

Q: *What compelled you to make the translations you have?*

A: Nothing 'compelled' me—except perhaps, like, "This is wonderful; people should read this in Turkish" sort of feeling—; but, more soberly, at one stage in the writing of my first academic texts, I realized that I was writing—in Turkish, naturally—things that could be understood only by people who could read the relevant books in their originals —which—I thought—I was doing ... So, what to do? I decided (at least at my doctoral dissertation ("The Relationality of Objects", dealing with Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein); maybe earlier, at my M.A. thesis on Hume) to translate the relevant texts of the philosophers I was writing on, before publishing my own texts on them. —Well, I managed to finish and publish Hume and Wittgenstein; but Kant, I couldn't (except for a compilation from the *Opus postumum*); so, I haven't published those academic texts up to now.

Q: *What attracted you to Hans von Hentig? Did someone ask you to translate him or was the impetus your own?*

A: He's *Hartmut* von Hentig—a couple of my friends, the van Gents—a Hollander/Swiss and his Greek wife—, Werner and Amalia, gave the book (*Paff der Kater*) to me as a Christmas gift, saying, "You will understand"— —I did... I don't think they *expected* me to translate it.[1]

Q: *What did you "understand"? And what more can you say of von Hentig's work, which is probably largely unknown to English readers?*

1 In biographical listings of Aruoba, von Hentig's first name was not listed. There is however a connection between the two: Hans von Hentig, a criminologist, was Hartmut's paternal uncle.

A: To me too… I have read only a sprinkling of his extensive professional writings on education and educational institutions. From what I understand, von Hentig is (was—I hope he's still alive— —I never could meet him, had only a telephone conversation with him, just after he had gone back to Germany from a holiday in Istanbul), a veritable force at the crucial position the German *Volk* found itself at, in the aftermath of NAZI Germany as the perpetrator of the greatest human crime in recent history: von Hentig tried to bring the German consciousness to an understanding and reckoning—*not* reconciliation—with this fact, with his writings and institutionalizations on/of Education.

My translation—what I "understood" from the small gift book—was merely the account he had written many years later—in his old age—of his relationship with a cat in his youth, with which he had lived at Chicago during, or just before, or just after (?) the last war, while writing his doctoral dissertation on Ancient Greek texts. The book is, *Paff der Kater/oder, wenn wir lieben* [when we care]…[2]

I should be surprised that there is no English translation— —it is a very profoundly austere and sincere text, brilliantly written…

Q: *Valéry attests that the translators who were skilled in transposing the ancients into our language are who raised poetry to its highest point. "Their poetry," he said, "bears the mark of this practice. It is a translation, a* faithless beauty*—faithless to what is not in accord with the exigencies of a pure language." Has working on translations affected or changed how you write poetry or prose? Do you think your writing contains the trace of your translation practices?*

A: Of course—you know that it does— —in asking that question you are merely prodding me on to elucidate a metaphysics of language and meaning… O.K., here goes: I think I understand what Valéry could have meant by "pure language". Chomsky too has something, which (if I remember correctly) he calls "universal grammar". Wittgenstein, of course, tries to grasp the roots of meanings which cannot be "said", i.e. *put to* language, but can be "shown"—seen—*with* language.

I think translating enables one to cultivate such an ability: to see the (O.K.) "pure" meaning *behind* the actual sentences you have in front of you. That ability is what we put to use when we "philosophize"; and, to be able to write those meanings in a 'concrete' language with 'imagery', etc. is what we call "poetry". So I am saying, in a way, that "philosophy" and "poetry" are fundamentally—*mutatis mutandis*—the same activity, and, further, that doing translation is somehow akin to this fundamental activity, as a 'meaning-transferring-activity'. Think of what you do when you compare a translated sentence with its original—or, better, two or more translations of an original in a language you *don't* know. I encountered this sort of thing while comparing translations of Kierkegaard into other languages, and while trying to translate Basho from translations. The "pure meaning" would sometimes 'come into focus', so to speak, behind the actual texts—I am tempted to say, 'without language'… (Not a bad metaphysics, eh? …)

Q: *You have translated* Der Antichrist *and* Dionysos-Dithyramben *as well as Nietzsche's "Lenzer Heide" notebook and his essay on "*Lüge*" into Turkish. The painter*

2 This was translated into English in 1983 and published by Fjord Press of Seattle, Washington as *Poff the Cat, or When We Care.*

Francis Bacon said that it is near to impossible to translate poetry—only when the translator is a real writer, a great writer does he believe a real translation occurs. Do you think that holds true for prose, too? And what were some of the particular challenges you encountered when translating Nietzsche?

A: If I bring my above 'metaphysics' to bear on this question: Of course no actual sentence (prose or poetry) can be rendered *as such* in another language. (Western languages seem to be privileged in this respect, because after centuries of interaction, thanks partly to Latin, it seems to be easier to obtain convenient correspondences, say, between French and English, or Italian and French; but these too can be deceptive—think of the rubbish produced by computer translation-programs… But the "pure sentence"—*that* can be translated (i.e. re-written) in any language, as far as the translator is able. I don't know about being a "great" writer, but the translator must of course be a "real" writer of sorts himself, to be a good translator. An excellent case in point is Celan's poetry translations into German from almost all European languages—of course, from—themselves—"great" poets. For, the "greater" a writer is, the clearer (that is *not* to say, easier) is the "pure" meaning contained in his writings—that's almost a tautology…

Now, Nietzsche is *the* writer—put in a favorite idiom of his—*par excellence*. What would that mean? …

We have to take another look at—revise our view of—the so-called 'History of Philosophy': Writers of philosophy, i.e. philosophers (not cud-chewer academicians who easily call themselves that…) went out of existence at Hegel—actually, Kant was the last one before Hegel, but the latter tried to salvage something from the wreckage the former had wrought—tried to transfer philosophy from being 'the love of wisdom' to being wisdom itself—being "science"… Thereby—becoming also Professor of Philosophy (and "Member of the Royal Mineralogical Society" *(sic.!)* and "other learned communities"…)—he paved the way of the henceforth 'professionals' of philosophy—academic philosophers… Whereas Nietzsche blocked that way, once and for all and for good: both with his—wayward (?) *and* undeniable (?), *and* intangible (?)—'theories' (*Wille zur Macht, ewige Widerkehr, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, etc*…), and with his incisive criticism of almost all—actual and possible—'theories' to be advocated in the name of philosophy—all sorts of 'metaphysics'…

Now: translating Nietzsche: As *the* writer, what he does in his writing is to bend and twist language to accommodate his thinking; i.e. *not* to 'use' language to 'express' an idea, but to *form* a sentence *by* an idea. The 'mechanism' of this feat is, naturally, syntax, i.e. the procession of words—concepts—in a sentence. Thus, a sentence of Nietzsche's, *thinks in itself*. Now, two disciples of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Wittgenstein, have learned this feat from him—though Heidegger somewhat overdoes it… Wittgenstein notes something like, "I think with my pen, for my brain does not know anything about what I write, before I write it."

Therefore, while translating Nietzsche, what one is to be careful about is the syntax, even above grammar. (Finding correspondences to individual words is another matter.) Turkish, being a very 'flexible' language, is able in most cases to follow what German does—or, rather, what Nietzsche does *with* German…

Q: *What led you to translate the* Antichrist *and the* Dionysian Dithyrambs*? Were the*

choices personal? The decision to translate those two books in particular is intriguing.

A: Yes, of course I chose them, because they were the last books Nietzsche wrote and wanted to publish, but couldn't, and were distortingly published, *posthum*. (I would have liked to translate *Ecce Homo* also, which belongs in the same category; but it was already brilliantly translated by Can Alkor.) *Antichrist* was willfully censured and distorted by the evil sister; the *Dithyramben* was not published according to his plan at all—all until the pioneering work of Podach, which was afterwards taken over by Colli and Montinari.

Now, by "last" I don't only mean 'terminal', but 'conclusive', in the sense that Nietzsche in a way concentrates all his previous accumulated thinking and intellectual methods—not to mention his achieved brilliance as writer—in these texts. *Antichrist* is e.g. his interconnectedly longest ('single-breath') text, even above each of the three "Essays" making up the *Genealogy*. And *Dithyramben* is the epitome of his poetry, in a way transversing all his life-experience, turned into imagery.

Q: *Do you know how the first translation into Turkish of* Also sprach Zarathustra *was received? And did you ever consider translating* Zarathustra*? While some Turks may have read him in German, or in French or other translations, the event of translating Nietzsche into a non-Christian and non-Western language certainly seems significant. If even today certain websites that feature Nietzsche's writings are not accessible in Turkey, and I have experienced that myself, his announcement of the death of God must have been controversial.*

A: I don't know—that was before I was born… But, the first full translation (there was at least one partial translation before that) was by a haywire professor of medicine educated in Germany, and later by a philosophy student (a class-mate of my teacher İoanna Kuçuradi), who later became an important playwright. The former knew German, but understood nothing about Nietzsche or philosophy; the latter translated it from Hollingdale's English—he didn't know German… The latter was first published by the Ministry of Education… At present there are five translations of *Zarathustra* in Turkish.

Yes, I did start translating it, but something personal happened that induced me to abandon it.

Now, the "death of god" presented no great problem for the Turkish reader, because, obviously, what Nietzsche meant was the *Christian* god, not *Allah*… About the forbidden websites—are you sure? I know of a lot of forbidden—prohibited, access hindered—sites, but none of Nietzsche…

Q: *As for the idea of God dying, even if Nietzsche speaks specifically of the Christian God dying, he of course suggests the possibility of the death of other gods. And Islam is the last of the salvific Abrahamic religions, the further or final revelation of the very same monotheistic God. In the Arabic translation of* Also sprach Zarathustra*, "Gott" is rendered as "Allah" or "Rabb." Ali Mosbah rendered the phrase "God is dead" as "Inna' allaha qad Mat." Nietzsche surely meant for it to resonate beyond strictly the "Christian God."*

A: Of course; what I meant was that to Turkish ears it didn't sound so blasphemous, because of the Christian connotation. Then again, (at least in *Zarathustra*) it is not only a remark on the Christian "God", but on the conception of a single ('mono-') god—remember all the gods dying of laughter because one of them proclaimed himself the only god…

I know Arabic only from what has infused into Turkish; but I think to translate *Gott* as *Allah* is wrong; because that's a proper name, like the Jewish *Jehovah*. There's the word *ilah* for "god"(*deity*) in Arabic—and according to Islam, *La ilahe ill'Allah*: Of all the gods, *Allah* is the only [one]… "Mat" is interesting too—in Turkish it is used in chess, when the King (*Shah*, from the Persian) is "checkmated": *Şah-mat*… *Mat [olmak]* is also current as '[being] vanquished/ enabled/ useless'…

I can only wish Mosbah Godspeed…

Q: *Are there Turkish or Ottoman thinkers that made a remotely similar critique of religion to that of Nietzsche's? What of Beşir Fuad, Baha Tevfik, or Celâl Nuri?*

A: Answering that question might lead us into a history that would hardly interest your readers; but let me make a few points: In the Ottoman intellectual milieu, being a "*filozof*" meant being an atheist. Now, towards the end of the Empire, and at the beginnings of the Republic (after 1900, up to 1940), some defiant writers—mostly early Marxists—with a grudge against religion and an inclination to secularism, drew on the first sprinklings of Nietzsche then rampant in Europe. They didn't get too far, though…

Q: *One of the concerns of the Stanford University Press edition of the complete works of Nietzsche, which Alan Schrift and Keith Ansell-Pearson are editing, is maintaining a degree of translation consistency in order to retain the specificity of Nietzsche's word choices. For Nietzsche scholarship in English, as in all languages into which he is translated, this is of great importance, especially when many readers only encounter writers in translation, which is clearly not the purest encounter with a writer. Is there a concordance among the Turkish translators on the translation of key terms that Nietzsche uses? What do you think of other Turkish translations of Nietzsche's works?*

A: Now, before I learned German, I had read almost all the then (1960's) existing English translations: The Faber (?) Works, Hollingdale, Kaufmann… When I was able—to flatter myself—to read him in the original, I realized that I had *not* read him at all—though, of course, I had gleaned a lot *through* the translations… Kaufmann, e.g., being a non-native English speaker, had merely conformed his translations from his native German into the American he had 'emigrated' into. He renders Nietzsche 'harmless', so to speak— —his is a 'docile' Nietzsche, domesticated, I am tempted to say, simmered down, into an acceptable current idiom: American academic jargon…

I think Americans are still labouring under that in translating Nietzsche into English. (I haven't yet seen the new *Zarathustra* translation, which, from what I glean from reviews, seems to be different.)

I would rather not go further into Turkish translations and Nietzsche in Turkish—in

order to make myself intelligible to your readers I would have to write a full dissertation…

Q: *The syntax of Nietzsche's work is extraordinarily rich and complex—it affects how one reads Nietzsche and reveals how he wants to be read. As perhaps with no other philosopher, syntax becomes music in Nietzsche. He underlines a voluminous number of words, capitalizes words where in German they would normally not be, uses ellipses frequently for aposiopesis and other rhetorical effects, and his use of dashes is astonishingly manifold. There is a key, tempo, and tone to his texts that is unmistakable. In many translations however, such syntactical devices are often not honored through being eliminated entirely (as with Kaufmann frequently eliminating Nietzsche's use of dashes), or altered, (as in Faber mutating Nietzsche's dashes into parentheses), which borders on an abuse of his texts, if not at very least a strong distortion of their subtleties. How did you navigate this particular problem? When translating Nietzsche into Turkish, to what degree did you honor his syntactical devices however much that was possible?*

A: Always—what you or I call 'syntax' is, with Nietzsche, the tempo (gait, way, direction…) of thought itself—that is not meant as something *übermenschlich*: In reading any sentence in any language, you encounter 'meanings'—of the individual words—one after the other, in a certain order—the total idea you form at the colon—the 'sense' of the sentence, *(im Freges Sinne)*—is not merely a mixture—with grammar—of these individual word-meanings *(Bedeutungen)*; but a *constellation*, as the outcome—sum-total—of their accumulation and connexions, in that order, in that sentence. That is what Nietzsche consciously does—constructs a sentence with an idea…

So, while translating him, the translator has to (yes, slavishly) follow and obey his syntax and punctuation—to the peril of committing crime in his (the translator's) native language. That is what I do in Turkish—but, as I said, thanks to Turkish being a 'steel-like' language (both flexible *and* durable) it is not always perilous when one carries similar bendings and twistings Nietzsche commits on German into Turkish.

Q: Schadenfreude, Geist, *and* Aufhebung *are particularly difficult to translate into English and in fact have no exact equivalents in that language.* Wehe, *which Nietzsche uses often, may be translated as woe but* Wehe *also refers specifically to labor pains or birth pangs, which woe does not at all convey. Ali Mosbah, who is translating Nietzsche into Arabic from German for the first time, noted that the possibility of joining words like* "über" *and* "Mensch" *in German, and there are a plethora of compound words in Nietzsche's texts, makes translating Nietzsche into Arabic extremely difficult for "that possibility neither exists nor works in Arabic." Since you are now working on translating Nietzsche into English for the first time, what is easier and what more difficult to translate from German into Turkish as opposed to into English?*

A: I was once fascinated by a placard placed in front of the front 'riders-seat' (is that how it is called in English?) of a German touristic 'midi bus'. It went: FAHRGASTSITZ-PLATZ! That could run in English, like, "journey's-honour-guest-seat" (!): "seat of the guest-of-honour of the journey"; whereas Turkish can form a compound noun of similar description: *Onur konuğu oturma yeri*.

Turkish is very resourceful in forming compound words. Take the famous rendering—which is actually a complete sentence; a question—*Çekoslavakyalılaştıramadıkları mızdan mısınız?* Which in English, means, literally, "Are you one of those whom we could not render Czechoslovakian?" Again, e.g. *Übermensch* is no problem for Turkish: *üstinsan*—prefix and noun in the same order…

So, yes, it is (for me) much easier to translate Nietzsche into Turkish than into English—but, then again, I am a native Turkish speaker, whereas English is a 'learned' language for me. However, 'objective' comparisons can be made between the abilities of the two languages.—I am no linguist, so I can make only a 'subjective' one: It has always struck me that English 'talks too much' to say something Turkish says much more shortly, 'economically'.

Q: *How also are the sense, music, and rhythm of Nietzsche's texts, what he signifies and communicates through syntax, tone, and tempo, affected in Turkish?—Whose "inner tension of pathos" is it one hears in your translations of Nietzsche into Turkish—yours or Nietzsche's?*

A: His, of course—mine are only imitations; I hope, good ones… But, as I said, the feat stems from Turkish, not me—I am merely the vehicle…

Nietzsche and Aruoba's Works

Q: *There are common themes and parallel thoughts between your work and Nietzsche's. The relationship between philosophy and poetry for instance is a concern in* de ki işte. *This is an important, complex relation that has concerned philosophers from Plato to Nietzsche to Heidegger. In the same book you criticize academic philosophy as well and suggest that philosophy can move away from concepts. In the* Nachlaß, *Nietzsche counsels that we must no longer accept concepts as gifts, "nor merely purify and polish them, but first make and create them, present them and make them convincing." Do you stand in opposition to Nietzsche on this point in thinking that philosophy can move beyond what were or still are its fundamental tools?*

A: Not at all—on the contrary, as you yourself mention in your question, I *am* of that opinion. I think that in the several centuries up to Nietzsche, starting with Descartes and Bacon and running all through the Enlightenment, all the way up to Kant, philosophers were *infected* with science. (Maybe one should start the line with Aristotle.) They were fascinated with the deludingly glorious achievements of Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, *et al*… And they wanted to be like them, while doing philosophy—they thought that they *were* actually doing what they had done: science: constructing

objective, universal, secure, certain knowledge… —Ironically, the former themselves thought that *they* were doing philosophy: *philosophia naturalis*…

Kant was the first one to dispel this illusion, and Nietzsche went, in his own fashion, all the way back to Herakleitos and Parmenides and continued on from there.

Q: *In* hani *you also discuss the relationship between philosophy and poetry but within the context of imagination and reality. While you define philosophy as a combat among equals between the imaginary and the real, you describe poetry as "a command that puts the existing real in line with the imaginary" (§87). If philosophy is also a super illusion and imagination is in a position to be the most fundamental determinant for philosophy, can't one then claim for philosophy what you claim for poetry?*

A: I can only call on Kant for help: Although he has all of these 'faculties' (*Sinnlichkeit, Verstand, Vernunft, Urteilskraft*) at hand, he occasionally asserts that *Einbildungskraft* is *the* most fundamental faculty, "lying in the unfathomable recesses of the human mind", etc. Hume, by the way, (skeptic as he was) also considers the "imagination" as the fundamental cognitive faculty, bridging the gap between "impressions" and "ideas" by "copying" the former as the latter—i.e. as a bridge between the human perception of the "world" and "reasoning". Both, I think, have in mind the ability of humans to *connect* the meanings of things, and so to make up objects, in their 'semantic/cognitive' relationship to the world.—That 'connecting' is the work of imagination…

—*A propos* the "claim" you ask about: As I said above, I see no *semantically fundamental* difference between philosophy and poetry; one can "claim" for philosophy whatever one can "claim" for poetry—and *vice versa*…

Q: *In* hani *you assert that poetry determines the world before philosophy and that philosophy limps behind poetry—is this not to fall into the metaphysical poetry/philosophy dualism, left as a legacy, or* contagion*, from the ancient Greek world (since Plato)? If one of Nietzsche's primary tasks is to fuse philosophy and poetry and overcome that dualism, are you at odds with that task? For Nietzsche, neither art nor philosophy has privilege over the other.*

A: You would have noticed that the "limping behind" metaphor stems from *Zarathustra*—I must differ from you: poetry *does* have precedence for Nietzsche: I would dare to say that if he had been able to render his "pure thoughts" as poetry to his satisfaction, he would not have written prose. Now, *Zarathustra*, of course, is telling in this regard: except for a series of "Songs" etc, it is not poetry; but it isn't prose either—at all… It is 'beyond poetry and prose'… —Maybe the nearest thing it can be compared with is the libretto of an opera…

One example: All through the three 'Book's, he postpones the articulation of the fundamental thought of the whole book, 'eternal recurrence', until he finds a proper *poetical* rendering of it at the end—in the section "Der Genesende", from the mouths of his "animals": "*Alles geht, Alles kommt zurück*…"

Q: *But it is "articulated" or rather,* presented *quite earlier, in "On the Vision and the Riddle," as a riddle. In all actuality, it is too profound to be articulated; thus,*

Nietzsche presents it inaudibly*, and he illustrates this silence graphically as I've argued, with a special configuration of two tensely spaced* Gedankenstriche: — —.[3] *I believe that Zarathustra never articulates the eternal return precisely because to do so would be woefully reductive. Is this not but one reason why he refers to the animal's interpretation of the eternal return as a hurdy-gurdy song?*

A: Yes, "*ein Leier-Lied*". Your double *Gedankenstriche* are also there, at the ends and beginnings of the two previous paragraphs. And before his "animals", in the section you mention, upon the mockery of the "dwarf", Zarathustra tries his hand at the "articulation", in front of "the gate Moment", but his voice gets dimmer and dimmer (*immer leiser*), because he "becomes afraid of his own thoughts and hindthoughts"—then he hears the howling dog that leads him to the "shepherd"...

Q: *In* de ki işte *you note that philosophy has a very special relationship to language. This relationship is manifested differently in every philosopher. Some philosophers feel the anxiety of that relationship more than others. How, according to you, is it manifest in Nietzsche?*

A: A direct answer: In his—justified—consciousness of being a great philosopher *and* a great writer. —You cannot be the one without being the other...

Q: *There is a concern expressed in many of your works with the* kişi *(person, or individual). Individualism is considered by many to be of great importance to Nietzsche, so much so that some readers refer to him as a radical individualist. Yet, the existence of the individual is put into question in* The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche's first work, and in a late work such as* Twilight of the Idols *he explicitly states that belief in the individual is the philosopher's error. Despite that, in the very same passage of the latter book, he values individualism physiologically and according to ascending and descending lines of life, stating that it is only the individual who contributes to the entirety of culture who is of value. Taking into consideration that Nietzsche uses several different words to denote different kinds of 'subjects' (*Einzelne, Individuum, Personlichkeit, Selbst, et cetera*), how do you interpret his nuanced views of the individual within the context of your understanding of the person/individual, and how has his view of the empirical status of the person/individual affected your own view? And what for you would be an accurate translation into English of* kişi*?*

A: To begin from the end: *kişi* is, naturally, *person* in the European (Latin-based) languages, including its root-meaning in theater—*dramatis personae*, e.g., is simply the plural *kişiler*, in Turkish. The "mask" origin, of course is forgotten. A player, since 'time immemorial' but at least since Ancient Greek theater, while impersonating (you see? ...) the individual he was in the role of, wore his/her mask: Antigone, *was* she with her mask and Creon *he*, with his...

Now in Turkish, the word comes from the conjunctive *kim* (*kimi*: 'certain who' in the plural), which later turned into the question form *kim* ('who?'), and shedding the "*-m*", became *ki* ('that/which'). *Kimse* ('whom/someone') is another development (from *kimesne*: 'whomever'). *Nesne* ('object') is an affiliated form, from *ne-ise-ne* ('what-ever-is'); *ne* being 'what?'.

3 See Rainer J. Hanshe's "Invisibly Revolving— —Inaudibly Revolving: The Riddle of the Double Gedankenstriche" in this issue of *The Agonist.* (6-24)

All of this happened in Ancient Turkish, in some 10 alphabets it went through, but is embedded in Anatolian and Ottoman Turkish, all the way up to 'modern' (post-Republic) Turkish, which recovered—rediscovered—ancient roots living in old texts and the spoken language and developed them.

At present there is an ambiguity between *kişi* and *birey*, similar to the one in English between *person* and *individual*. *Birey* is a construct from the root *bir* (the numeral 'one'; *biricik*: 'unique'); *biri*, being 'one of [them]' and *birisi*, 'someone'…

In my view—which is eminently shaped by Nietzsche—*kişi* (the single, living, mortal human being) is *both* the fundamental object *and* the subject of philosophy (—and this is in *no way* 'individualism'…)—in contrast with or in opposition to "human nature"; a common 'universal-substantive humanity' existent in each and every single "human being", which was presupposed in almost all of pre-Marxian and pre-Nietzschean philosophy.

Think of a grave-stone: A name, a date of birth and a date of death (and a whole life in between…) — that *is* a person.

Q: *In the Section "The Meaning of the Life of the Person" (*Olmayalı*), it is possible to see the elements of* askesis *that one often encounters in Nietzsche's works. For example: individual-society relations (§7), power dynamics (§8), agonism (§23),* et cetera*. Is this a coincidence, or does it have a direct link to the theme of askesis in Nietzsche's thought and the new kind of* askesis *that he strives to cultivate?*

A: The individual chapters (sentences) of that section were written in a common 'mood' that might be termed 'ascetic'—a mood in which, having reached a sort of silenced solitude, the person (the writer of that sentence) almost inaudibly contemplates the "meaning of [his] life", building up from a thought he had encountered—experienced—because of an incident of his life.

I think Nietzsche's concept/perception of—one type of—the "*Asket*" can be applied to the 'existential situation' of that person—hence to "me", i.e., the writer of those sentences…

Q: *In §29 of the Section "Felsefe (işte)" in* de ki işte*, you discuss both silence and solitude and their place within philosophy. You state that philosophy is contingent upon both silence and solitude: "Philosophy is the art of being silent amidst noise and of being lonely amidst a crowd." How for you do they impact and affect one another and what for you is the role of silence in philosophy?*

A: They are inseparably intertwined: Just as crowds and noise (English, unfortunately, does not measure up to the 'acoustics' of the Turkish words *kalabalık* and *gürültü*) go together, so do solitude and silence (*yalnızlık* and *sessizlik*).

Silence—the silent person—is the medium of philosophy.

Q: *How for you do silence and solitude function within Nietzsche's philosophy?*

A: Think of all the situations at which Zarathustra becomes silent (*schweigt*) and "listens to his own heart"—"Hush"… (Whose song was that: "There's a kind of hush all over the world tonight…")

The greatest Nietzschean of the XX. Century (—No: *not* Heidegger), Wittgenstein, says something like this about his book: "What I haven't written therein is the important part." And of course the last sentence of the book is, in English, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereon must one be silent." The rendering isn't ideal; because the German *schweigen* is a verb, whereas English has no such verb. —You asked above about Turkish and English. The Turkish of §7 of the *Tractatus* runs, in my translation:—

Üzerine konuşulamayan konusunda susmalı.

Q: *Wittgenstein's statement about what he has* not *written is very akin to a striking avowal Nietzsche makes in one of his letters, a statement which Heidegger lent particular interpretive force to, though he neglected to deal with the entire avowal. Oddly, not one scholar has addressed this extremely selective gesture of Heidegger's. What Nietzsche states is that everything he has written hitherto is foreground, and that's where Heidegger stops, but the end of the sentence is deeply illuminating, and not to be ignored: "for me," Nietzsche continues, "the real thing begins only with the dashes." It's astounding if not at least very careless of Heidegger to ignore that, and as far as I have researched, no commentator to date has addressed this.*

A: I don't think that's a case of "neglect"—Heidegger, when quoting other writers, often has the rather bad habit of giving only portions that support his current argument or interpretation, and (O.K.) "ignoring" the rest. Moreover, his 'monumental' *Nietzsche-Buch* (actually lecture-notes of *Seminare* between the years 1936-1941) is partly 'strategic', to challenge the abuse of Nietzsche by the NAZI ideology (Bäumler, etc.); in disappointment with, and to atone for, his involvement with the regime in 1933—he indicates (I think in the *Spiegel*-Interview) that he knew that the lectures were followed by GeStaPo agents— —poor fellows: think of the torture they were dealt out, sitting there, listening to all the verbiage—trying to assess whether he was saying something subversive of *Nationalsozializmus*… ; and partly to constitute a chapter of the "de-struction of the History of Philosophy", which was meant to furnish the historical justification for *Sein und Zeit*.

Q: *What do you think of Heidegger's view that Nietzsche is the last metaphysician and that his conception of the will is somehow eschatological? And why to you is Wittgenstein the "greatest Nietzschean" of the XX Century as opposed to Heidegger. One could also think of Deleuze or Foucault.*

A: Well, again, that view is also partly strategic— —like when he quotes Nietzsche (*SuZ* §31; S.145) "*Werde, was du bist.*", without giving his name… However, I think he is right, apart from his use of the interpretation. Nietzsche indeed developed (several but interconnected) 'metaphysic's *to end* all 'metaphysications' (!). *Wille zur Macht*, e.g., terminates all the answers to the question, "What is the single and ultimate end/goal of all animal activity, human or otherwise"… And *ewige Wiederkehr* is his answer to Kant; to the question, "How can I know that my (present) action is ethically correct?"—seeing that everything happens "beyond good and evil"…

About Wittgenstein—being Nietzschean does *not* mean being 'influenced' by him or giving him weight in one's deliberations. —How did it run (I am translating from memory): "Brethren, you had sought yourselves; then you found me. Now, abandon

me and go away from me, and find yourselves—then, I will come back to you with a new love"…

Foucault, of course, is a genuine Nietzschean—built his 'optics' on top of Nietzsche's. His conception/perspective of "pouvoir" is a direct development and brilliant elucidation of Nietzsche's "Wille zur Macht". Deleuze is also very acute, but keeps a Hegelian stain… —Whereas Wittgenstein is a *great* Nietzschean—pure and simple…

Q: *The philosophers' relationship to death is another theme in* de ki işte *and the first Section of the book concerns death. After stating that philosophy is a difficult and painful endeavor, you observe that philosophers may appear calm, joyful, and happy at the moment of death and give the examples of Socrates, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein. From the early 1880s on, Nietzsche used to conjecture that he would die soon and this sense of death is according to you particularly evident in his last writings, which you proclaim* 'smell' *of a yearning for death. In what way does* Dionysos-Dithyramben *smell of death? What further do you think of Nietzsche's relationship to death?*

A: All of the nine poems resound with death, and the third one—the shortest—works immediately on a particular possibility of dying as the manifestation (testament?) of a "Last Will". I can point this out line by line; but that would take us too far afield, would require a full-fledged article— —the reader should do it himself…

"Further": I think Nietzsche was constantly conscious of death—mostly, his own; but also others'. I can dare to say, that wherever he looked, he looked for, and saw, death. —That wasn't a personal 'morbid interest'—it was his philosophical 'optics'… For example, the whole idea of 'eternal recurrence' is built on the conception of death. Again, I would interpret the formula, "Remain true to earth", as, "Don't delude yourself into believing that you will go on existing at someplace else after death"… It is hard for me not to hear an undertone of death while reading any sentence of Nietzsche's…

(*A propos* Wittgenstein: Russell notes (in his *Autobiography*) that he "knew that he [Wittgenstein] could go and commit suicide at any moment"…)

Nietzsche and Poetry

Q: *Many scholars often discount Nietzsche's poetry based on evaluative terms of good and bad; due to this approach as well as prejudices many academic philosophy professors have towards poetry, his poetry has received little analysis. Kaufmann for instance goes to great lengths to express his dislike for a poem such as "From High Mountains: Aftersong" yet, however one may qualitatively evaluate it, it is a fascinating poem. Aside from the separate volumes of poetry, the poems in* The Gay Science *and the concluding poem to* Beyond Good and Evil *are not dispensable supplements but integral parts of each book, elements of the whole. Instead of good and bad evaluations what is surely more valuable is to ask,* What is being communicated with those poems? *And how do they relate to the entirety of each book? What as a translator and poet is your view of Nietzsche's poetry?*

A: Nietzsche has only one book of poetry—which was the last—intended—publication he was able to work out in full. Before that, he contemplated making independent volumes of some of his poetry ("An den Mistral", "Prinz Vogelfrei", etc), but didn't. Instead, he included sections of poetry into each of his books after *Zarathustra*. Now, *Zarathustra* itself, *includes* poetry ("songs"—sections ending "Also sang Zarathustra" instead of "Also sprach Zarathustra"); in fact, three of the *Dionysos-Dithyramben*, which he initially wanted to call—name—"Songs of Zarathustra" (*Lieder Zarathustras*)— —but is itself not poetical. I have dwelled on that above.

Now, Nietzsche's situation in the history of poetry should be evaluated from a similar standpoint with his situation in the history of philosophy: He was standing—he *knew* he was standing—at a great junction, if not dead-end, from which several ways diverged. He took to almost all the possible philosophical roads, and walked them to some sort of end; but he did not do so with the poetical ones. He took several steps in some of the directions, but did not walk the whole length of the way. —That might have been impossible, anyway: It might be impossible humanly—or supra-humanly!—to become a great philosopher *and* a great poet, for one person, at the same time... Not only that the total energy—will-power!—needed for the two endeavors would be inadequate, they might have hampered one another as well.

So, I surmise, at one point in his life (at the "initial crisis" that is talked about? ...), Nietzsche decided to put his energy into philosophy and to leave his beloved poetry to work out as something that would take care of itself—perhaps wisely; for one can-



Arture 532, Nietzsche, 1999, 30 x 40.5 cm ~ Yüksel Arslan

not *strive* to write poetry, whereas one *can* do that with philosophy.

We can see the historical outcome of this 'walking the road' process in the works of Stefan George and Rilke, who both built immediately on the philosophical backdrop created by Nietzsche to develop the first great modern German poetries—with the impetus of the first great French—Baudelaire *et al*… .

Q: *Well, let me push you further on the poems that conclude* GS *and* BGE *in particular because I don't think he is just tacking poems onto the ends of those books simply because he didn't make independent volumes of poetry. He is too precise an architect of his work to resort to that. At very least, he seems to be doing something quite specific with the poems at the end of the* GS *and* BGE*. In the concluding aphorisms of each book, he questions the very value of words, of their ability to communicate his thoughts, and he seems to be speaking specifically of prose. Before reducing his thoughts to words, he notes that they were once "so colorful" and "full of thorns and secret spices" which caused him to sneeze and laugh. But when he transforms (or* deforms*) such thoughts into words, they lose their fragrance or sensorial as well as musical dimension. Following these critiques, he offers us "songs," the songs of Prince Vogelfrei, and "Aus hohen Bergen," which as you know he refers to as a "Nachgesang". Poems are different of course from prose, fragments, and aphorisms and are more akin to music. In this way then, is he not attempting to surpass or overcome with his* poem-songs *the very limits of prose, which, as he proclaims, steal the color, prickliness and fragrance (!) of his thoughts? If each book spiders out into others, the question or rather, demand, of reading each book as a unique totality remains and Nietzsche's individual books are rarely considered in and of themselves. Lampert is one of the few scholars to do this, at least in English. The scholars who think one can read Nietzsche's books in any haphazard order and that they lack an overall sense of design are quite mistaken.*

A: I will start from the end: Each book of Nietzsche's is of course to be considered "in and of itself" (none is like any other); for, as you say, he was an architect, or, a poet (as you know, the verb *poeinein* means "making with the hand"). Each one is a construct, and not a mere 'flow of text' chopped up into sections and paragraphs, *oder gar,* a random compilation of aphorisms. —So, O.K., I will say "of course" to all of your remarks and rhetorical questions above: I did *not* say that Nietzsche's practice of including poems into his books was merely a case of appending packs of verse to compilations of "prose fragments and aphorisms". It was like telling the reader, by giving the poetry, something like, "You see; I could have—maybe should have—written all of this like *this*, but didn't—couldn't"…

Q: *Do you think Nietzsche resolves the tension of his critique of the poet and poetry while continuing to write poetry himself and to write poetically as in* Also sprach Zarathustra*? How is Nietzsche different from the poets that he critiques and how is his poetry different, if you believe it is at all? Do you think he achieves his goal of becoming a different kind of poet?*

A: Now, to continue from the previous question: I am no expert in the history of poetry, but seeing that someone so eminently unqualified as Kaufmann could walk into judgment on Nietzsche's poetry, I can try my hand, too: If with the instances of Stefan George and Rilke, we understand the transition from traditional poetry into

the modern as the achievement of (almost) absolutely novel poetical practices and constructs, then, starting from Nietzsche's *Liebling*, Hölderlin, who paved the way for all to come, we can conclude that Nietzsche did take several steps towards modern poetry, but didn't reach "the goal of becoming a different kind of poet", as you ask. For example, Ferdinand Freiligrath, whom Nietzsche parodies in "The Daughters of the Desert", or even the great pioneer of the classical, Goethe, whom Nietzsche admires, stood at the end of the traditional, but stayed there. So did Nietzsche, except for several—interesting—steps in the other direction.

This transition to modernism can also be traced in his—meager—compositions, in which, even I, as someone 'with no ear at all', may surmise to hear the beginnings of modernity—but *only* the beginnings...

> **Q:** *Which poems in particular, if that's what you're referring to, do you think make such steps? And if you can elaborate,* why *do you think they achieve that? It's intriguing that you make similar remarks about his music. What relation do you see, or how instrumental do you think his knowledge of music was to his knowledge of language, or, how do you think his knowledge and understanding of music bear upon his interpretation of language?*

A: You don't expect me to vivisect single poems, I hope; but I can point e.g. to the unusually long "Aus Hohen Bergen", the "Nachgesang" of *Jenseits*, which can be compared with the last poem in the "Anhang/Lieder des Prinzen Vogelfrei" of *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, "An den Mistral"; all moving towards the *Dithyramben*. To "elaborate"; without writing a treatise:—

The first step was the move away from rhyme and meter, which were the fundamental classical *sine qua non* of being "poetry". Rhyme was almost done away with by Hölderlin in the late hymns and elegies; but he had kept meter; whereas Nietzsche took the step away from that too. (I surmise both of them took as model ancient Greek poetry, especially the texts of the choruses in tragedies, which they both knew firsthand—but I don't know for sure, I can't read Greek...) Instead of rhyme and meter, Nietzsche moved towards constructing *rhythm,* the flow of sound; but achieved that in (only some of) the *Dithyramben*. (Rilke was to become the first master of that...)

The second step was to displace the subject of the poem: Instead of the classical unanimous writer of it, who *is* there but keeps himself *behind* what is said in it, who could be anyone; to *posit* his own person as the subject—the speaking "I"... Now, of course, there were other poets who tried their hand at this (e.g. Ernest Dowson—who of course Nietzsche did not know; but Hölderlin too occasionally uses this sort of "Ich"...) Nietzsche's "ich" is—again limitedly—authentically himself as the subject of his poems.

I could go into further details, technicalities actually, but I don't feel competent enough to assert them. Let me just mention one:—

In classical poetry, the grammatical sentence begins with the beginning of the line and, even when it runs several lines long, it ends with the end of a line, and the next sentence begins with the next line. I.e., you hardly ever have a period and a capital letter *inside* a line. Nietzsche begins to tentatively play with the sort of *flow* of the sentence among lines which will become a novelty of modernity. Now, again, there

are the beginnings of this form in Hölderlin, and again, Rilke perfected it in his (last) *opus magnum*, *Duineser Elegien*.

Now, for Nietzsche's music, I am in no position to point to anything concrete; but a young Turkish composer who is also a researcher, Mehmet Nemutlu, once remarked in a radio program we made on Nietzsche's compositions (some of which had been performed and recorded at the time), that he had started to do the sort of thing that Mahler, e.g. was to develop. I can't say *what* that is, except that it's something modern...

As to language and music, I can only point out that for Nietzsche reading is something you do with your ears.

Nietzsche Today

Q: *Nietzsche died over 100 years ago. Since then, interest in him has been growing throughout the world. Ali Mosbah said he is deeply convinced that "Nietzsche holds the most important answers to the questions posed by the 21st century at the ready for us. I believe," he said, "that the 21st century will be the century of Nietzsche." Laurence Lampert made a similar proclamation when he referred to Nietzsche as "the philosopher of our age" and said that not only are his "aspirations are the aspirations of a Plato," but that his "teachings may come to be as historically important as Plato's." Are these visions of Nietzsche in accord with your own vision of him? According to you, in what ways does he shed light on the problems of our age if not offer counsel as to how to navigate through them?*

A: He does both: He has tackled questions to which we have still not yet come to, but have to, and has devised intellectual tools which we are not yet able to handle. Starting exactly at 1900, it became impossible for any creator in any branch of the written word *not* to take up from him in one way or the other. And this wasn't simply 'being influenced'—it was complying with Nietzsche's call to "become what one is"... There's the excellent study *Heirs to Dionysos* (whose was it? ...), which deals with, but hardly exhausts all the 'great' writers who took to the road with Nietzsche in their Rucksacks—I think there was none of note who didn't...

Today, most of present-day academic philosophy, I would dare to generalize, still labours under remnants of problems Nietzsche had solved—perhaps, resolved, one should say, or better, dissolved—long since. To mention only one example, which is actually an acute study, *Nietzsche and Political Thought* by Mark Warren. He comes very close to articulating the sort of political/social ideal for modern society that can be learned from Nietzsche but is unable to cross the threshold of traditional 'political theory'. Again, the theoreticians of the European Union (if there *be* any...), are unaware of what Nietzsche called being "a good European".

Q: *What do you think of Nietzsche's vision of the future and his desire to create* Übermenschen*? Are his desires, such as redeeming humanity from revenge, which is for him "the bridge to the highest hope and a rainbow after lasting storms," at-*

tainable in some distant future, or do you think them purely utopic?

A: None of that: the *Übermensch* is historically very real (cf. §§3-4 of *Antichrist*)—it—he—is neither something to 'create' (a new species of homo sapiens, *etwa*…), nor 'utopic'. He is the creative person—he is Leonardo and Michelangelo, he is Thomas More and Erasmus…

From the point of view of Zarathustra—"the teacher of the *Übermensch* to come"—what is "future" about him is in which way he could be willed, educated, shown direction, in the desolation Nietzsche saw in *his/our* present age—how to rear—yes, breed!—the new transvaluators of values, the new creators of values— —that was the task Nietzsche set to himself, to Zarathustra…

I can presume to give you contemporary examples of *Übermenschen*, whom, as Americans, you can appreciate: How would you like, Orson Welles and Stanley Kubrick, or Bob Dylan and Leonard Cohen? …

Q: *In the Anglo-Saxon world, of all of Nietzsche's work, it is the* Genealogy of Morals *in particular that receives the most attention; more books are certainly written on that text than on any others, such as* Daybreak *or* The Gay Science*, which both demand to be engaged with more thoroughly. What texts of his are of primary importance in the secondary literature on him in Turkey? And what areas of his thought do you think have been neglected in Turkish philosophical circles?*

A: The responses Nieitzsche found and finds in Turkish circles are very various. In academia, there is a range of views from, "no philosopher, mere poet", to blind adoration and lip-service. In leftist circles, he was considered, for a time, as the mastermind of Fascism—as was the mode all over the world in the '60s and '70s. In the last 20 years he became extremely popular as (a) guide to a secularly meaningful worldview. He "sells" good, but I am sceptical of the ways he is "read"…

Q: *And what secondary readings of Nietzsche had the most decisive impact on you?*

A: Hardly any—except perhaps my teacher İoanna Kuçuradi's book *Nietzsche'de Trajik Olan* (*The Tragical in Nietzsche*). From an early stage on, I developed my own—rather strict—view of Nietzsche and tended to disregard, if not ignore, "secondary readings" of him. Through the years, as new sources came into light—the extraordinary development of the *KGW* and new secondary work with sounder foundations—I did not find reasons to change my view; on the contrary, it was reinforced. (That probably makes me a fanatic…)

Q: *Since there is a close connection to Arab culture in Turkey, are there more studies of* The Gay Science *and the influence on Nietzsche's thought of troubadour culture, which was not only a European but a Middle Eastern phenomenon?*

A: There is a far looser "connection to Arab culture in Turkey" then is considered in the West. Nietzsche is read in Turkey solely as a European philosopher.

The possible connection with the—originally Homeric—Anatolian *âşık* (bard) tradition is hardly considered, which wasn't "a Middle Eastern phenomenon", but one which was an amalgam of the 'Turcic' *ozan* (singer-poet) tradition of Middle Asian/

Shamanistic origin and the Anatolian traditions of various cultures, including probably Dionysian cults.

Aruoba Today

Q: *With the difficulties you encountered in academia due to the political situation in Turkey when you were teaching, how do you view the current situation there and its impact on the university? With the rise of the religious party, what is the situation like now in relation to when you were teaching and essentially forced to leave or sever your ties with academia?*

A: Well, the universiy was done away with—there's a pun I think I coined and have repeteadly used: "*yökedilmek*": *yokedilmek* means "being annihilated" (*yok*: 'nihil') and the abbreviation of both the "Law of Higher Education" brought into force by the military regime and the "Council of Higher Education" which it established, is "YÖK"... My first article on the issue (published in Bülent Ecevit's *Arayış*; the only critical magazine of the time) was entitled "The Death of the University".

As for the ('Mild'?-)Islamist party now in power: It has, naturally, brought the "Council" into its own circle of influence, together with the President of the Republic (elected by it), who nominates the rectors of the universities, proposed by YÖK after inconsequential 'elections' at the universities.

I am of the opinion that there are at present no universities in Turkey (with the possible (?) exception of one or two, which have tried to keep themselves afloat in the deluge), and that the 100-and-some institutions that bear that name are cross-breeds of Kindergarten and state Scrivens' Bureaus. Nowadays, they are in the process of being invaded by scholastically reared Islamist "scientists"—*ulema*, in Arabic...

Q: *Most of our English speaking readers are surely not aware of this, but you had something of a literary* tête-à-tête *with Orhan Pamuk upon the publication of his* Kara Kitap (The Black Book). *This involved another writer, Tahsin Yücel, who criticized the value of the book, which he didn't think deserved the praise it received and provoked him to raise a question about the status of literature and of what makes a writer, of what is populist versus* Unzeitgemäß. *What can you tell us of this affair, which prompted you to write the brief article "Stephen Pamuk and/or Orhan King"? And did Pamuk ever respond to you?*

A: Tahsin Yücel (who is an eminent linguist, well-known e.g. in French professional circles too, who also writes novels) in a critical book-review, asked the fundamental question, "Can a writer who uses language badly be a good writer?" and pointed out the deficiencies of Pamuk's Turkish. Pamuk's response (in an interview, without mentioning names) was, to remark that he from time to time "cleansed his library" by ridding it of books written by Turkish literature writers who were "between their fifties and sixties, doomed at birth, half successful, half clumsy, male and bald", all (at least the physical side) of the description fitted almost exclusively Yücel. So I wrote the comment; in it I drew a parallel between Orhan Pamuk and Stephen King, whose *Shining* I had read because of Kubrick's film. Comparing King and Pamuk, I concluded that they were in the same category of writers of novels as "light consumers' goods

interviewed by:
Yunus Tuncel
and
Rainer J. Hanshe

to be sold in supermarkets" and had no "significance or importance as genuine literature". I wrote that, if King would give an interview to *Newsweek*, and claim to be the third point on the extended line of American literature between Herman Melville and William Faulkner, he would find plenty of critics and experts who would grab him by the neck and drag him up to the Manhattan Bridge and throw him down from it. Extending the parallel, I asked, "Now what if Pamuk, giving an interview to *Aktüel*, should claim—once and for all, without mincing words—to be the third point on the extended line of Turkish literature, between Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar and Oğuz Atay; who would do what?" I concluded, "Well, they don't allow pedestrians on the Bosphorus bridges..."

No, he did not respond to my comment.

Q: *Our concern is not with literary squabbles but with the larger question the issue raises, which is that of values and of the reception of artworks. How does the commodification of art, which presumes to make art available to all, possibly endanger art or reduce and diminish the experience that it can offer? Cezanne used to visit the Louvre frequently if not every day when he was in Paris but now that most museums have become veritable shopping malls, it's difficult to impossible to imagine that as solitary an encounter with a work of art as Cezanne had is ever at all possible. What do you think of the democratization of art? Is there an art for all, or is that a total fallacy and the cry of elitism a specious criticism of effete liberals?*

A: Well, all these considerations revolve around the concept "bestseller". That was the point I started from, to show that precisely the fact, that, when a book becomes popular and hence a bestseller in its own day is an indication of it's inferiority—i.e. "selling" is counterindicative of being "good". That's not 'elitism', but is based on the historical fact that none of the books which are considered (afterwards) to be "best", "sold" in their own day; and contrariwise, none of the bestselling books popular in their own day lived on to become important and enduring for posterity. I gave as example the contrast between the case of Kant's *C[K]ritik der reinen Vernunft*, which was deemed worthy of a print of 750 by its publisher in 1781 and sold about 200 copies in six years (Kant had to contribute to the expenses when he wanted a second 'corrected' edition in 1787), and the cases of the works of Moses Mendelssohn and Christian Garve, who were bestselling 'philosophical' authors of Kant's day, going into—for the day—immense numbers of print, but are hardly known today and are not printed at all. (I remarked that I, as professional philosopher, knew their names from Kant's letters and biographies.) Then the contrast between Melville/Faulkner, and bestselling King; likewise, Tanpınar/Atay, and bestselling Pamuk...

This issue, as you will know, was confronted by Benjamin in his deep-sighted "Reproducibility" text— —how much did *that* "sell" in its own day?... (I remember that it wasn't even printed in its own day but some thirty years later.)

Q: *With the violent technological transformations now occurring, and at terrifyingly swift paces, what future do you think the book has in an epoch where more and more people refuse to purchase physical books, but download them instead (open sharing, etc.), and where entities like Google sorely threaten copyright laws? What do you think of the new technologies of the book and how they have changed and are changing the way people read and encounter "books", or how they might—*

will—be written?

A: I think the "violent technological transformations" are far less "terrifyingly swift" than you feel them to be—the span between Gutenberg's Bible and the Heidelberger "off-set" printing is much greater than the one between "physical books" and "scanning/downloading" on the Web. —Now, to be able to be 'downloaded', books have to be first 'loaded'; for that, they have to have become 'physical books', and for that they have to have been written first, with the hand. You would say, books can be typed directly on a computer. Apart from certain texts that require no styling or forming (notary documents, like), I don't think handwriting will—or can—go totally out of fashion and disappear— —e.g. are children to be taught reading and writing in primary school via computers?

Writing with the hand—handwriting—is something very fundamental to culture itself; as well as being the hallmark of the person—it is personality *in concreto*. (Think of the importance of an 'auto-graph'...) I don't think handwriting can become obsolete.

Q: *Do the critiques of technology and the commodification of culture offered by Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Adorno or other thinkers serve in any way as guides for you as to how to respond to such forceful shifts, all of which seem to be beyond our control, except perhaps for how we engage, or* **refuse** *to engage with them?*

A: My son, when he was a kid, had concluded in his mind that eggs, like electric bulbs, were manufactured, and asked me, "How do they put the yellow ball into the shell?"—he had never seen hens... Of course the thinkers you mention have important thing to say on technology and human beings' rupture from nature—e.g. Heidegger saying that farming has become "motorized food industry". We have to resist these developments, but as you say, they are largely out of our control—actually, they are not even in the control of the so-called 'leaders' or 'aim-setters' of capitalist society. They arise out of man's distorted view of nature as his property, coupled with his 'natural' greed. As individuals we can counter this view by trying to live *with and in* nature as much as possible and to cultivate our *regard* of it—of what is left of it...

Then again, I am of the belief that if left sufficiently on its own, "nature" can still get rid of man and his 'doings'; "the skin-disease of earth" (*Zarathustra*) and cleanse itself. Man sitting at the controls of a bulldozer is still a pitiably weak thing when compared with the "nature" he is in the process of disrupting—as he has to be reminded of by eathquakes and tornadoes...

Q: *We know that you served as an apprentice of sorts to Bilge Karasu, who is far less known in the Anglo-Saxon world than other Turkish writers. What can you tell us of your relationship to him and his impact on your life?*

A: Actually, I adopted him as master; and he, not reluctantly, complied to having me as apprentice. We worked together at various writing activities and, would also show each other 'completed' texts that we had written, to read. For example, we went over my translation of Hume's first *Enquiry* together. Or, e.g., the motto from Hegel in front of his *Gece (Night)* is something I found as a response his setting me a riddle on the novel.

He has deeply influenced me—sometimes to a degree I cannot fathom—both by his

superb mastery of Turkish, by his endeavor as a writer and by his incomparable personality.

Q: *Do you intend on translating other works by Nietzsche in the future? What are you currently working on?*

A: I am now past 60—so, any hope of 'creative' work (including translation) is very much out of the question for me. (Wittgenstein sets the limit at 25 for creative work in philosophy—although he himself goes on to write, past 60, awaiting certain death, one of his best texts, "Über Gewissheit"…)

At present, about Nietzsche, I am trying to finish a Dialogue I wrote—am still writing—between Marx and Nietzsche, as they meet and talk 'up there above'. I also have a plan and notes on a text which would establish the proposition "Society is organized hypocrisy"; but I doubt whether I will be able to finish it. The rest will probably be bits-and-pieces of a 'History of Philosophy' I feel I owe my readers, and, occasional haiku, when and if they want to come— —until I rest…

November-December 2009

The Nietzsche Workshop @ Western

http://groups.to/nietzsche

Thursday, May 6th 2010
9am to 5pm
Dean's Boardroom, 9th Floor
Social Science Centre
University of Western Ontario

A Full-Day Worskhop
with keynote lectures by

Manav Guha
(Reimagining War in the 21st Century: from Clausewitz to Network-Centric Warfare) &

Julian Reid
(Biopolitics of the War on Terror, Foucault in an Age of Terror, The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live)

Re-Thinking War in the 21st Century

Faculty and Students
working in broader areas of research
are encouraged to attend

NIETZSCHE
FOUCAULT
DELEUZE

Co-sponsored by the Centre for the Study of Theory and Criticism, UWO
and SSHRC
(the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada)

the.nietzsche.network@gmail.com

The Agonist
A Nietzsche Circle Journal

Introduction to Ernst Bertram, Nietzsche: Attempt at a Mythology[1]

by Pierre Hadot

translated by Paul Bishop

Translator's Preface

Ernst Bertram was born in Elberfeld in 1884, and he held the post of professor of German literature from 1922 to 1946. A prolific scholar, he is best remembered today, if at all, for his study of Nietzsche, first published in 1929, which became an immediate bestseller. More recently, his significance as a commentator on Nietzsche has become overlooked, but in 1990, the French publishing house Éditions du Félin reprinted the French translation of his study by Robert Pitrou, first published in 1932. And in 2009 the University of Illinois Press published the first English translation, prepared by Robert E. Norton.

The 1990 French edition included a preface by the renowned French scholar, Pierre Hadot. In it, he placed Bertram's Nietzsche in its intellectual and historico-cultural context, and in particular Bertram's friendship with another German admirer of Nietzsche, Thomas Mann. Hadot's preface explains why Bertram's image of Nietzsche remains so significant, and provides an excellent introduction to Bertram's work; it has been translated here to bring it to a wider audience, and with a view to promoting further interest in Bertram's study.

1 [Pierre Hadot's preface is included in the 1990 reprint of Robert Pitrou's translation (1932) of the seventh edition (1929) of Ernst Bertram's study of Nietzsche, available as Ernst Bertram, *Nietzsche: Essai de Mythologie* (Paris: Éditions du Félin, 1990, repr. 2007). For the original German edition, see Ernst Bertram, *Nietzsche: Versuch einer Mythologie* (Berlin: Bondi, 1918); tenth edition (Bonn: Bouvier, 1989). Bertram's book has been recently translated, with an introduction, by Robert E. Norton, as *Nietzsche: Attempt at a Mythology* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2009). In this translation of Hadot's preface, references are to (and quotations taken from) Norton's translation. Unless placed within square brackets, all footnotes or material in footnotes are by Pierre Hadot. For a discussion of Norton's translation of Bertram, see Keith Ansell-Pearson's review in *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, 38 (Autumn 2009), also available online at the following HTML address: http://www.hunter.cuny.edu/philosophy/jns/RVW_AnsellPearson_Bertram.shtml.]

Symbols

I have often read and reread this book, and I have always found it new, unexpected, and unique.[2] Yet it was written over seventy years ago now, and translated nearly sixty years ago. In 1948, however, Thomas Mann predicted: "It will be frequently republished and it will always inspire admiration."[3]

Its very first phrase is laden with meaning: *Alles Gewesene ist nur ein Gleichnis*—"All of the past is but a parable."[4] This is an allusion to the grandiose conclusion of Part Two of Goethe's *Faust*: *Alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichnis*—"All that passes away is only a symbol."[5] A "symbol," that is, of what Goethe in subsequent lines calls the "indescribable" and the "inaccessible."[6] The author thus describes both his book's method—we shall return to this point—and its content. Throughout his work, Bertram will propose "symbols" of this "indescribable" and this "inaccessible", which constitute his hero's personality, as they do that of every human being; and Nietzsche's mystery will be wrapped in these symbols as it unveils itself.

"The admirable secret of your book, which lies in its conception," so Thomas Mann wrote to Bertram in 1918, "is precisely that, in each of these essays and its variations, the entire antithetical intensity of life, all the unutterably interesting character, all the intellectual magic of its subject are compressed."[7]

As a work of art that is at once delicate and monumental, and constructed with a masterful skill, Bertram's *Nietzsche* represents something entirely unique in the history of literature, in the secret of its structure and its mode of composition.

To begin with, each of its chapters is presented, as it were, in a musical way, in the form of "theme and variations." As he develops each theme, Bertram

2 Cf. the chapter "The Figure of Socrates" in my book *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique* (Paris: Études augustiniennes, second edition, 1987), in which I took up themes developed by Bertram in his chapter entitled "Socrates." [[See Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995): 147-178.]]

3 In this foreword, Thomas Mann's letters will be cited after the translation by Louise Servicen, published by Gallimard in four volumes (covering the years 1889-3926; 1937-1942; 1943-1947; 1948-1955). [In this translation, letters are cited from the German edition of Mann's correspondence: Thomas Mann, *Briefe* 1889-1936, ed. Erika Mann (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1961); *Briefe 1937-1947*, ed. Erika Mann (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1963); and *Briefe 1948-1955 und Nachlese*, ed. Erika Mann (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1964).] Not all Thomas Mann's letters, notably certain letters written to Bertram, appear in these volumes; see below, note 7. [Here the quotation is from Thomas Mann's letter of 30 July 1948 to Werner Schmitz; *Briefe 1948-1966 und Nachlese*, p. 40].

4 [Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 1. An alternative translation, preferred by Hadot, is, "All that has been is only a symbol"; see below, note 5.]

5 [See Goethe, *Faust*: *Part Two*, ll. 12104-05.]

6 [Goethe, *Faust: Part Two*, ll. 12106-12109: Das Unzulängliche, / Hier wird's Ereignis; / Das Unbeschreibliche, / Hier wird's getan.]

7 See Thomas Mann's letter to Ernst Bertram of 21 September 1918, in: Mann, *Briefe 1889-1936*, p. 151; and Inge Jens (ed.), Thomas Mann an Ernst Bertram: *Briefe aus den Jahren 1910-1935* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1960): 76 (this edition gives the German text of Mann's correspondence with Bertram, together with an excellent commentary). […]

Pierre Hadot translated by: Paul Bishop

gradually brings to light all its various harmonies, its implications, and everything that crystallizes around it. In each chapter, it is always Nietzsche who appears in his division, internal and contradictory, like a living coincidence of opposites: "The individual chapters that follow," Bertram writes in his introduction, "thus seek to elucidate the intrinsic spiritual duality of this mind, the great balance in which his nature and his values indeterminately hover."[8]

Each chapter bears the name of realities, images, attitudes, people, or places, laden with tradition and with mystery, which became myths for Nietzsche, either implicitly or explicitly (hence the book's subtitle: *An Attempt at a Mythology*). In other words, they became symbols of himself and of his aspirations. This is why we find all of Nietzsche, every time, behind the mask of these symbols, which reveal him precisely because he likes to mask himself behind them.

As he sketches each symbol, Bertram always returns to the same theme: the inner duality of the Nietzschean soul, and its struggle against itself, its amorous hatred of itself. Moreover, one could say that what Nietzsche asserts about the "magic of Socrates" is true of himself: "He had his soul, and behind it another one and behind it yet another."[9] All these contrary aspects of Nietzschean multiplicity are manifested or concealed in the different phases of his intellectual development, but sometimes even in the course of a particular phase: Germanophilia and Germanophobia, rationalism and mysticism, Socratic irony and Dionysian ecstasy, Christianity and Hellenism, North and South, the return to the Greeks and the prophecy of the Superman.

The choice of these myths, and the lyrical orchestration in which they are so magnificently set forth, confer on this book that "intellectual magic" of which Thomas Mann speaks.

As Robert Pitrou comments in his translator's preface,[10] one may, if one wishes, read these chapters in any order one pleases, particularly beginning with the most approachable ones, such as *Arion*, *Judas*, *Weimar*, or *Venice*. This is not surprising, since, as indicated, each of them opens up a perspective on Nietzsche as a whole. Nevertheless, one can detect in this succession of symbols a certain movement, a progression, a certain secret order that orients the work.

In a way, the chapter entitled *Ancestry* (perhaps *Ahnentafel* would be better translated as "genealogical table") corresponds to the first (usually quite tedious) pages that biographers devote to their hero's parents and family. Here, however, Bertram speaks less about Nietzsche's ancestors than about his passionate quest for a genealogy, that is, ultimately, his anxious search for the symbols of himself. This genealogy not only enables him to understand his biological and psychological individuality, but also allows him to situate himself spiritually within the world's most aristocratic genealogy—that of Heraclitus, Empedocles, Spinoza, and Goethe. Better still, the glance that Nietzsche casts on the past as a "visionary poet," "the founder of what persists,"[11] to use Hölderlin's expression which Bertram placed as an epigraph

8 [Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 8.]

9 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 151. [Nietzsche, *Nachlass* of April-June 1885; KSA 11, 34[66], 440.] [...]

10 [Robert Pitrou, "Préface du traducteur," pp. 47-48 (p. 48).]

11 ["Poets, however, establish what remains" (Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 11. Cf. the final lines of Hölderlin's poem "Remembrance" (*Andenken*): "But what is lasting the poets provide"

at the beginning of this chapter, becomes in a sense the consciousness and the memory of humanity, in the words of *The Gay Science*: "Anyone who manages to experience the history of humanity as his own history [...] being a person whose horizon encompasses thousands of years past and future, being the heir of all the nobility of all past spirit—an heir with a sense of obligation, the most aristocratic of old nobles and at the same time the first of a new nobility—the like of which no age has yet seen or dreamed of [...] if one could finally contain all this in one soul and crowd it into a single feeling—this would surely have to result in a happiness that humanity has not known so far: the happiness of a god [...] This godlike feeling would then be called—humaneness."[12]

Thomas Mann said that when reading the second chapter, entitled *Knight, Death, and Devil*, he felt "close to tears."[13] In this engraving by Dürer, which accompanied Nietzsche throughout his life and which, on several occasions, he both received and gave others as a gift, the disciple of Schopenhauer and of Wagner sensed a symbol of his own existence, a symbol both of his pessimistic vision of the world and of his courage to face up to the terrible secret. To be sure, in Dürer's view, this Knight symbolized Luther's conception of the Christian, for whom life is a battle, and whose faith fears neither Death nor the Devil. But this is precisely what justifies the position of this chapter in the overall economy of Bertram's work. It prolongs the theme of *Ancestry*, and announces the theme of *The German Becoming*. Indeed, it recalls the figure of Nietzsche's father, a Lutheran pastor ("I am the issue of entire generations of Christian ministers"; "I have never felt my innermost dependence on the spirit of Luther more strongly than I do now"),[14] and at the same time it introduces the notion of a properly German version of Christianity, of a "Christian ideal of the North," or a "Christianity of the North," as embodied, for instance, in Dürer's figures of the Apostles. It is a virile, active, and "Protestant" Christianity, but also tormented. "It was left to the Germans," as Wölfflin wrote in his book on Dürer that Bertram cites,[15] "to represent the Apostles not as autocratic, perfect men, but as men who were consumed by a feeling of painful inadequacy."[16] This German Christianity is one of the elements that make up the tonality of the Nietzschean soul. The theme of a specific German Destiny, of German "Becoming," thus makes its appearance.

This new theme, as sketched above, undergoes a powerful orchestration in the next chapter, whose title is none other than *The German Becoming*. Here, moreover, another quotation from Wölfflin's book echoes the passage we have just mentioned: "Northern beauty is not a beauty that is circumscribed and limited, but is rather boundless and endless [...] The finished form means too little to the

(Was bleibt aber, stiften die Dichter). See Friedrich Hölderlin, *Poems and Fragments*, trans. Michael Hamburger (London: Anvil Press, 1994): 510-511.]

12 [*The Gay Science*, §337; see *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974): 268-69; KSA 3, 565.]

13 See Mann's letter to Philipp Witkop of 13 September 1918 (Mann, *Briefe 1889-1936*, p. 150).

14 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, pp. 20 and 48 [Nietzsche's letters to Heinrich Köselitz of 21 July 1881 and to Erwin Rohde of 28 February 1875].

15 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 50.

16 Heinrich Wölfflin, *Die Kunst Albrecht Dürers*, 5th edition (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1926): 272 (I have only been able to find a copy of the fifth edition; the first edition was published in 1905); [Heinrich Wölfflin, *The Art of Albrecht Dürer*, trans. Alastair and Heide Grieve (London: Phaidon, 1971): 217]

Pierre Hadot translated by: Paul Bishop

Germanic imagination, it always has to be enlivened with the additional attraction of movement."[17] This dissatisfaction, absence of limits, and movement, all express the profound essence of what it is to be German or, rather, of German "Becoming."

A "Becoming" that is German, because the essence of Germanness consists precisely in being unfinished, in being always in motion and evolution. Thus, Luther's adage is quintessentially German: "This life is not piety, but rather a *becoming* pious [...] it is not *being*, but *becoming*."[18] To become German, that is, to become *more* German, is, in Nietzsche's eyes, an invitation to "de-Germanize" oneself, to surpass oneself, to leave oneself behind, to become permeable to all the riches of humanity, to "form" oneself, allowing oneself to be fascinated, as Goethe was, by a nostalgia for the South and for Being. Nothing could be less Nietzschean than complacency in the national glory that arose after the victory of 1870. In his view, Chauvinism and nationalism spelled the death of German hope, precisely because, according to Bertram, Germanism—like the Superman, moreover—is, for Nietzsche, a kind of Platonic idea, as it were inaccessible. It is a hope, and, above all, a demand with regard to oneself.

Hence Nietzsche's virulent criticism and amorous hatred with regard to the Germans (that is to say, with regard to himself as a German, as an aspect of German Becoming), but also with regard to this German and Lutheran form of Christianity which was, as we have seen, part of himself, and which he never forgave for having twisted, falsified, and distorted its Greek heritage. For, in Nietzsche's view—and in this respect he is faithful, despite the modifications and changes he makes to it, to a tradition that goes back to Winckelmann and to Goethe—the true Platonic Idea of Germanism resides in a conception of ancient Greece as the country of "artists of life", that is, a superior humanity in possession of the secret of existence, a country whose image Nietzsche projects both into the past and into the future: "Every day we are becoming more and more Greek, to begin with, as is proper, in our concepts and in our value judgments [...]: but at some stage, one hopes, also with our body! Here lies (and here has always lain) my hope for the Germans."[19]

It is now the theme of Greece, which has just appeared, that is to be orchestrated, in the perhaps unexpected tonality of *Justice*. For Nietzsche's hesitations and contradictions are soothed and reconciled in the contemplation of Justice according to Heraclitus, that is, by the most Greek of all the Greeks. "Only a Greek," as Nietzsche wrote in *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, "was capable of finding such an idea to be a foundation of an apology for the cosmos."[20] Nietzsche goes on to explain that the experience of combat, rivalry, and struggle, was

17 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 62. I have been unable to find this text in the fifth edition. [Nor is the source of this quotation given in Norton's translation.]

18 [Dieses Leben ist keine Frömmigkeit, sondern ein Fromm-Werden. Keine Gesundheit, sondern ein Gesund-Werden. Kein Wesen, sondern ein Werden. Keine Ruhe, sondern ein Üben. Wir sind es noch nicht; werden es aber (Luther, *Commentary on Philippians* 3: 13; in Luther, *Sämmtliche Schriften*, ed. Johann Georg Walch, 23 vols. (reprinted St Louis, Mo.: Concordia, 1883-1910): vol. 15, 1494-95; cited in Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 59).]

19 [This passage, which concludes the chapter "The German Becoming" in the seventh edition of Bertram's *Nietzsche*, the basis of Pitrou's French translation, is not included in Norton's translation, which is presumably based on an earlier edition; cf. Bertram, *Nietzsche: Versuch einer Mythologie*, p. 99. See Nietzsche's *Nachlass*, August-September 1885; KSA 11, 41[4], 679.]

20 *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, §5 (KSA 1, 825).

a fundamental characteristic of Greek life "in the gymnasia and in the *palestras*."[21] Generalizing from this experience, Heraclitus sees in this universal struggle, "in which the judges seemed to fight, and fighters seemed to be their own judges,"[22] Justice itself, the sole form of Justice. The divine eye that contemplates the universe sees all contraries, and all oppositions converge in an invisible harmony: an artist's gaze, or that of a child contemplating the play of the world.

This is an artistic vision of the universe, but it is also a musical one: "Over all the individuals realized in sound and the struggles their passions undergo, over the whole vortex of opposing forces, there soars in the supremest self-possession an overwhelming symphonic intelligence which out of all this conflict brings forth concord: Wagner's music as a whole is an image of the world as it was understood by the great Ephesian philosopher: a harmony produced by conflict, the unity of justice and enmity."[23] It therefore comes as no surprise that the following chapter is dedicated to "Music." It should really have been given this title, rather than that of *Arion*, which seems to be neither a Nietzschean myth nor a symbol. If the preceding chapter allowed us to catch a glimpse of what Nietzsche meant by a return to Greek thought, the hope and ideal of the German soul, this one explains a different aspect of German "Becoming": music. In any case, it is an essential chapter in the perspective of the general economy of the book. For we know, from his correspondence with Gundolf and with Ernst Glöckner, that Bertram had planned to give his work a different title, *The Music of Socrates*.[24] It is an essential chapter, that gives us a foretaste of what, toward the end of the work, the evocation of Socrates allows us to glimpse: Nietzsche dreaming of a musical Socrates, who is then identified with Dionysos, just as music itself is identified for him with the Dionysian state. Bertram therefore analyses the successive and contradictory attitudes toward music adopted by Nietzsche in the various stages of his development, notably because of his break with Wagner: his surpassing of German nationalism (so closely bound up with music), and the increasing fascination exerted upon him by the South. It is an itinerary that moves from enthusiasm to repugnance, from admiration for Wagnerian harmony (and by the same token, as we have seen, Heraclitean) to a deliberate preference for Mediterranean melody. Ultimately, however, as Bertram emphasizes, Nietzsche's ineradicable northern character betrays him: in 1882, when composing his orchestration of the *Hymn to Life* (with text by Lou von Salomé), Nietzsche had believed he was producing an example of a music of the South, anti-Romantic and anti-Christian. But an Italian who heard this *Hymn*, as played by Peter Gast, thought he was listening to Church music: "He had a vision of Calvary Hill with the seven stations of the cross!"[25] A highly significant anecdote: for Nietzsche, music was always ultimately a sign of the legacy of Germanic Christianity; born of tragic pessimism, music is suffering and the transcendence of suffering. Music and pessimism are both

21 *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, §5 (KSA 1, 825).

22 [*Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, §6 (KSA 1, 826).]

23 *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*, §9 [see *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 242; KSA 1, 494. The "philosopher of Ephesus" is, of course, Heraclitus.]

24 See Heinz Raschel, *Das Nietzsche-Bild im George-Kreis: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Mythologeme* [Monographien zur Nietzsche-Forschung, vol. 12] (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984), pp. 172 [Gundolf's letter to Bertram of 6 February 1918] and 186 [Glöckner's letter to Bertram of 3 January 1918].

25 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 102.

Pierre Hadot
translated by:
Paul Bishop

signs and masks of the end, of finality, and of death. Ultimately, music is Passion, in the liturgical sense of the word.

This theme of the Passion and of suffering is explored in the following chapter under the patronage, somewhat artificial, of Philoctetes (who is not a symbol used by Nietzsche).[26] Another motif, which had been developed at length in all the preceding chapters, is reintroduced along with this theme: that of the Christian atavism of Nietzsche, the son of a pastor. If Nietzsche said of Goethe that he was situated "between Pietism and Hellenism,"[27] it is particularly true of the Goethe whom, as we shall see, he often liked to use as a biographical mask; that is, it is true first and foremost of Nietzsche. For, on one hand, Nietzsche uses "Christian" tones analogous to those of Pascal or Novalis, speaking of the value of suffering and sickness, of the fruitfulness of asceticism, and of the acceptance of pain. On the other hand, however, he goes beyond Christianity to join Hellenism in its idea of a triumph over illness through the will to health, to life, and to healing. "Such happiness," he said of Epicurus, "could be invented only by a man who was suffering continually."[28]

The first six chapters are dominated by an evocation of the legacies, atavistic traits, and collective and traditional representations, that exerted an influence on Nietzsche's psychology. The ten following chapters that follow, in contrast, invoke the deep instincts of the Nietzschean soul: betrayal (*Judas*), concealment (*Mask*), and the mythical personalities behind which Nietzsche hides himself, because he recognizes himself in them: Goethe (*Weimar*), *Napoleon*. After a kind of interlude concerning Nietzsche's style (*Jokes*, *Cunning*, and *Revenge*), subsequent chapters evoke the *Stimmung* proper to the Nietzschean soul, his cult of the fragmentary, of the aphorism, of the Moment (*Anecdote*), the autumnal tone (*Indian Summer*), the magic of the South (*Claude Lorrain*), the music of the South (*Venice*), and the premonition of the end (*Portofino*).

The last three chapters, *Prophecy*, *Socrates*, and *Eleusis*, orchestrate in a grandiose way the theme of the premonition of the end, which is at the same time a projection toward the future, allowing each reader to glimpse the figure of Dionysos.

Let us return, albeit briefly, to the content of these chapters and to the links between them.

Bertram uses the figure of *Judas* (who seems never to appear in Nietzsche's work) to symbolize the drama of the Nietzschean soul which, although naturally full of gratitude and acknowledgement, is nevertheless moved by a profound instinct of betrayal, which prompts it to deny and to slander what it loves: "To attack is for me a form of gratitude."[29]

The chapter on the *Mask* is one of the most important in the book, for it analyzes with great subtlety the meaning of Nietzsche's strategies of concealment.

26 [In Norton's translation, the chapter title *Philoktet*, translated by Pitrou as *Philoctète*, is translated as *Illness*.]

27 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 108. [Nietzsche, *Nachlass*, May-July 1885; KSA 11, 35[66], 539.]

28 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 197. Cf. *The Gay Science*, §45 [trans. Kaufmann, p. 110; KSA 3, 411].

29 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 123 [cf. *Ecce Homo*, "Why I am so wise," §7; trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992): 17; KSA 6, 275].

On the one hand, he needs to hide behind mythical figures to express and confess himself: Goethe, Napoleon, but above all, Socrates. On the other, Socratic irony inspires its own ironic method of dissimulation, its style with double meanings, which is based on the "great educator's" need to practice what Kierkegaard called "indirect communication."[30] He therefore conceals himself behind a character, or behind an attitude he adopts without identifying himself with it, or behind an ironic tone. As the final chapters of the book suggest, the deep justification of this dissimulation lies in the sheer impossibility of expressing the mystery of existence.

The next two chapters sketch two of the masks, as Nietzsche imagines and recreates them, behind which he most enjoyed taking refuge: Goethe (symbolized by the town of *Weimar*, which held a magical attraction for Nietzsche) and *Napoleon*.

Jokes, Cunning, and Revenge is a "prelude in German rhymes" to *The Gay Science*, a prelude whose title is taken from an operetta by Goethe that was set to music by Peter Gast, a composer dear to Nietzsche. The rhymed sayings of this "prelude in German rhymes" deliberately imitate those of Goethe. The evocation of this stylistic kinship provides Bertram with the opportunity to engage in a suggestive study of Nietzsche's style, and in particular the structure of his aphorisms.

This notion of the aphorism leads, naturally enough, to the next chapter, which starts out from a consideration of a related literary form, the *Anecdote*. If, as Bertram thinks, Nietzsche's technique can be reduced to his masterful and Romantic handling of the anecdote, it is precisely because this particular form of aphorism has its roots in Nietzsche's soul. The Nietzschean idea is a symbol, an image, grasped in "an azure moment of sinful happiness,"[31] to use Nietzsche's words, in a privileged moment, since his life is made up of isolated, autonomous moments, and expresses itself in fragments, almost all of which have a purely anecdotal character. As Bertram remarks with profundity, even the doctrine of the Eternal Return is the fruit and the glorification of a supreme Moment.[32] We can only experience eternity, Bertram remarks, in the form of the Dionysian Moment: we can only affirm eternity in the *yes* we say to the *Now* that justifies the entire universe.

In my view, the four following chapters are the most fascinating and convincing in the work. It is remarkable how Bertram enables us to feel the fundamental tones of Nietzschean inner music and landscape, uncovering all the meaning that, for Nietzsche, was contained in these words, heavily laden with magical and mythical value: *Indian Summer*, *Claude Lorrain*, *Venice*, *Portofino*.

Indian Summer (*Nachsommer*) is the title of a novel written by the Austrian writer Adalbert Stifter and published in 1857; Nietzsche said of it that it was "the only German book, after Goethe," that had "a magic effect" on him.[33] The predilection of

30 On this problem, cf. Pierre Hadot, *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique*, pp. 78-95 [*Philosophy as a Way of Life*, pp. 150ff.]

31 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 198 [*The Will to Power*, §1039, in Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, ed. Walter Kaufmann, trans. R. J. Hollingdale and Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1968): 535; KSA 11, 14[1], 217; cf. KSA 14, 758-59].

32 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 202.

33 Nietzsche, *Nachlass*, October-November 1888; KSA 13, 24[10], 634 [das einzige deutsche Buch nach Goethe, das für mich Zauber hat]. This entire text may serve to illustrate several pages from Bertram: "As far as Goethe is concerned: the first impression, a very early impression, decided everything: the lion-novella [cf. Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 204], which was,

the author of *Zarathustra* for this distinguished, elegant, conservative, backward-looking work is surprising.

This "late summer," this "Indian summer," is above all the serene wisdom of an old man, the Baron of Risach, who has withdrawn to a country estate, the Asperhof, located in the mountains of Austria, and lives in a marvellous landscape in close contact with nature, devoting himself to gardening and agriculture, dedicating his life to the cult of beauty and art. It is also about the late reunion of two beings who loved each other in their youth. It is highly significant that Nietzsche was fascinated by this dream of aristocratic life, spent amid beauty, nature, and tranquillity. A tranquillity that is indeed autumnal, in that it combines luminous happiness, maturity and fecundity, as well as a premonition of death. The fundamental tone of the Nietzschean soul is autumnal; it is fascinated by the light of the October sun. "Gilded cheerfulness, come! / sweetest, secretest / foretaste of death!"[34]

One of these autumnal notes is the following, concerning the year 1888: "Never have I experienced such an autumn, nor have I thought anything of the sort possible on earth—a Claude Lorrain thought on to infinity, each day of the same excessive perfection."[35] The paintings by Claude Lorrain to which Bertram dedicates the following chapter meant, for Nietzsche, both the autumn light and the "South," with all the mythical, magical significance that the word held for him: the desire to transcend Germanism, Europe, and even Greece. Ultimately, it is "a de-realized symbol," as Bertram says, "of a higher reality, a mysterious medium through which he senses and reveres the first homeland of his humanity and, beyond that, of his German humanity."[36]

The following chapter, *Venice*, allows us a glimpse of Nietzsche's emotional geography: Basel, Genoa, Turin, Venice; above all Venice, "the only place on earth that I love," "a consecrated place for my feeling."[37] "When I seek another word for music I never find any other word than Venice. I do not know how to distinguish between tears and music—I do not know how to think of happiness, of the south, without a shudder of faintheartedness."[38] This music of Venice is for him, as it was for Goethe in his *Italian Journey*, the "Song of the Gondolier" that his soul wished to sing, the cry of the solitary soul who does not know whether another soul will respond to his cry.[39]

---

strangely enough, the first that I learned of him, gave me once and for all my concept, my taste of 'Goethe.' An autumnal feeling, transfigured into purity, in enjoyment and allowing things to grow ripe, in waiting, an October sun rising up into the spiritual heights; something golden, something that sweetens, something mild, not marble—that is what I call Goethean. Later I absorbed, on account of this concept of 'Goethe,' Adalbert Stifter's *Nachsommer* with a highly favourable disposition: basically it is the only German book after Goethe that has a magic effect on me."

34 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 206 [*Dionysos-Dithyramben*, "Die Sonne sinkt"; *Dithyrambs of Dionysus*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Anvil Press, 1984), "The Sun Sinks," p. 51].

35 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 218 [*Ecce Homo*, "Twilight of the Idols," §3; trans. Hollingdale, p. 88; KSA 6, 356].

36 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 222.

37 [Nietzsche's letter to Overbeck of 24 March 1887; KSB 8, 47; and his letter to Carl Fuchs of 14 April 1888; KSB 8, 294. Cited in Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 225.]

38 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 342 [*Ecce Homo*, "Why I am so clever," §7, trans. Hollingdale, p. 32; KSA 6, 291].

39 [See the poem at the end of this section of *Ecce Homo*.]

The idea of Zarathustra came to Nietzsche's mind in two places, both symbolic for him: one is the Engadine, more precisely along Lake Silvaplana, next to an enormous block of rock, not far from Surlei; the other is the bay of Rapallo, dominated by the promontory of *Portofino*. It is not by chance that Nietzsche emphasizes this detail, because, for him, Portofino is a symbol of the art of ending things. "The best [musicians] of the second rank always become restless as the end approaches and do not manage to slope into the sea in such profound and calm harmony as, for example, the mountains at Portofino—where the bay of Genoa ends its melody."[40] The art of knowing how to finish was Nietzsche's great art: knowing how to finish his aphorisms, which offer new views when they fall, also knowing how to finish an entire world that ends up with him, to launch, at this very end, an appeal toward the Ocean of the Future.

The last three final chapters—*Prophecy*, *Socrates*, *Eleusis*—are closely linked, because they touch upon three aspects of the mission with which Nietzsche believed he had been charged: annunciation, pedagogy, and mystery.

In his chapter on *Prophecy*, Bertram traces the different stages that Nietzsche went through as he became aware of his vocation: his childhood and his youth, then his encounter with Wagner, that initial annunciation that took the form of *The Birth of Tragedy*. The revelation of his mission gradually took form, until it became a blinding flash at the time of *Zarathustra*: an awareness of a millennial mission, making him forever a man of predestination and solitude, a consciousness that erupts in his ecstatic glorification of the destiny that gave him this vocation, but also a consciousness of the sin, of the *hybris* he is committing in acclaiming himself as a prophet, and, finally, a consciousness of the tragic end that will be the punishment for this *hybris*: "I am a prophet of the lightning: […] this lightning is called Superman." "A flash of lightning, Dionysos becomes visible in emerald beauty".[41] Dionysos, the god of becoming!

The book's culmination is the chapter devoted to *Socrates*. Many pages have prepared and announced it, particularly the chapters entitled *Arion* and *Music*. Socrates, Nietzsche's mask, whom he pursues with his amorous hatred. What he hates in Socrates is the theoretician, the critic, and the moralist inherent in Nietzsche. Yet he is nostalgic for the musical Socrates evoked in the *Phaedo*. In particular, Socrates is a name and symbol for Nietzsche's burning nostalgia for being the Great Educator. His pedagogical ideal is that of Plato's Socrates, of education in an atmosphere of love. He dreams of a new Platonic Academy, of a "Community of the Elect." In the Nietzschean description of the great educator, moreover, we find the theme of concealment that we encountered in the context of the figure of the *Mask*. The great educator never says what he thinks. Like that of Socrates, his greatness manifests itself in silence. Nietzsche's drama consists in the fact he himself was a master without disciples, but his triumph lies in his projection of his Socratic myth, his singing Socrates, onto the gigantic figure of Zarathustra, the Dionysian educator. And, mysteriously, as in Plato's *Symposium*, the figure of Nietzsche's Socrates comes

40 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 234 [*The Gay Science*, §281; trans. Kaufmann, p. 227; KSA 3, 525].

41 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 259 [*Zarathustra*, *Prologue*, §4, in Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969, p. 45; KSA 4, 18; and "Klage der Ariadne"; "Ariadne's Complaint," in *Dithyrambs of Dionysus*, trans. Hollingdale, p. 59; KSA 6, 401].

SPECIAL 30% DISCOUNT

Heidegger, Hölderlin, and the Subject of Poetic Language

Toward a New Poetics of Dasein Ecstacy

By Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei



"The perennially interesting complex of topics—Heidegger's thought, Hölderlin's thought and poetry, Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin's poetry—is here enriched by a fourth meditation, written against the grain: Jennifer Gosetti-Ferencei reads Heidegger's thought in the light of Hölderlin's poetry and theoretical writings. The outcome is a defense and justification of poetic subjectivity at once subtle and exhilarating. Heidegger, Hölderlin, and the Subject of Poetic Language is composed with admirable passion, erudition, and conceptual flair. It will be indispensable for students of continental philosophy, literature, and literary theory." **—Stanley Corngold, Princeton University**

"The book is a state-of-the-art discussion of Heidegger . . . The reader emerges from this book with a tremendous sense of possibility—of new avenues opened up, and of old debates unclogged."**—Nicholas Birns, New School University**

JENNIFER ANNA GOSETTI-FERENCEI is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University. She is the author of The Ecstatic Quotidian: Phenomenological Sightings in Modern Art & Literature and of After the Palace Burns, which won The Paris Review prize in poetry.

PROMOTIONAL CODE:
GOS09

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY PRESS

www.fordhampress.com | 800-996-6987

336 pages | 978-0-8232-2361-9

Paperback ~ $24.00

to coincide with the figure of Dionysos, in the hymn to the Genius of the Heart, "the tempter-god whose voice knows how to descend into the netherworld of every soul."[42]

Eleusis (which is not a symbol explicitly used by Nietzsche) evokes the initiations into the mysteries of ancient Greece, whose secrets it was forbidden to reveal. Here, once again, Bertram traces Nietzsche's itinerary throughout his life, torn between the rationalist thirst for "knowledge" and communication, and the experience of the ineffable mystery. Even at his most rationalist and sceptical, one always finds in Nietzsche the theme of the mortal danger of knowledge, and a concern to conceal it beneath the veils of myth, and to respect mystery. At the high-point of his intellectualist period, he inscribed the following dedication into a copy of *Daybreak*: "Whoever will have much to proclaim one day, / Must long remain silent unto himself: / Whoever intends to ignite lightning one day, / Must long be—a cloud."[43] Words cannot express what is accessible only through the experience and suffering one has gone through: Aristotle said that the initiates of Eleusis did not learn, but they "experienced," or they "suffered."[44] Nietzsche's itinerary thus leads up to an ultimate ineffable experience.

The Legend

As I have said, Bertram's book is, above all, a work of art. It is a kind of prose poem, written in a lyrical, even hieratic style in which Nietzschean myths and symbols reflect and tinge one another, in a way that is simultaneously musical and plastic.

In his *Introduction*, entitled *Legend*, Bertram justifies the "mythological" method he employed in writing his work. In fact, and we shall return to this point, it is true that, in a certain sense, the method defined in the introduction is not quite the one he actually applies. Nevertheless, the considerations he develops in this way at the beginning of his book are extremely significant.

For him, real history (he is thinking in particular of literary history) is the history of souls, and the revelation of souls. This being the case, history can never be a pure statement of fact. All history is interpretation. What subsists of the past is never life itself, but its "legend." This is particularly true in the history of individuals. Biography is always, in some way or another, hagiography. Only in a legendary form

42 [See *Beyond Good and Evil*, §295; *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1968): 423; KSA 5, 237. Cited in Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 284.] [Cf. Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, pp. 147ff.]

43 [Inscribed into August Bungert's copy of *Daybreak* in Genoa on 14 March 1883; KSB 8, 597. Cited in Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 300.]

44 [See Synesius, *Dio*, 10.48a, citing Aristotle: "As Aristotle claims that those who are being initiated into the mysteries are to be expected not to learn anything but to suffer some change, to be put into a certain condition, i.e., to be fitted for some purpose" (*The Works of Aristotle*, ed. Sir David Ross, vol. 12, *Select Fragments* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), "Fragments on Philosophy," no. 15, p. 87; cf. Synesius of Cyrene, *The Essays and Hymns*, trans. Augustine Fitzgerald, 2 vols. (Oxford; London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford, 1930): vol. 1, p. 163. For further discussion, see Walter Burkert, *Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical* [*Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche*] [1977], trans. John Raffan (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p. 286: "Aristotle states, however, that the important thing was not to learn anything but to suffer or experience (*pathein*) and to be brought into the appropriate state of mind through the proceedings." Cf. Bertram's discussion in *Nietzsche,* p. 300.]

can a personality be prolonged beyond time. It lives, it survives, it wants to become an image, an image with its own life that gradually transforms itself over time. Each generation adds to this image and, in a sense, a "great man" is always our creation, just as much as we are his. Thus history is the active creation of images, not the reproduction and conservation of what has been.

True history is thus poetry, or literary creation. This does not mean that history is the arbitrary invention of images and myths, but that it is necessarily mythic and poetic, because it emanates from its object—here, Bertram is always thinking of great men and of Nietzsche—, a force that shapes its own body and its posthumous image, its legend and its myth.

The image of Nietzsche that Bertram presents in his book thus corresponds to a moment in the history of his myth, to the vision one could have of Nietzsche from the perspective of the beginning of the twentieth century. It does not claim that, in the future, there will not be "any higher stage of his future legend, any deeper myth of his being."[45]

From all these statements of principle, we should first of all retain the last one. His portrait of the author of *Zarathustra* is—as Bertram is perfectly well aware— closely linked to a particular epoch and environment (which, as we shall see, exercised a very strong influence on his work, and which, as Bertram himself came to believe, was ultimately harmful).[46] Yet unlike what sometimes happens to those of our contemporaries who, like Bertram, doubt the possibility of historical objectivity, he avoids considering his exegesis as a definitive and final explanation, for he does not forget that each moment in the evolution of the myth is only provisional.

Secondly, it could be said that these initial statements do not correspond precisely to the book's method. No doubt, to some extent, Bertram describes the myth of Nietzsche as it was conceived and experienced in the circle around Stefan George, which is indeed a moment in the history of the Nietzsche myth. Yet if this perspective, this vision, which is linked, so to speak, to a particular time and place, leads Bertram to privilege certain aspects of Nietzsche's personality over others, they do not explain the peculiar structure of the book, each chapter of which is situated at a different observation point, in an attempt to grasp the whole of Nietzsche's personality, in each of the myths or symbols that pertain to his very being. Here, the word "myth" does not have exactly the same meaning as in the *Introduction*, where Bertram uses it as a synonym for "legend." It refers instead to images which, for Nietzsche, are, in Bertram's expression, "points of crystallization,"[47] whether they be historical or mythological figures, cities or landscapes. From this perspective, there is something "psychoanalytic" about Bertram's method, in the broadest sense of the term. It is an exploration of the Nietzschean "imaginary." I mean by this that Bertram is trying to circumscribe the Nietzschean personality, by analyzing everything that crystallizes around the symbols, images, figures, and tones (for instance, that of autumn) that fascinate him and have become, in some sense, a part of himself. Ever since Bertram, literary criticism has accustomed us this kind of approach. At his time, however, it was an entirely new procedure, which could moreover be entirely justified

45 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 9.

46 See Bertram's letter to Ernst Glöckner of 2 April 1918, in Raschel, *Das Nietzsche-Bild im George-Kreis*, pp. 205-06.

47 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 267.

by the particular nature of the Nietzschean soul, for which each idea is transformed into sensual emotion and imaginative vision. Thus, to give just one example, Nietzsche does not hesitate to speak of "the taste of Goethe,"[48] which, for him, is that of an October sun, of gold and honey. And his thought is dominated by images laden with emotion, such as the North and the South, or the Eternal Recurrence, or the Superman, whose precursors are the great figures of humanity, images that are "mythologized," so to speak, by his visionary thought, even when he wants to be critical and rationalist. Added to this is his need to mask himself behind the figures with which he identifies, such as those of Socrates and Goethe, or to create a legend out of himself, in his lifetime. Bertram was therefore perfectly right to try and analyze these foundational images, these symbols, masks, and myths, which imposed themselves upon the Nietzschean soul. He did not succumb to the easy option, which would have been to concentrate above all on the myths that are, so to speak, self-evident, such as Dionysos, the Eternal Recurrence, or the Superman, but he tried to detect the less noticeable symbols, which reveal the essence of his personality. Some titles, as we have said, are not particularly felicitous, because they do not belong to Nietzsche's vocabulary, as is the case with *Arion*, *Philoctetes*, and *Judas*, but the realities they symbolize—music, suffering, betrayal—are eminently Nietzschean. Bertram also had the great merit of choosing this symbols while situating them within the German tradition that anticipated them. It too is evoked both in the texts placed as epigraphs at the head of each chapter, and in the analysis that develops the meaning of these symbols. Yet this "psychoanalysis" lacks, among other things, one essential element: the figure of the female, and Nietzsche's attitude toward women. There should have been a chapter that could have been entitled *Ariadne*, because of the note sent by Nietzsche, on the brink of madness, to Cosima Wagner: "Ariadne, I love you. Dionysos,"[49] and because of the extraordinary *Ariadne's Lament* that features in the *Dithyrambs of Dionysos*. This lacuna may be explained by Bertram's own homosexual tendencies, and by the climate that prevailed in the circle around Stefan George, which influenced him.

The methodological principles set out at the beginning of the book thus do not entirely explain its structure. According to the Introduction, the "Attempt at a Mythology" mentioned in the book's subtitle should have presented the state of the Nietzsche legend at the beginning of the twentieth century.[50] Yet the nineteen chapters that make up the book actually present Nietzsche's inner mythology, although the choice of symbols is influenced in part by the Nietzsche myth in the George Circle.

Nevertheless, Bertram's theory of biography and literary history, as set out in the *Introduction*, deserves our attention. According to Bertram, as we said, it is impossible to resurrect the past. To write history is in fact to describe the life and the survival, present and actual, of the past, both in us and in collective consciousness. The observer's viewpoint is part of the description. In a lecture given in Bonn in 1919-1920, Bertram applied to history what Goethe said of nature: "In speaking of nature,

48 See above [note 33], *Nachlass* of October-November 1888.

49 [See Nietzsche's letter to Cosima Wagner of early January 1889; Friedrich Nietzsche, *Werke in drei Bänden*, ed. Karl Schlechta (Munich: Hanser, 1966): vol. 3, p. 1350.]

50 [Cf. "Introduction," p. 6: "The following pages are intended to provide studies toward a mythology [...] of the last great German, to record some of what the historical moment of our present seems to see in and as Nietzsche."]

each person speaks only of himself."[51]

This idea that perfect historical objectivity is impossible should not be too surprising for our contemporaries; I expect they have read Raymond Aron's *Introduction to the Philosophy of History: Essay on the Limits of Historical Objectivity*,[52] a book from which I should like to cite a few phrases to show their kinship to the views expressed by Bertram twenty years earlier: "All spiritual activity fits into a tradition in and by which the individual defines himself [...] Every age chooses for itself a past, drawing on the collective reservoir, each new existence transfigures the inheritance it has received, by giving it another future, another significance [...] This explains how masterworks are enriched by the admiration of the ages. It explains why no fact, as long it is not purely material, is definitively excluded from the actuality."[53] "For human beings, there is no truth of an existence. Each interpreter composes an image, and only God could discern the unity of a final will."[54]

Bertram's theses belong, in fact, to a long history about which we shall have more to say. For the moment, let us say that this critique of historical objectivity does not authorize the historian to interpret facts arbitrarily. Bertram states this more clearly in the lecture cited above: writing history is always an act of literary creation, but one "which assumes as its subject-matter the tradition of facts, a tradition subjected to the most conscientious research and attempts at verification. It is a literary creation which has gone through the historical school of the nineteenth century and which restricts itself, aware of its limitations, to the facts attested by tradition and proven by the most rigorous attempts at critical verification, but which moves within this limitation [...] like Bach does in his counterpoint: very freely. It is a writing of history that ultimately has the right to return to this spiritual attitude which, according to Goethe, constitutes the real, unique value of history: enthusiasm."[55]

Let us salute in passing this homage to the great historical school of the nineteenth century, and to the kind of indispensable training that it represents, on which our contemporaries would do well to meditate; and let us note that Bertram by no means had contempt for the concern for accuracy.

It must be admitted that, in his book on Nietzsche, Bertram constantly strives to back up his affirmations by texts (his book is, moreover, a sort of Nietzschean breviary), without trying to force their sense or over-interpret them. Rather, his method consists in drawing from this material a magnificent literary work, a veritable

51 Part of this lecture is reproduced in the *Nachwort* added by Hartmut Buchner to his new edition of Ernst Bertram's German text, in *Nietzsche*, Bonn: Bouvier, 9th [and 10th] edn, 1985, pp. 403-04. [Cf. Goethe's letter to C. L. F. Schultz of 8 January 1819: *Jeder spricht nur sich selbst aus, indem er von der Natur spricht*. This passage is also cited in Georg Simmel, *Goethe* (Leipzig: Klinkhardt & Biermann, 1913): 36, and Oswald Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte*, vol. 1, *Gestalt und Wirklichkeit* (Munich: Beck, 1920): 137.]

52 Raymond Aron, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire*, Paris: Gallimard, 1938, p. 103.

53 This had already been stated by Jacob Burckhardt, as summarized by Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 8: "Thucydides may have reported a fact of the first importance that will be noticed only a hundred years from now" [cf. Jacob Burckhardt, *Griechische Kulturgeschichte*, Introduction; and *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*].

54 Aron, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire*, p. 112.

55 In Buchner, "Nachwort des Herausgebers," p. 404.

prose poem, which he offers to the memory of Nietzsche as a great creator.

By demanding that the historian write not merely a "scientific" but also a literary work, Bertram wanted him to engage, in a personal way, in a creative effort, which would express the life of the historical object in a consciousness that is itself historical. For him, a seemingly objective and impartial report is not sufficient to enable us to know reality. One must coincide internally with the spiritual life of historical reality through the creation of a literary work, itself endowed with spiritual life, and capable of provoking enthusiasm and emotion.

The circle of Stefan George

Although Bertram himself never used the word, his historical method nevertheless implies, as we have seen, the idea of the *historicity* of interpretations. He admits that the image of Nietzsche he presents is "the image of the moment in which his myth appears to us to be standing at present."[56] It is therefore legitimate, and even necessary, to resituate Bertram's book, too, within its historical and spiritual context.

Bertram's *Nietzsche* is dedicated "To my friend Ernst Glöckner," and this is full of significance.

It was Glöckner who had been at the origin of the book. It was he who, on 5 April 1915, because of his concern for Bertram's state of health, had advised him to undertake a great work: "Not a scientific book, but a book of life, in which *you will write yourself*"—(already the "writing of the self" of Michel Foucault!)—"as is the case with all books, if they have any real value [...] There is a topic for which you are as it were predestined: Nietzsche." And a few lines later, Glöckner returns to the same exhortation: "Write yourself and you will write the best book about Nietzsche."[57]

Bertram, 22 years old, had met Ernst Glöckner, aged 21, in 1906. It was the beginning of a long friendship, and an enduring love: their correspondence, sometimes daily, which lasted from 1907 to 1934, the date of Glöckner's death, consists of some five thousand letters.[58] In 1927, Bertram refused an appointment to the Chair of the History of Literature at the University of Munich, in order to be able to realize his dream of a life shared with Glöckner in Cologne.[59] The latter is described by a contemporary as follows: "Doctor Glöckner is a curious, monk-like figure, who earns his living by producing works of calligraphy and who belongs to the circle of Stefan George."[60]

56 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 61.

57 Some letters by Ernst Glöckner to Ernst Bertram are reproduced in Raschel, *Das Nietzsche-Bild im George-Kreis*, pp. 171-213. [Here cited from p. 184.]

58 On the relationship between Ernst Glöckner and Ernst Bertram, see the *Nachwort* by Inge Jens, placed at the end of the German edition, with a commentary by the same author, of Thomas Mann's letters to Bertram (*Thomas Mann an Ernst Bertram: Briefe aus den Jahren 1910-1955*, pp. 291-307), and the correspondence between Ernst Glöckner and Ernst Bertram in Raschel, *Das Nietzsche-Bild im George-Kreis*, pp. 171-213.

59 See Jens, "Nachwort," pp. 297-298.

60 Cited in Kurt Hildebrandt, *Das Werk Stefan Georges* (Hamburg: E. Hauswedell, 1960): 419.

It was thanks to Glöckner that Bertram met Stefan George, who was, moreover, already familiar with Bertram's poems, in 1910.

Who, then, was this Stefan George (1868-1933)? For the history of literature, he was a poet who, in his time, was considered a very great poet. But he was also an unusual personality, who had an extensive influence and who, through the intermediary of his "circle," or his group of admirers, exercised a considerable influence, in terms of literature, scholarship, and politics, on the whole of Germany in the twentieth century. The signs of this influence are still visible today. In 1983, for example, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of his death, a symposium was held by the Heidelberg Academy, devoted precisely to Stefan George's impact on scholarship, either directly or through such disciples as Friedrich Gundolf or Max Kommerell. For instance, Hans-Georg Gadamer evoked his studies in Marburg, and his repeated encounters there with the work and thought of Stefan George, through such personages as Ernst Robert Curtius, Friedrich Wolters, and Paul Friedländer, whose pupils included Friedrich Klingner and Georg Rohde.[61] In Frankfurt, the same influence could be discerned in Karl Reinhardt, Walter F. Otto and, in particular, Max Kommerell. It was then, particularly between the two wars, that Germany rediscovered Hölderlin, thanks to the work of a young poet, Hellingrath, who died at the front in the First World War, and who also belonged to George's movement. Nor was Gadamer's teacher Martin Heidegger a stranger to the general admiration for Stefan George. According to Gadamer, this movement produced a profound transformation in approach to history, philology, and even other disciplines.

In his youth (1889), Stefan George had been closely linked to the French Symbolist movement, and he had come under the influence of Mallarmé in particular. One of his central ideas seems to have been rooted in this experience: the key rôle of language, understood as it were in its own right, independent of its communicative function, as a sacred incantatory power.[62] "The poet," as Maurice Boucher has written about George, "will have to recreate language, giving a purer meaning to the words of the tribe, choosing and assembling them to create multiple evocations, an allusive density laden with mysteries, secret correspondences, and magical prolongations [...] Poetry will thus be the work of an elite who, in their haughty solitude, will not speak for the crowd at all, but will elaborate, among an inner circle of initiates, an erudite polyphony where the voices of thinkers and priests shall mingle."[63]

In *The Year of the Soul* [*Das Jahr der Seele*], published in 1897, one can discern "the subtle influence" of Ida Coblenz, the only woman whom George ever

61 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Stefan George (1868-1933)," in *Die Wirkung Stefan Georges auf die Wissenschaft: Ein Symposium*, ed. Hans-Joachim Zimmermann [Supplemente zu den Sitzungsberichten der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, 1984, vol. 4] (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1985): 39-49 [cited here from "Die Wirkung Stefan Georges auf die Wissenschaft," in Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 9, *Ästhetik und Poetik II: Hermeneutik im Vollzug* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1993): 258-270]; here, pp. 39-42 [i.e., pp. 258-262].

62 Gadamer, "Stefan George (1868-1933)," p. 45 ["Die Wirkung Stefan Georges auf die Wissenschaft," pp. 259-60].

63 See Maurice Boucher, "Preface," in Stefan George, *Poèmes* 1886-1933, trans. with preface and commentary by Maurice Boucher (Paris: Aubier-Flammarion, 1969): 32. [Cf. Mallarmé's poem "Le Tombeau d'Edgar Poe," which includes the line *Donner un sens plus pur aux mots de la tribu*; Stéphane Mallarmé, *Œuvres complètes*, ed. Henri Mondor and G. Jean-Aubry (Paris: Gallimard, 1945): 70.] See also Charles du Bos, "Maquettes pour un hommage à Stefan George" [1926; pub. 1928], in *Approximations* (Paris: Éditions des Syrtes, 2000): 857-88.

loved, but with whom he had quickly broken up.[64] In the years that followed, Stefan George sought to increase his influence by becoming the center of a literary circle, in which he often liked to read his works, as if reciting psalms, before the members. This was also the moment in which his sentimental life became firmly oriented towards homosexuality. 1901 saw the official publication of the collection entitled *The Carpet of Life* [*Der Teppich des Lebens*]. This was the time of the "cosmic" circle in the Schwabing district of Munich (around 1903), which brought together such figures as Klages, Schuler, Wolfskehl (the organizer of the circle), and Gundolf, until it broke up in 1904. 1904 also witnessed the death, at the age of 16, of Maximilian Kronberger, the young man who had been the object of George's passionate and apparently completely "Platonic" love. This love is evoked in the collection entitled *The Seventh Ring* [*Der siebente Ring*] (1907), which practically divinized the dead youth, under the name of Maximin. In a diary entry of 2 August 1928, Charles du Bos speaks of "this new, sacrilegious mystery of Incarnation" that organized itself around "Maximin."[65]

As Michael Winkler has observed, the collapse of the Munich circle, along with other symptoms, shows how this group of friends, originally conceived as a poetic circle, had ended in failure. No doubt, George's admirers continued to meet, whether in Berlin, Bingen, or Heidelberg. Nevertheless, "George henceforth saw himself obliged to try to obtain the influence he still hoped to exert on the intellectual life of Germany primarily through the scholarly works of his friends."[66]

Gundolf and Wolters then founded the *Jahrbuch für die geistige Bewegung* (1910). Above all, however, the following years saw the publication of a series of monographs (*Werke der Wissenschaft aus dem Kreis der Blätter für die Kunst*), works by people close to or sympathetic to Stefan George, that helped disseminate the master's ideas into university scholarship.[67] In particular, these books included those by Heinrich Friedemann on Plato (1914), by Gundolf on Goethe (1916), and later by Kantorowicz on Frederick the II Hohenstaufen (1927).[68] Bertram's *Nietzsche*, which Glöckner had advised him to write in 1915, was published in 1918.

As Michael Winkler remarks, these studies shared certain characteristic features, including "an almost exclusive concentration on what was considered exemplary in previous epochs of Western high culture, whose spiritual world may serve for an age lacking direction, as an authoritative model; a striving for monumental unity which, in opposition to analytical perspectivism, unifies the diverse elements of historical reality, adds them together, and raises them to the level of heroic legend and myth."[69] One of the most original contributions of George's thought was the interest it attributed to the notion of 'form' (which must be understood in the sense of a whole that transcends its component parts). Hans-Georg Gadamer has placed a

64 For this detail, and those that follow, see Michael Winkler, *Stefan George* (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1970): 29 ff.

65 [See Charles du Bos, *Journal*, vol. 4, 1928 (Paris: Corrêa, 1950): 159.]

66 Winkler, *Stefan George*, p. 53.

67 See the book (with a bibliography) by Michael Winkler, *George-Kreis* (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1972).

68 [See Heinrich Friedemann, *Platon: Seine Gestalt* (Berlin: Blätter für die Kunst, 1914); Friedrich Gundolf, *Goethe* (Berlin: Bondi, 1916); Ernst Kantorowicz, *Kaiser Friedrich der Zweite* (Berlin: Bondi, 1927).]

69 Winkler, *George-Kreis*, p. 94.

great deal of emphasis on this point, describing the works arising from George's circle as *Gestaltbiographien*, or "biographies of Form,"[70] because instead of reducing works and actions to simple sequences of events and to a sum of historical influences, they see them as 'forms' that find their unity within themselves.

It was precisely in 1910, when Stefan George was giving this fresh impetus to his followers, that Bertram met the author of *The Seventh Ring*, and from 1915 on his project of writing a book on Nietzsche was integrated within the group's intellectual and "university" project, as outlined above. A letter from Bertram to Thomas Mann, dated 5 June 1916, attests to the admiration he felt in the presence of the Master: "The sight of a man who realizes his potential so completely and fearlessly, and who embodies the great *amor fati* as no one, so far as I know, after Nietzsche has ever done, is always something that gives one heart."[71]

Valuable testimony about the composition of the work and the reactions of Glöckner, Gundolf, and George can be found in the extracts of correspondence published by Heinz Raschel.[72] Glöckner, who had been at the origin of the project, sees everything, with considerable naivety, from the perspective of the cult he himself renders to Stefan George, and he is enthusiastic. On 3 January 1918, he writes that the chapter *Prophecy* had made a deep impression on him, and that this chapter will certainly have a tremendous effect on George. "It is almost as if the latter's life is being told here under someone else's name, the whole of his being that is essentially interpreted." He thinks the title that Bertram wanted to give to his book, "The Music of Socrates," is just as excellent. In his letter of 17 February 1918, Glöckner foresees that George will no doubt be less enthusiastic about the chapter *Socrates*, because he has never been happy with Nietzsche's position with regard to Socrates. Eventually, however, on 1 March 1918, he writes that George is satisfied with the chapter, and regards it as being of central importance.

Gundolf, for his part, voices several criticisms.[73] He completely refuses to accept the title "The Music of Socrates", on the grounds it makes no commercial sense (6 February 1918). And he asks questions: Is it really true that Nietzsche never strikes a theatrical pose? Isn't the role of the mask somewhat exaggerated? (25 February 1918). Again, he makes the following remark, which gives an accurate reflection of the arrogance of the circle's members: it is impossible to cite in connection with Nietzsche an author such as Dehmel, or such ephemeral writers as Thomas Mann, Fontane, or Conrad Ferdinand Meyer (29 March 1918). Bertram stuck to his guns, here, and eliminated only Richard Dehmel. In his letters to George, Gundolf shares his reflections on the book and on Nietzsche himself. He likes the book (22 February 1918), but Nietzsche's attitude as it emerges throughout the book, this "monomania" that leads him to engage in ceaseless self-contradiction and constantly to question what he has established, is a real torture for Gundolf. When Gundolf reproaches Nietzsche his big mouth, this amounts to an implicit criticism of the book's final chapter (*Eleusis*): "Nietzsche was never able to keep a secret." "What a difference

70 Gadamer, "Stefan George (1868-1933)," p. 43 ["Die Wirkung Stefan Georges auf die Wissenschaft," p. 263].

71 See Thomas Mann to Ernst Bertram, ed. Jens, pp. 217-18.

72 Raschel, *Das Nietzsche-Bild im George-Kreis*, pp. 171-213.

73 See also Gundolf's personal notes on Bertram's book, in Lothar Helbing and Claus Victor Bock (eds), *Stefan George: Dokumente seiner Wirkung aus dem Friedrich Gundolf Archiv der Universität London* (Amsterdam: Castrum Peregrini, 1984): 16-18.

from Goethe […], who either speaks plainly […] or falls silent in the face of what is inexplicable." Nietzsche is by no means non-theatrical, "he is always looking at how he strikes a pose," "he never lives without a mirror" (this is aimed at the beginning of the chapter *Mask*).

Reservations with regard to Stefan George and the ambiance surrounding him surface repeatedly in Bertram's letters to Glöckner. For him (28 October 1915), Heinrich Friedemann's book on Plato is unreadable, because it is written "in the jargon of the *Blätter*" (the series inspired by George). When reading the chapter *Claude Lorrain* out to George, he senses that the Master does not seem enthusiastic (27 March 1917). We learn from his letter of 31 December 1917 that Bertram intended to write, but never completed, two other chapters: *Tower of Babel* and *Rhythm*. On 6 January 1918, there is a tone of regret: "There is too much George in this book, I fear, but I could not help it, even though I saw this from the outset." It matters little: what counts for Bertram is what he expresses in his letter of 9 January 1918: "Thank you, my dear friend of my heart, for having given me the possibility of finishing this work and so giving *you* a cause for joy. *Your joy*, it is in your joy that the value of this work resides." With regard to the chapter *Judas*, Bertram (28 January 1918) makes an interesting remark about the autonomy of what he calls legend and myth: "That the legend [of Judas] 'exists,' and that it existed independently before the composition of the book, is quite sufficient; the fact that the author of the book is a poet is irrelevant." From March 1918 on, the letters mainly concern the problem of publication. On 2 April 1918, Bertram is worried: "It seems that the obstacles to printing have had and continue to have less to do with the printer, Bondi, than with the fact that the manuscript had not entirely been sifted through by the censors [of George and his circle, and that Bondi does not have the right to print anything that has not been completely approved. I am always under suspicion of some heretical deviation." And he again expresses the fear of having falsified the problem of Nietzsche by mixing in too much George.

After publication, Bertram bitterly notes (23 November 1919): "George, after the fact, has never forgiven the *Nietzsche* […] There are too many things in this book that he will not and cannot accept." "I shall never forget this experience: perhaps the Master himself can be a Judas." Finally, the definitive judgment is pronounced on 13 June 1924: "The 'circle' has been the greatest delusion of my life […]."

Considering the ambivalent and complex feelings of the different protagonists in this story, how should we define the relation that existed between Bertram's book and the circle of Stefan George? Should we consider, with Heinz Raschel,[74] that the influence exerted on the book by the poet of the *Seventh Ring* was considerable and ultimately detrimental, as was George's influence on German scholarship in general? Or else, on the contrary, should we, with Hartmut Buchner[75] and Inge Jens,[76] emphasize Bertram's independence with regard to George, and the deep differences of opinion between the author of *Nietzsche* and the circle? Should we, finally, with Hans-Georg Gadamer, judge that George's ideas had a positive influence on the development of research in the humanities?[77]

74 Raschel, *Das Nietzsche-Bild im George-Kreis*, pp. 153-70.

75 Buchner, "Nachwort des Herausgebers," pp. 409-10.

76 Jens, "Nachwort," pp. 300-06.

77 Gadamer, "Stefan George (1868-1933)," pp. 39-49 ["Die Wirkung Stefan Georges auf

Pierre Hadot
translated by:
Paul Bishop

To begin with, it should be acknowledged that Stefan George is already present in Bertram's book, in the form of some highly significant quotations from George's poems. In the Introduction,[78] first of all, there appear (anonymously) some verses from *Jahrhundertspruch*, a poem from *The Seventh Ring*, "Ten thousand die without a sound …"[79], lines that are very difficult to interpret. Charles du Bos, who cites them in his *Sketches for an Homage to Stefan George*, seems to think that only the Founder, the Prophet (*Künder*), hence the Poet, creates language.[80] Bertram, for his part, seems to see in the "ten thousand" "the crowd of the humble who die without glory," while the great king (or the great poet) bequeaths *his* name to posterity, becoming a representative figure, God's prophet for the age. George was obviously thought to be the Founder, Poet, and Prophet within his circle. In addition, the chapters *Arion* and *Socrates*[81] quote the last verses of the poem *Nietzsche*, taken from the *Seventh Ring*, which express George's attitude toward Nietzsche ("And when the austere and tormented voice...," "There is no path that leads over the icy cliffs...").[82] They express themes that are indeed taken up in Bertram's book:

die Wissenschaft"], pp. 258-70.

78 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 8.

79 [Cf. the poem:

Zehntausend sterben ohne klang: der Gründer
Nur gibt den namen .. für zehntausend münder
Hält einer nur das maass. In jeder ewe
Ist nur ein gott und einer nur sein künder.

("Jahrhundertspruch," in Stefan George, *Werke*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984): vol. 1, p. 338)

Ten thousand perish wordless, one alone,
The founder, gives the name. One sounds the tone
Ten thousand tongues will sing. Each age has only
One god, and only one proclaims his throne.

("Centenary Lines," in *The Works of Stefan George*, trans. Olga Marx and Ernst Morwitz (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1949): 239).]

80 Du Bos, "Maquettes pour un hommage à Stefan George," [pp. 876-77].

81 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, pp. 89 and 287.

82 [Cf. the final stanza of George's poem:

Der kam zu spät der flehend zu dir sagte:
Dort ist kein weg mehr über eisige felsen
Und horste grauser vögel—nun ist not:
Sich bannen in den kreis den liebe schliesst ..
Und wenn die strenge und gequälte stimme
Dann wie ein loblied tönt in blaue nacht
Und helle flut—so klagt: sie hätte singen
Nicht reden sollen diese neue seele!

("Nietzsche," in Stefan George, *Werke*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984): vol. 1, pp. 231-32 [p. 232].

He came too late who might have pleaded with you:
There is no way across the icy summits
And haunts of ghostly birds—now you must learn
To stay within the circle drawn by love.
And when his voice, austere and full of torment,
Rings like a paean into azure night
Across the surf—we mourn: It should have chanted,
This first new soul, it never should have spoken.

Nietzsche was unable to create a "circle of love" around him, that is, he remained without influence, because, unlike the author of *Seventh Ring*, he was not capable of gathering a community around him. Moreover, echoing something Nietzsche himself said about *The Birth of Tragedy*, George seems to want us to believe that Nietzsche seems to regret not having been exclusively a poet: "It should have sung, rather than spoken, this new soul."[83]

Heinz Raschel has noted a number of the book's themes that echo the circle's representation of Nietzsche.[84] The most indubitable connection seems to me to be to the image of Nietzsche as someone who, unlike George, lacked disciples, isolated, living without the community indispensable for the influence of a Master. This is Nietzsche's pedagogical nostalgia, as described in the chapter *Socrates*. On the other hand, I am not sure whether Bertram clearly presents Nietzsche as a precursor of George. When, at the end of the chapter on *Weimar*, it is said that Nietzsche retained "the sense [of] someone who [was] coming […], whether one calls him the Superman or lends him more human names,"[85] the use of the plural for "more human names" seems to me to rule out that he had just one person in mind. Bertram's expressions always remain vague on this point. Could he have seriously considered George as the Superman, the creator of a new world, while criticizing him for his sectarianism and, in the end, his betrayal? When praising him to Thomas Mann,[86] does he not compare him precisely to Nietzsche, without considering him in the slightest to be someone beyond Nietzsche? Moreover, the Superman is, according to Bertram's interpretation,[87] a Platonic Idea, which guides action, but which remains an inaccessible, transcendent goal. How could George have been identified with it? It seems rather that Bertram never really shared his circle's adoration of the Master, and that, as Hartmut Buchner has observed, it was precisely his aversion to its sectarian spirit that distanced him from Stefan George.

One point that seems to me particularly interesting is the idea of Germany as a new Hellas, or a return to ancient Greece. This, as we have seen, is the theme of *German Becoming*. It was also an idea dear to George, who wanted to recreate divine man, to bring about a "deification of Man" and a "humanization of God," on the Greek model.[88] In this regard, he was the heir of a long German tradition that goes back to Winckelmann, Lessing, Voss, Goethe, and Hölderlin, and was, moreover, based on a false representation of Greek life. Under the influence of Winckelmann, the way of life of the Greeks was imagined after the model of the sculptures of classical Greece. Thus arose the myth of Greek serenity, inspired by the silent, immobile bliss of the Greek gods. As Klaus Schneider has shown, these so-called "silent gods" of ancient Greece, of which Hölderlin spoke, were a mere reflection of a conception of divinity

---

("Nietzsche," in *The Works of Stefan George*, trans. Marx and Morwitz, p. 159).]

83 [KSA 1, 15: sie hätte singen sollen, diese "neue Seele"—und nicht reden!]. The phrase can be found in the text "Attempt at a Self-Criticism," placed in 1886-1887 by way of a prologue to the beginning of the book. There is an excellent critique of George's poem by Raschel in his *Das Nietzsche-Bild im George-Kreis*, pp. 37-54.

84 Raschel, *Das Nietzsche-Bild im George-Kreis*, pp. 149-53.

85 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 169.

86 See above, Bertram's letter of 5 June 1916.

87 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, pp. 61 and 173-75.

88 Raschel, *Das Nietzsche-Bild im George-Kreis*, pp. 168 and 73-84.

inspired by neo-Platonism and Pietism.[89] This error of perspective continued to have an effect, beyond Stefan George, on the conception of Greek religion proposed by Walter Otto.[90] Nietzsche, following Jacob Burckhardt,[91] reacted with vigour against this representation of Greek life, insisting on the pessimistic, tragic, and tormented character of the Greek soul. Yet despite his usual variations and contradictions, Nietzsche always remained faithful to the idea that the Germans had as their mission and hope to become "more Greek," in mind and body, as we see from a text dating from 1885, cited at the end of the chapter on *The German Becoming*.[92] The theme of the "return to Greece" deserves a highly attentive study.[93]

It is perhaps in its method that Bertram's *Nietzsche* comes closest to the theories of the George Circle. Indeed, it represents one of the *Gestaltbiographien* of which Gadamer speaks, and corresponds in its spirit it to the new conception of scholarly research favoured by the circle, and which exercised an influence on the whole of twentieth century German scholarship. Here, moreover, lies the source of the book's qualities as well as its shortcomings. Its qualities include its meticulous craftsmanship, its monumentality, its poetry, its deep inspiration, and its vibrant sensibility. Yet it has its shortcomings, too, such as its lyrical style, often ponderous, the complete absence of references enabling the reader to identify quotations, and its massive and unverified claims in the field of the history of ancient religions.

Yet what should one think, in general, of the value of the scholarly method embraced by the George Circle? Heinz Raschel has subjected it to a vigorous critique on the basis of one particularly well-chosen example: the representation of Nietzsche held by the members of this inner circle.[94] The picture painted by Raschel is quite appalling, and even frightening. As far as Bertram himself is concerned, however, it seems to me that Raschel has not sufficiently brought out his originality and his independence with regard to the official doctrine espoused by the circle. This is why George and Gundolf never forgave him for his book.

Let us return to the question: what should one make, in general, of the value of the scholarly method inspired by George? Hans-Georg Gadamer seems to think that the reaction against the historical method of the nineteenth century that developed around George had a beneficial influence on German scholarship.[95] We must distinguish, Gadamer remarks, between two senses of the word "history." On the one hand, the history criticized by the George circle is what one might call historicism, understood as an attitude that the historian can exclude from his historical vision

89 Klaus Schneider, *Die schweigenden Götter: Eine Studie zur Gottesvorstellung des religiösen Platonismus* (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1966): 1-13 and 100-03.

90 [The German classical philologist Walter F. Otto (1874-1958) wrote numerous studies of classical literature and ancient mythology.]

91 See Charles Andler, *Nietzsche, sa vie et sa pensée, vol. 1, Les précurseurs de Nietzsche* (Paris: Éditions Bossard, 1920): 194-210 [see note 130 below].

92 [Bertram, *Nietzsche: Versuch einer Mythologie*, p. 99.] Cf. *Nachlass*, August-Sepember 1885; KSA 11, 41[4], 679.

93 In addition to the works cited above and their bibliographies, one may also consult E. M. Butler, *The Tyranny of Greece over Germany: A Study of the Influence exercised by Greek Art and Poetry over the Great German Writers of the Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and Twentieth Centuries* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1935).

94 See Raschel, *Das Nietzsche-Bild im George-Kreis*.

95 Gadamer, "Stefan George (1868-1933)," p. 46 ["Die Wirkung Stefan Georges auf die Wissenschaft," pp. 266-67].

both his own life and his own point of view. For the George Circle, historical objectivity is an illusion. Genuine history, in contrast, as practiced in the great biographies that emanate from this inner circle, is a history that sees itself as historical. It is aware of the fact that historical vision implicates within it the very life of the historian, the values to which he is committed, and the present moment in which he thinks. It is thus is a historical vision that "edifies," in the etymological sense of the world, that is, it constructs, enriches, communicates enthusiasm, and ultimately has a formative pedagogical value. This vision appropriates the legacy of the past in an existential way—Gadamer uses the term "fusion of horizons" (*Horizontverschmelzung*)[96]—a fusion that takes place between the historical horizon and the horizon of the present.

Gadamer implies, moreover, that if pedagogical concerns were of such importance in these conceptions proper to the ambience of George's circle, it was because they were reviving, as it were, the experience of the Platonic Academy—the living dialogue between master and disciple. This also explains, in his view, the renewal of Platonic studies that took place thanks to the circle's work, particularly of Paul Friedländer. On this point I must nevertheless say that there seems to me to be a huge gap between the Platonic Academy, where Plato was merely the *primus inter pares*, and where discussion was free and open, and the *milieu* of George, where he would pontificate in front of submissive admirers, upon whom he imposed his judgments and his will.[97]

Be that as it may, here again, as in the case of Germany as the new Hellas, it must be admitted that this conception of history is in fact part of a long tradition, and that it is not as new as one might think. Antiquity was already familiar with this opposition between history as simple curiosity for knowledge, and history as teacher of life, educative and formative. We find this problem in Goethe, in the second of Nietzsche's *Untimely Reflections*, and in Dilthey, and finally in the philosophers of life (*Lebensphilosophen*). Basically, this tendency was already in the air of the time, as it were.

Gadamer does not hide his sympathy for this "Georgian" conception of history, and his own theory of interpretation was certainly influenced by it. Obviously, I cannot deal with this problem in depth here. Perhaps, however, I may offer a reflection inspired by more than forty years' experience of historical and philological work.

That the historian is himself an historical being, that the past can only be thought in the present, by a living being who necessarily has a particular perspective: all of this is hard to deny. That it is a matter of existential urgency to give a personal, living, formative sense to our enquiries into the past—this is what historians and philosophers of Antiquity had long taught. To understand this, it suffices to read Plutarch's *Lives*, or to think of the resonance they found in Montaigne and in other thinkers of the Renaissance and of modern times. This pragmatic conception of history had been suppressed by the development of a rigorous historical method,

96 Gadamer "Stefan George (1868-1933)," p. 47 ["Die Wirkung Stefan Georges auf die Wissenschaft," p. 267. See [on the concept of *Horizonverschmelzung*] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*, 2 edn (Tübingen: Mohr, 1965): 289, 356 and 375 [*Truth and Method*, trans. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (London: Sheed & Ward, 1975): 273, 337 and 358].

97 On this aspect of George's personality, see Raschel, *Das Nietzsche-Bild im George-Kreis*, pp. 109-18.

Pierre Hadot translated by: Paul Bishop

the discovery of which honours the nineteenth century, which wanted to do real scholarship, not write hagiography. Unfortunately, however, one witnessed the development, throughout the twentieth century, under the influence of Nietzsche, George, Heidegger, and Gadamer, of certain interpretative *practices* that led to genuine aberrations. Nietzsche's phrase, cited by Bertram in his *Introduction*, is its fundamental principle: "One and the same text permits innumerable interpretations—there is no 'correct' interpretation."[98] Taking as its starting-point the principle that historical objectivity is an illusion, and that, for various reasons, it is impossible to know what an author meant, and that this is of no importance anyway, since the text must be treated as an autonomous reality, one allowed oneself to take all kinds of liberties in the interpretation of or even in the translation of texts, or, what is more, in their establishment, and this resulted in interpretations that are absolutely phantasmagorical. This is an unfortunate regression to the most artificial and arbitrary procedures of allegory, as they were practiced at the end of Antiquity. If we continue down this road, and if such methods become generally accepted, we will reach the point where we end up cutting ourselves off from our historical roots, and replacing our memory of the past by some fantastic mythology or phraseology. Nietzsche was wrong. We must firmly maintain the opposite principle: "The same text cannot license all interpretations. There are valid interpretations and inadmissible interpretations."

The dangers inherent in these new historical methods, whether advocated by George or by others, thus seem to me to be considerable. In their original intention, however, they represented a salutary reaction against the withering positivism of a purely scholarly attitude. In their intention, moreover, they were, once again, an unconscious regression or return from the scientific method of the 19th century, to the conception of history maintained from Antiquity to the Renaissance, and even down to the modern period. This time, the regression was salutary, insofar as one thus rediscovered, in the guise of new expressions, the idea of a truth that may be achieved only by transforming oneself.[99]

To conclude these reflections, then, let us say that ultimately, the writing of history (probably like every other human activity) should be a *coincidentia oppositorum*, trying to respond to two contrary demands, each as urgent as the other: to perceive and evaluate historical reality, we need, on the one hand, a conscious and complete engagement of the ego, and, on the other, a complete detachment from the ego, a deliberate effort at impartial objectivity. In my view, only the exercise of scientific rigour, that detachment from the self demanded by an objective and impartial judgment, can give us the right to implicate ourselves in history, giving it an existential meaning.

Be that as it may, as we have seen, Bertram himself did not disown the great historical school of the nineteenth century, the school of rigour and precision, and he knew how to combine exactitude with enthusiasm, at least as far as Nietzsche is concerned. From this point of view, too, his Nietzsche does not completely belong to the George Circle.

98 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 5. [Nietzsche, *Nachlass*, Fall 1885-Spring 1886; KSA 12, 1[120], 39.]

99 On this conception of truth in ancient times, cf. my book *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique* [[*Philosophy as a Way of Life*]] (see note 2). For a critique of certain methods of interpretation, see Ernst H. Gombrich, *Symbolic Images*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Phaidon, 1978): 1-5.

Finally, we may say in conclusion that Bertram's book attests to a certain autonomy with regard to the theories and the demands of the author of the *Seventh Ring*. As Inge Jens has noted, Bertram's conception of art was ultimately very different from that of the Circle.[100] For example, Bertram greatly admired the bourgeois literary genre of the novel, "from Hermann Bang to Thomas Mann."[101] His literary interests were focused on figures other than those in the "Georgian" pantheon, and he was aware of this. He was, for instance, a passionate fan of Lichtenberg and of Stifter. Taking up a comment made by Hartmut Buchner, I would say that his *Nietzsche* ultimately seems not so much the precursor of George as "the crystallization of many centuries of the history and intellectual destiny of Germany," and "one of the greatest and most influential manifestations in the history of the human mind."[102]

This is probably why Bertram himself could write: "There are too many things in this book that George will not and cannot accept."[103]

Thomas Mann

"The magically seductive Tristan-ambiguity of Venice, a metaphysical ambiguity commingling the closest proximity of death with an ultimate sweetness of life—it is this masqueraded beauty of Venice to which everyone has always succumbed [...] one thinks of Platen's *Venetian Sonnets*, Conrad Ferdinand Meyer's 'On the Grand Canal,' or Thomas Mann's *Death in Venice*—all instances in which beauty does not, as with Plato, only seduce us to the highest life, but also where it simultaneously, mysteriously simultaneously, must signify a seduction toward death."[104]

When he read these lines from *Nietzsche*, Thomas Mann was, as he later wrote, "terrified" to see his name mentioned "in a passage [...] belonging to book that unfolds in such elevated spheres."[105]

When Bertram wrote a review of *Königliche Hoheit* [*Royal Highness*], Thomas Mann had begun a correspondence with him on 2 January 1910 (the same year that Bertram first met George). Bertram was nine years younger than Thomas Mann. They had continued to correspond, and then met in Munich, where they played music together. Bertram became the godfather of one of the novelist's daughters: "We were close friends," Katia Mann wrote, "with Ernst Bertram, the Germanist from Bonn who was then living in Munich. He had one foot in the circle of Stefan George, but he admired and had great respect for my husband. As for Stefan George, my husband did not like him at all, all this prophetic pomposity was quite alien to him."[106] This

100 Jens, "Nachwort," p. 303.

101 [Hermann Bang, 1857-1912, was a Danish author and Impressionist writer.]

102 See Buchner, "Nachtwort des Herausgebers," p. 410. [The second phrase is a reference to Gottfried Benn's essay "Nietzsche—Nach fünfzig Jahren," see note 134 below.]

103 See Bertram's letter to Glöckner of 23 November 1919; Raschel, *Das Nietzsche-Bild im George-Kreis*, p. 212.

104 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 227.

105 See Mann's letter to Bertram of 21 September 1918 [Mann, *Briefe* 1889-1936, p. 150; *Thomas Mann an Ernst Bertram*, p. 75].

106 Katia Mann, *Thomas Mann: Souvenirs à bâtons rompus* (Paris: A. Michel, 1975): 66 [translated by Louise Servicen from Katia Mann, *Meine ungeschriebenen Memoiren* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1974): 59].

Pierre Hadot translated by: Paul Bishop

friendship between Bertram and Mann is, we may note in passing, an additional proof of Bertram's independence from Stefan George, for George hated Thomas Mann so much that he absolutely forbade Ernst Glöckner to have anything to do with the novelist.[107]

Thomas Mann and Bertram discussed literature, politics, and above all the books on which they were currently working: Bertram's *Nietzsche* and, in Mann's case, the *Unpolitical Reflections* [*Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*]. They would read each other's chapters, and Mann would often ask Bertram to transmit quotations from Nietzsche to him, particularly ones from the *Nachlass*, which the novelist did not own. This worried Bertram a bit, for he was afraid that, if his book appeared after "Tom's" did, his own quotations would look as if they had been stolen from Thomas Mann.[108] Finally, thanks to Mann's intervention with the publisher Bondi, both books appeared more or less simultaneously, in August and September 1918. In general, Thomas Mann's letters to Bertram are an extremely valuable testimony to the personalities of both Mann and Bertram, and to life in Germany during the First World War and the years after it.

As soon as the book was published, Mann expressed his enthusiasm in a letter to Bertram.[109] He admired "the arrangement of the chapters," "the mixture of philology and music." "Never has an essentially philological approach been handled with such vibrant sensitivity." He loved the chapter on justice. Perhaps he found the beginning of Weimar regrettable, a bit too "psychoanalytic" for his taste.

Mann added: "Every now and then it seems to me […] to be *my* book, intended for me—for which I give thanks to a benevolent providence." He could detect, he added, a connection between Nietzsche and his own *Reflections*: "I see in it not only their complement, but in some sense their redemption [*Erlösung*], just as, inversely, the truth of your *Legend* finds its confirmation, to a certain extent, in my stammering confessions."[[110]] Elsewhere, he called Bertram's book the "sibling" [[*Geschwister*]] to his *Reflections*.[111]

One also finds interesting entries in Mann's *Diary*: "[…] a book whose qualities are moving"; "[…] it is my book and it discusses what interests me most by far—my central subject, and it discusses it with a love full of passion, of a kind that present-day philology and history cannot rival." He sensed that, in certain passages, Bertram was thinking of him without mentioning him by name. In the light of the book, he noticed the "Greco-Goethean element" present in his own *Felix Krull*. He wrote: "It is reassuring to think that without *Tonio Kröger* and *Death in Venice*, this book would not have been possible, either in certain isolated turns of phrase or in its entirety."[112]

---

107 See Ernst Glöckner's letter to Ernst Bertram, dated 21 August 1921, cited in Jens, "Nachwort," pp. 278-79.

108 See Bertram's letter to Ernst Glöckner of 1 March 1918 [cited in Raschel, *Das Nietzsche-Bild im George-Kreis*, p. 201].

109 See Mann's letter to Bertram of 21 September 1918 [Mann, *Briefe* 1889-1936, pp. 151-52; *Thomas Mann an Ernst Bertram*, pp. 74-78].

110 [Mann, *Briefe* 1889-1936, pp. 151-52; *Thomas Mann an Ernst Bertram*, pp. 76-77.]

111 See Thomas Mann's letter to Philipp Witkop of 13 September 1918 [Mann, *Briefe* 1889-1936, p. 150].

112 [Thomas Mann, *Tagebücher 1918-1921*, ed. Peter de Mendelssohn (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1979): 5-9].

The statements by Thomas Mann raise a very interesting problem in terms of literary history. Why did he think of Bertram's *Nietzsche* as a "sibling", or, better yet, as the redemption of his *Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man*? What link can there be between a virtually timeless biography of Nietzsche, and that product of circumstances, his *Reflections*?

As a product of circumstances, Mann's *Reflections* is a huge book,[113] a series of "stammering confessions," as he himself says, that bears little resemblance to the ordered and prestigious monument Bertram erected in honour of Nietzsche. No doubt the *Reflections* bear fascinating witness to Thomas Mann himself, to his personal ideas, his likes and dislikes. But the book is hard to read, full of digressions and disconcerting excurses. It is a product of circumstances, for two reasons. First of all, it is a plea for Germany at war, directed against Allied propaganda. Next, it was a scathing response to an attack by his brother, Heinrich Mann, which had hurt him deeply. In his *Zola*, published in Switzerland in 1915, Heinrich had both taken the side of democratic values defended by the Allies, and attacked Thomas, describing him as a sort of "apolitical" aesthete, living in his ivory tower without caring about the distress of humanity or the welfare of the masses.

For the most part, the *Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man* develop a theme already sketched in an article (*War Thoughts*) [*Gedanken im Kriege*], published in 1914. The Allies defend democracy and civilization, that is to say, well-being and material comfort, technological progress, which can be the same in all countries. Thomas Mann and Germany, for their part, are defending something higher than civilization, that is to say, culture, or the quality of the soul, proper to each country, which forms and educates individuals, by means of poetry, music, and art. Thomas Mann thus develops, on the basis of this Nietzschean distinction between civilization and culture, an entire critique of that modern civilization which is leading, little by little, to the death of Man *via* the smothering of culture.

Thomas Mann was later the subject of much criticism for the conservative statements that appear throughout the pages of his work. They have been contrasted with the crusade for democracy that Mann undertook after 1933. Yet he always maintained that there was no discontinuity in his views throughout his life. First of all, it is true that the book itself is extremely complex: one senses in its foreword that the author is already distancing himself from his work, treating it with a certain irony. Above all, however, Thomas Mann seems to have remained faithful all his life to what was, for him, the core of the book, apart from the tragic circumstances of the War, as he expressed it in its final pages: "The human question is never, never to be solved politically, but only spiritually-morally."[114] In other words, it is not a problem of civilization, but a problem of culture.

There are many almost literal points of contact between Bertram's work and Mann's. In both cases, there is an attempt to understand "Germanity," or the essence of the German soul, and first of all the tendency, already well observed by Nietzsche, that the Germans have for self-criticism with regard to what is German. Bertram

113 [Thomas Mann, *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*, Berlin: S. Fischer, 1918; *Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man*, trans. Walter D. Morris (New York: Ungar, 1983). Hadot draws the reader's attention to the introduction of the French translation, *Considérations d'un apolitique* (1975), with its introduction by J. Brenner.]

114 Mann, *Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man*, p. 434.

Pierre Hadot translated by: Paul Bishop

evokes one aspect of this self-criticism: "this deep culpability toward themselves—the true original sin of the German character—,"[115] which he detects, for instance, in Hölderlin and Nietzsche, who criticized the Germans for having chosen "nationalism" instead of Napoleon. This self-criticism leads them to cosmopolitanism: "I am not completely forgetting," Thomas Mann says, "that it is almost part of higher German culture to present oneself as un-German or even anti-German; that a tendency toward a cosmopolitanism that undermines the sense of nationalism is, according to German authoritative judgement, inseparable from the essence of German nationality; that perhaps, without some foreign admixture, no higher German character is possible; that precisely the exemplary Germans were Europeans who would have regarded every limitation to the nothing-but-German as barbaric."[116]

Bertram, for his part, develops the Nietzschean theme: "To be a good German means to de-Germanize oneself."[117] And he insists, perhaps more than Mann does, on that other Nietzschean motif of the anxiety,[118] the incompleteness of the German soul, which means that, as Bertram notes, the Germans remain "the profound and lasting unease of all their neighbours, to their helpless and shameful consternation."[119]

Also interesting for understanding the fundamental tone of Mann's soul is the page where he writes: "If I have Schopenhauer's morality—a popular word for the same thing is 'pessimism'—as my basic psychological mood, that mood of 'cross, death and grave' […]."[120] These lines echo a text by Nietzsche which Bertram quotes in his chapter on *Knight, Death, and Devil*: "What appeals to me in Wagner is what appeals to me in Schopenhauer, the ethical atmosphere, the Faustian odour, cross, death, and crypt."[121] This is what Nietzsche elsewhere calls "the Germanic seriousness toward life" [*dem germanischen Lebensernst*].[122] It is also expressed in a letter from Mann to Bertram which affirms that this expression "cross, death, and crypt," is for him "the symbol of an entire world, *my* world, whose opposition to the prevailing social ethic has now become acute."[123]

In his *Reflections*, Mann goes on to express, with great perspicacity, his own specificity, as well as Nietzsche's: "If, however, this same basic mood made me

115 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 178.

116 Mann, *Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man*, p. 48.

117 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 61. [*Human, All Too Human*, "Assorted Opinions and Maxims," §323, in *Human, All Too Human*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986): 287; KSA 2, 511.]

118 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 64.

119 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 63. Compare Thomas Mann, *Reflections*, p. 52 on "the tortuous problem of the German soul" [or, as Mann put it, *das Problem des Deutschtums*].

120 Mann, *Reflections*, p. 54.

121 [Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 39; cf. Nietzsche's letter to Erwin Rohde of October 1868: Mir behagt an Wagner, was mir an Schopenhauer behagt, die ethische Luft, der faustische Duft, Kreuz, Tod und Gruft usw. (KSB 2, 322).]

122 [Nietzsche, letter to Richard Wagner of 22 May 1869; KSB 3, 9. Cited in Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 39.]

123 See Thomas Mann's letter to Ernst Bertram of 3 April 1917 (*Thomas Mann an Ernst Bertram*, ed. Jens, p. 46). Compare his *Reflections*, p. 399: "The Nietzsche […] who singled out from all plastic art one picture with lasting love—Dürer's "Knight, Death, and Devil"; the one who had told Rohde of his natural pleasure in all art and philosophy in which "ethical air, Faustian smell, cross, death and grave" could be detected: a phrase I immediately seized upon as a symbol for a whole world, my world, a northern-moral-Protestant, *id est*, German one that is strictly in opposition to that world of ruthless aestheticism."

into a psychologist of decadence, then it was to Nietzsche to whom I looked as a master, for from the start he was not so much for me the prophet of some kind of vague 'superman,' [...] as rather the incomparably greatest and most experienced psychologist of decadence."[124]

An echo of the chapter *Knight, Death, and Devil* can be found almost word for word in the passage where Mann, following Bertram, evokes the Protestant resonance of Nietzsche's soul, "the son of the pastor from Naumburg," the moral atmosphere that Nietzsche loved in Schopenhauer: "cross, death, and crypt," Dürer's engraving that expresses this atmosphere, his enthusiasm for Bach's *St Matthew Passion*, and finally the asceticism and Christianity that formed a secret part of his personality.[125] Elsewhere, as in the chapter on *Arion*, we find the theme of Luther as a lover of music (which is "close to theology,"[126]), who is thus responsible for the close association between music and German culture.

These points of convergence are interesting. Above all, however, one should try to understand what Thomas Mann meant when he said that Bertram's book seemed to him to be the "redemption" of his own book. This could, I suspect, offer material for a lengthy study. Let me suggest, very cautiously, the following hypothesis. Perhaps, for Thomas Mann, Bertram's book—as a book, and a realization—was the living response to the anxieties and questions of the *Reflections*. This anxiety is expressed in the work's preface. Would the triumph of the Allies, that is, of democracy and civilization, destroy the German spirit? "Richard Wagner," says Thomas Mann, "once declared that civilization disappears before music like mist before the sun. He never dreamed that one day, for its part, music would disappear before civilization, before democracy, like mist before the sun. This book dreams of these things—in a confused, difficult, and unclear way—but this and nothing else is the content of its fears: '*finis musicae*.'"[127] Yet in the eyes of Thomas Mann, wasn't Bertram's book, which he is supposed to have wanted to entitle "The Music of Socrates", the proof that music, the *mousikê* of the Greeks—that is, in his view, culture and the intellectual life—was still alive in Germany, and would continue to live? After the publication of the book, Mann wrote to Bertram: "The expectation of your future offerings is a genuine incentive to life for me."[128] Perhaps, too, the idea of a Germanity understood as a Platonic Idea, as a hope and a demand, responded to his own concerns.

Bertram's *Nietzsche* was given an enthusiastic reception in its time,[129] and it exerted a long-lasting influence on Nietzsche studies. In his monumental and unrivalled work on Nietzsche, Charles Andler expresses on several occasions his

124 Mann, *Reflections*, p. 54-55.

125 Mann, *Reflections*, p. 104.

126 Bertram, *Nietzsche*, p. 89; Mann, *Reflections*, p. 232.

127 Mann, *Reflections*, p. 23.

128 See Thomas Mann's letter to Ernst Bertram of 21 September 1918 (Mann, *Briefe* 1889-1936, p. 152; *Thomas Mann an Ernst Bertram*, ed. Jens, p. 78).

129 See, for example, the reviews by Josef Hofmiller in the *Süddeutsche Monatshefte* (1919[/1920]) [p. 382] (part of which is quoted by Buchner in his "Nachwort des Herausgebers," pp. 412-413), which concludes: "This book is, in its kind, not merely original, but unique"; by A. Drews in the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, 1919, p. 477-481 (which criticized Nietzsche for being, because of his own critical attitude towards the Germans, responsible for the hostility of foreigners towards Germany). One can also find in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 1933, July-September, Supplement, pp. 5-6, an anonymous review of Pitrou's translation that is extremely positive.

admiration, while voicing his reservations about its methodology.[130] He speaks of the "dazzling essays that constitute Bertram's book." "It provides," he says, "in-depth insights without subjecting itself to any division into periods." He evokes the "magnificent passages in this book," mentioning the chapters on *Justice*, *Philoctetes*, and *Socrates*. He admires their "profound psychological insights and beautiful literary form." The judgment of Karl Jaspers was much more severe.[131] He admits that the symbols Bertram uses can "have something shrewd about them," for example "in the symbol of *Judas*, to interpret the dialectical negativity that runs through all his work, or in *Knight, Death, and Devil*, to expound his courage that knows no illusions." Yet in Jaspers' view, they suppress the dynamics of Nietzsche's thought. Here, however, there is a misunderstanding. Bertram's book does not claim to be a philosophical study that reconstructs the system and the dynamics of thought of the author of *Zarathustra*. It is, as we have said, a resolutely literary and psychological work, a kind of psychoanalysis in the broad sense of the term, or an exploration of the Nietzschean imaginary. It is thus entirely to be expected that it speaks more to poets than it does to philosophers. This is why Gottfried Benn, even after having read Jaspers' book, held Bertram's *Nietzsche* to be "the most grandiose" [*großartigste*] of all the literature on Nietzsche, precisely because, in a sense, it went beyond philosophy which, in his view, was not what was most interesting in Nietzsche.[132] Moreover, Bertram's chapter entitled *Anecdote* rightly insists on the "anecdotal," and hence non-systematic, character of Nietzschean thought.[133] Gottfried Benn said that he was always rereading Bertram's book, and that it accompanied him everywhere.[134] It is interesting to note that it had a profound influence on Benn's aesthetic conceptions.

After the appearance of the great works devoted to Nietzsche in the course of the twentieth century, Bertram's book retains all its value and its relevance. It is a sort of monument, set up to commemorate a tragic destiny: a precious witness of the way that a particular age looked at Nietzsche, and a work of art that was able to attain the mysterious timelessness of a masterpiece.

Epilogue

From 1910 to 1921, Thomas Mann and Bertram had been completely unanimous about political issues, and particularly, after the War, in their disapproval of the attitude of France and the French towards defeated Germany, whether it was the

130 Charles Andler, *Nietzsche, sa vie, sa pensée*, 6 vols (Paris: Éditions Bossard, 1920-1931): vol. 2, p. 17; vol. 3, p. 14.

131 Karl Jaspers, *Nietzsche; Introduction à sa philosophie*, Paris: Gallimard, 1950, p. 15. [*Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of his Philosophical Activity*, trans. Charles F. Wallraff and Frederick J. Schmitz, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1965, Nietzsche: *Einführung in das Verständnis seines Philosophierens* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1936).]

132 Bruno Hillebrand, *Artistik und Auftrag: Zur Kunsttheorie von Benn und Nietzsche* (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1966): 65. [See note 134 below.]

133 Hillebrand, *Artistik und Auftrag*, p. 67.

134 Cited by Buchner, "Nachwort des Herausgebers," p. 410, n. 6 [referring to "Nietzsche—nach fünfzig Jahren" [1950], in Gottfried Benn, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Dieter Wellershoff, 8 vols. (Wiesbaden: Limes, 1968): vol. 4, *Reden und Vorträge*, pp. 1046-57 (p. 1047); and "Bücher, die lebendig geblieben sind," published in *Die literarische Welt*, 5/9 (1929), in *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 7, *Vermischte Schriften*, p. 1659: *welche Bücher ich immer wieder lese, Bücher, die mich überall begleiteten*].

French authorities occupying the Rhineland, or writers such as Maurice Barrès.[135]

Gradually, however, their paths began to diverge. Thomas Mann supported the Weimar Republic, unlike Bertram, who became increasingly chauvinist. He even went so far as to suspect the circle around George of being pro-Western, "more and more Communist," and of being no more than "a clique of Jews."[136]

It is interesting, for example, to see a disagreement arise between the two friends on the subject of Charles du Bos. In 1926 Thomas Mann had proposed inviting the French writer to join the board of the Nietzsche Society: he presented him to Bertram "as a friend and expert on the German mind."[137] Bertram refused categorically, giving this reason: "So long as the French continue to forbid [[as they would until 1932]], any German scholar from participating in any conferences—even today, after Locarno—[138], and so long as the ban on German literature is enforced in the occupied zones, […] we have no need to welcome any French into this society. […] Obviously the Nietzsche-Society does not have the right not to be European in spirit, but one is no longer European when one is simply deprived of one's dignity."[139] In his "Translator's Preface," […] Robert Pitrou expresses his surprise at Bertram's silence in response to his requests for further explanation. This silence is probably also explained by Bertram's attitude toward the French.

Bertram greeted the rise of National Socialism with joy, whereas Thomas Mann, precisely because of that rise, was forced into exile, first to Switzerland in 1933, and then, definitively, to the United States in 1938. It is a remarkable testimony to his faithfulness that, despite their political differences, Bertram, even in this era of hatred, continued to send Thomas Mann books, letters, and presents until 1935.

After the War had ended, in 1948, Mann was contacted from Germany and asked to intervene on behalf of Bertram, who, because of accusations relating to his attitude during the Nazi period, had been deprived of his right to teach and of all his pensions. Among the novelist's correspondence, one may read the letter of 30 July 1948 that he wrote to Werner Schmitz on this subject.[140] It is a letter of great dignity, which recalls the numerous words of warning that he had given his friend, but which defines with great precision and fairness Bertram's responsibility, his romanticism of a Germanist, his complete lack of self-interest, his purity of intent. It is true that Bertram was not a member of the Party, but he was a fervent National Socialist, doubtless in his own way: one that was mythical, idealistic, and lost in dreams.

Mann also alludes to Bertram's links with Stefan George. Bertram, Mann maintains, never really belonged to this Circle. "His Protestantism and his Germanism protected him from the tendencies to Roman imperialism and Jesuitism in this sacred

135 See Jens, "Nachwort," p. 296.

136 See Jens, "Nachwort," p. 300.

137 [See Mann's letter to Bertram of 3 February 1926, in Jens (ed.), *Thomas Mann an Ernst Bertram*, p. 149.]

138 [The Locarno Pact was concluded in 1925 at a conference held in Locarno, Switzerland, by the powers of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium, with a view to guaranteeing peace in Europe.]

139 See Bertram's card sent to Ernst Glöckner on 7 February 1926, cited in Jens, "Anmerkungen", in *Thomas Mann an Ernst Bertram*, p. 268.

140 See Mann, *Briefe 1948-1955 und Nachlese*, pp. 38-40.

inner circle."[141] There were also too many Jews in it, for his taste. Mann protested against the ban on publishing that had been declared against Bertram. It would be a loss for Germany if the great book on Stifter that Bertram had been planning could not be published. Similarly, the withdrawal of his pension seemed to him unjustifiable.

In 1949, Thomas Mann participated in a collective petition made on Bertram's behalf by three Nobel Prize winners—himself, André Gide, and Hermann Hesse.[142] In the end the decision was reversed, and Bertram received his retirement pension and the authorization to publish.

For his part, Bertram had written to Mann on 26 July 1947, to inform him of his distress and his bitterness.[143] The correspondence between the two friends began again. They saw each other in Cologne on 25 August 1954 at a lecture given by Mann[144], and on this occasion Bertram gave him three of his works as a gift.

One of them, entitled *Moselvilla*, bears as an epigraph a stanza taken from Hölderlin's poem entitled "The Poet's Courage" (*Dichtermut*):

> When at night fall a man like him, of our kind, comes
> Past the place where he sank, many a thought he'll give
> To the site and the warning,
> Then in silence, more armed, walk on [145]

Above it, in Mann's copy, Bertram had written:

> All that has been is merely a symbol,
> (Alles Gewesene ist nur ein Gleichnis)

the opening phrase of his introduction to his *Nietzsche*.[146] He thus evoked their past, their friendship, and their shared passions of former times, but also the meaning of their lives[147] and the final redemption in *Faust, Part Two*: "All that has been—and all that happens—is merely a symbol."

141 [Mann, *Briefe 1948-1955 und Nachlese*, p. 39.]

142 See the article in the Swiss newspaper, *Die Tat*, of 6 March 1949, which, after having criticized the measures taken against Bertram ("a patriot, but not a Nazi"), quoted the letters of Thomas Mann ("a man of extraordinary intellectual level who has for many years been my best friend"), of Hermann Hesse ("this judicial error must be rectified"), and André Gide ("I would like to make a personal commitment to proving his innocence and the unjust treatment to which he has been subjected").

143 See Jens, "Anmerkungen," pp. 286-88.

144 See Jens, "Anmerkungen," p. 290; Katia Mann, p. 169 [Meine ungeschriebenen Memoiren, p. 155].

145 [*Dichtermut, Erste Fassung* ["The Poet's Courage," First Version], in Hölderlin, *Poems and Fragments*, trans. Hamburger, pp. 206-07:

Wenn des Abends vorbei Einer der Unsern kömmt,
Wo der Bruder ihm sank, denket er manches wohl
An der warnenden Stelle,
Schweigt und gehet gerüsteter.]

146 Jens, "Anmerkungen," p. 290.

147 See the monograph on Bertram by Hajo Jappe, entitled *Ernst Bertram: Scholar, Teacher, Poet* [Ernst Bertram: *Gelehrter, Lehrer, Dichter*] (Bonn: H. Bouvier, 1969).

The Agonist
A Nietzsche Circle Journal

Friedrich Nietzsche: On the Concept of the Organic since Kant

translated and annotated by Th. Nawrath, Paderborn

No one perhaps considers Friedrich Nietzsche to be a thinker who expressed himself self-evidently at first sight. Although his published works are usually magnificently phrased, many people miss an academic clearness, like in a treatise—presenting a distinct structure of definitions, proofs, corollaries, and the like. Therefore a reader might expect a certain tension between what one knows from Nietzsche on the one hand and the draft of an academic dissertation on the other hand as it has to uphold several standards concerning style, content, and form of argumentation. The translated dissertation draft shows how Nietzsche tried to manage such demands, giving an insight into these three dimensions of his thought in spring 1868 as well.

a) The Historic Situation: Schopenhauer vs. Kant

1868 was one of the most important years in Nietzsche's development as a thinker. It marks the moment when he abandoned the struggle of the Hegel scholars and seized on the writings of Arthur Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer, widely recognized as Nietzsche's "educator", maintained a critique of Immanuel Kant, the genius of the leading philosophical schools in Germany at their times. Kant's thought did not linger in the fog of different speculations about the essence of revelation or other religious topics (as did the thought of the Young Hegelians). It focused on the core problem of cognition as the main part of the *conditio humana*. Accordingly, criticism either had to target Kant's idea of cognition or his undue preference for it in general. Nietzsche found such criticism in Schopenhauer, who gave a pretty clear approach of his argument in contrast to other authors. Here Nietzsche found the two reasons in principle to reject Kantian thought. And in the dissertation draft he tried to apply them to the contemporary state of biological research.

b) The Biographical Situation: A Letter to Paul Deussen

During his time as a soldier Nietzsche had a riding accident that caused him physical pain for several weeks. But at the same time he learned that he did not want to stay a private first class ("Gefreiter"), but to become a free civilian again ("Befreiter").[1] He finished his letter to Paul Deussen with the sentence: "Please leave the military address line aside."[2]

1 Nietzsche to F. Zarncke (15 April 1868), *KGB*, sect. 1, vol. 2, p. 266.

2 This quotation and the following ones can be found in Nietzsche to P. Deussen (April/

In fact, Nietzsche felt himself cured from any pathos both military and philosophical. His aim was to write a number of papers that were supposed to be appreciated by contemporary scholars for being down-to-earth. Among them, he referred to a doctoral dissertation that was meant to prove that "Kant" was no solid ground anymore. His inspiration was the profound development of the physiologic sciences of the last fifty years. The argument seemed to be absolutely clear to him; for he planned to complete the dissertation within half a year as his "preliminary work [was] pretty finished." Without any "philosophical clutter" it was planned to be "half philosophical, half scientific." The concrete aim was to prove that metaphysics belongs to the realm of psychological needs or the arts.[3] As a result, there will be no "absolute truth" left. All human beings can have is an "awareness of the relativity of knowledge".

c) Becoming Structured

The dissertation draft consists of 52 fragments (mixed up with some remarks on Democritus, Homer, Hesiod and Nietzsche's teaching schedule). While Nietzsche's published writings are phrased in a sophisticated manner (style, grammar and vocabulary), the draft consists of rushed notes like a spontaneous oral presentation. Incomplete sentences and very short glances at various topics sometimes take the reader through a whole line of argumentation each moment. Different from other editions,[4] this translation tries to preserve this fragmentary character and does not try to add headings or other aspects of an order that is not already provided by the *KGW*.

After some kind of an introduction about *teleology in general* the first group of notes, captioned *Natural-Philosophically* [naturphilosophisch], is supposed to lead the reader to a refutation of Kant's thought. It seems to be intended to contain the following steps of discussion: (1) *The presentation of the problem*; (2) *Kant's rejection of other approaches to the problem*; (3) *Approaches of natural philosophers after Kant*; (4) *Criticism of Kant's opinion*. Such a structure would have matched the standards of a dissertation, presenting a problem, a plain discussion, and a clear result.

So far, so good. Since Nietzsche had a plan on hand, he could get into detail now, outlining each thesis he had to prove or reject. The next group of notes—on `purposiveness´—states two such theses: positively (1) *we only recognize the mechanism*; and negatively (2) *we do not recognize the organism*. To prove these ideas, Nietzsche could have employed several contemporary approaches, especially those of the Young Hegelians, who formed his horizon until then. Or he could have employed arguments of Schopenhauer, who was his main interest at that time. But he did not. In fact Nietzsche named the third section *Goethe's experiments*, introducing a very special perspective on the issue: the concept of a *force* and not of

May 1868), *KGB*, sect. 1, vol. 2, p. 267-271. My translation.

3 In the draft Nietzsche says: "Teleology like optimism is an aesthetic product." (*KGW,* sect. 1 vol. 4, p. 554)

4 Especially the *Musarion* edition (Friedrich Nietzsche: *Jugendschriften. Dichtungen, Aufsätze, Vorträge, Aufzeichnungen und Philologische Arbeiten 1858-1868*. Munich 1922; p. 269-291) construes a text too easy to read by adding comments and arranging parts arbitrarily.

an *individual* for it was not an appropriate notion of organic purposiveness.

Next, the draft's short fourth section, *A wrong opposition*, applies this change of paradigm in four steps: (1) *Elimination of the extended imagination of teleology*; (2) *Borders of the concept. The purposive in nature*; (3) *Purposive equals capable of existence*; (4) *Organisms as multiplicities and unities*. These "multiplicities and unities" can be considered as the achieved result of the argumentation and the reason why Nietzsche seized on the approach of Goethe, although it was as odd among scientists at that time as today.

Afterwards in section five on *Kant* Nietzsche presented several theses of Kant's notion of ends in nature—just to tackle it with counter-arguments immediately. These arguments seem to mark a clearing of thought for Nietzsche, who noted two different roadmaps of his whole argumentation again. The first one tries to keep on a rather logical level and puts a conflict common to traditional (pre-Kantian) approaches against the teleological argument for the existence of God: (1) *Concept of purposiveness*; (2) *Organism (the undefined concept of life, the undefined concept of the individual)*; (3) *The alleged impossibility to explain an organism mechanically*; (4) *The recognized purposelessness in nature in conflict with purposiveness*. In comparison the latter structure already shows a deeper insight, especially into the concept of `life´, which has been only part of step two of the other earlier structure. Now the inquiry into the problem of teleology will turn on the idea of `life´ after Goethe's concept of a force has been applied to it: (1) *Teleological inquiry is inquiry by forms*; (2) *Forms (individuals) are appendant to and taken from the human organization*; (3) *Life force*.

d) The Argument. Unclosing a Lifelong Intellectual Ordeal

Of course, it is not a metaphysically satisfying argument that someone's reasons must be wrong if only his conclusions are incorrect. In the draft Nietzsche referred to several ideas that show that one of Kant's later ideas is wrong (namely the concept of ends in nature as a proof of the reality of teleology). This is not a good inquiry for three reasons: firstly, Nietzsche did not really present the arguments or test the research that led to the conclusion that nature can be explained mechanically. Secondly, he did not recognize Kant's assumption correctly, but read his ideas second-hand. Thirdly, if he rejects the laws of logic, he should not apply them to his criticism of Kant as well.

Despite these apparent problems, one can already find several insightful aspects in the draft that point to the unexpectedly far distanced thoughts of Nietzsche at that time. He was going to employ works of empirical research. But in the actual draft he mainly refers to philosophical authors like Empedocles, Goethe, and Schopenhauer. In fact he was going to write what we would call an interdisciplinary treatise. Or should I say: a *multi-perspectival* investigation?

Beside this nucleus of a perspectivism, the text deals with the possibility of forms arising out of chaos. Such an idea of natural perfectibility is known from Nietzsche's history of the mind, which is present in the tension between the types of life described in the *Genealogy of Morals* and the several notions of the *Übermensch* and his wandering to real-ideal independence and actual freedom. In the draft Nietzsche struggles with these problems, too. He thinks about such questions as: How can

there be anything we can only consider completely with our intellectual faculty? Does it belong to our reason or to any reason at all?

While the first question would lead to radical idealism, the second one would lead to a teleological proof of the existence of God. (Or what one might call his `God´.) Contrary to the *Genealogy of Morals* the *dissertation draft* does not state a negative argument against the existence of things that require to be created purposively, but it positively tries to present a third way to answer the puzzle: *chance*.

Can there be a universe simply due to chance? Nietzsche does not go on to extend the scope of his investigation within the draft, facing the two extremes of the possibility of unpredicted creativity and existence on the one hand (symbolized as the *Übermensch*), and of the cosmological idea of an *eternal repetition* on the other hand. And he does not need to extend his thoughts up to these spheres. But for what reason could he feel himself satisfied with nothing more than the problem of teleology and a mechanism of life? Because the concept of the *will* he had at that time allowed him to ignore the remaining questions.

The draft is still written under the influence of Schopenhauer: “All parts of nature comply with each other because there is a will.” But Nietzsche does not simply employ the idea of a will without any further reflection. If there is a will that solves the problem of organisms, does that will have to solve the problem of the antagonism among the organisms as well? The problem of evil in the world arises. Or traditionally: *theodicy*.

Now we face the sharp problem that has been seen by Nietzsche and has made him stop at that point: How to reject the metaphysics of teleological judgment and simultaneously not to get into an even more metaphysical meshwork? What is the `organism´ in itself?

Schopenhauer provides two starting grounds to answer these questions: (1) there is a concept of cognition different from Kant’s; (2) and there is an omnipresent will to be considered in every speculation about reality. Now, if Nietzsche did not add further arguments, there would be no great difference from Schopenhauer’s own treatment. But in fact it is not the only support he accepted. Actually Nietzsche quotes Goethe’s ideas on the formation of organisms. He summarizes: “There are no individuals in reality; rather, individuals and organisms are nothing but abstractions.” We can conclude briefly that Schopenhauer’s concept of will allowed Nietzsche to reject Kant’s notion of an organism while Goethe’s concepts of individuality and holism allowed him to reject Schopenhauer’s pessimism concerning the effects of the will.

Unknowingly Nietzsche seems to tacitly outline an `arena´ wherein exactly the ideas associated with his future philosophy are present: ideas of non-individuals (*power quanta*) and of the problem of identity throughout a universe without any given substantive identity (a *flow of the same*). Whatever such *hen-kai-pân* sameness might be in metaphysics, the draft offers us nothing less than a picture of Nietzsche a moment “before sunrise”– –

Friedrich Nietzsche

On the Concept of the Organic since Kant[5]

[549] On Teleology

Kant attempts to demonstrate that there is a *necessitation* to think the natural bodies as premeditated by ourselves, i.e. by concepts of ends. I can only concede that this is a way to explain teleology to oneself.

In addition; the analogy of human experience provides the random, i.e. not meditated emergence of the purposeful, e.g. in the happy coincidence of talent and destiny, lottery tickets etc.

Therefore, the convenient and purposive cases must be within the infinite plenitude of real cases, too.

The *necessitation* that Kant deals with exists hardly anymore for our time: but one may consider that even Voltaire himself regarded teleological proof as non-compelling.

Optimism and teleology go hand in hand: both are down to disclaiming the non-purposeful as something really inexpedient.

[550] In general the weapon against teleology is: proof of the inexpedient.

Thereby it will only be evinced that the highest reason acts only sporadically, that there is an area for a lower reason, too. Therefore there is no unique teleological world; but a creating intelligence.

The conjecture of such a one is made by human analogy: why can there be no power unconsciously creating the purposive, i.e. nature: one may think of the instinct of the animals. This [is] the standpoint of natural philosophy.

Also one no longer places the act of knowing outside the world.

But we get stuck in metaphysics and have to bring up the thing in itself.

Finally there can be a possible solution on a strictly human standpoint: the Empedoclean one, where the purposive only appears as one case beneath many non-purposive ones.

Two metaphysical solutions have been attempted:

5 This translation is based on Friedrich Nietzsche: *Nachgelassene Aufzeichnungen (Herbst 1864 - Frühjahr 1868)*, *KGW,* sect. 1 vol. 4 (Berlin/New York 1967f). Numbers in brackets refer to the pagination of this edition. The text is the draft of a planned academic dissertation to achieve a doctorate. The inquiry has never been completed. Its original scope was not only on teleology, but as the designated title explains 'On the concept of the organic since Kant' ('Begriff des Organischen seit Kant'; cf. Nietzsche's letter to Paul Deussen, April/May 1868, *KGB*, sect. 1 vol. 2 (Berlin/New York, 1975-2004).

One, roughly anthropological, places an ideal man outside the world;
the other one, metaphysical as well, resorts to an intelligible world in which the end is immanent to things.[6]

The purpose is the exception.
The purpose is random.
It reveals a completely unreason.

One has to eliminate every theological interest from the question.

[551] Teleology since Kant.

Natural-Philosophically [naturphilosophisch].

The simple idea unfolds in a multiplicity of parts and states of the organism, but it remains as a unity in the necessary conjunction of the parts and functions. This is the act of the intellect.

The purposiveness of the organic [and] the regularity of the inorganic are brought into nature by our reason.

The same idea as enhanced presents the explanation of outer purposiveness. The thing in itself must show its unity in the harmony of all phenomena. All parts of nature comply with each other because there is a will.[7]

But the contrary to the whole theory is formed by that awful battle of the individuals (who also manifest an idea) and the species. Hence the explanation presupposes a continuous teleology: which does not exist.

That which is difficult is just the assemblage of the teleological and the non-teleological world.

The presentation of the problem.
Kant's rejection of approaches to the problem.
Approaches of natural philosophers.
Criticism of Kant's opinion.

[552] Kant, *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*.[8]

The Only Possible Foundation for a Proof of the Existence of God.[9]

Holbach, *Système de la Nature*.[10]

6 The German text states: "Zweck" which is translated as "end" according to the Kantian jargon Nietzsche employs consistently.

7 The German text is not clear as to whether Nietzsche means the numeral or the indefinite article. With respect to Nietzsche's reading of Schopenhauer, the indefinite article was chosen for translation.

8 Immanuel Kant: *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels* (1755).

9 Immanuel Kant: *Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes* (1763).

10 Paul Henri Thiry d'Holbach: *Système de la Nature*, ou *Des lois du monde physique & du*

Hettner, [*History of the French literature in the 18th century*, vol.] 2.[11]

Moleschott, *Cycle of Life*.[12]

The question has its similarity to that of the freedom of the human will where they were looking for its solution in the field of an intelligible world because they disregarded the possibility of coordination.

There is no question that is necessarily solved only by assuming an intelligible world.

Teleology: inner purposiveness. We see a complicated machine that preserves itself and cannot sensibly imagine any other architecture in order to construe it in an easier way. But that only means: the machine preserves itself, therefore it is purposive. [553] We are not entitled to any judgment about a 'highest purposiveness'. At the utmost[13] we could conclude on a reason, but we have no right to call it a higher or lower one.

An outer purposiveness is an illusion.

Against this we know the method of nature as to how such a 'purposive' body emerges, a senseless method. According to that purposiveness proves itself only as viability, i.e. a condition *sine qua non*. Chance can reach the most beautiful melody.

Secondly we know by [or through] the method of nature how to preserve such a purposive body. By senseless recklessness.

But teleology moots a lot of questions which are unsolvable or are not solved until now.

The world-organism, origin of evil, does not belong here.

But e.g. the emergence of intellect.

Is it necessary to face teleology with an *explained* world?

It is only left to prove another reality within a limited domain.

Counter-assumption: the self-revelatory logical laws can be higher on higher stages. But we are not allowed to talk about logical laws at all.

[554] *Purposive*.

We see a method for achieving the end or more correctly: we see *existence* and its means and conclude that these means are purposive. The recognition of a high or even the highest degree of reason does not lie herein yet.

monde moral (1770). Nietzsche cites the French title in the German text, too.

11 Hermann Hettner: *Geschichte der französischen Literatur im achtzehnten Jahrhundert*, vol. 2 (Braunschweig 1860).

12 Jacob [Jakob] Moleschott: *Der Kreislauf des Lebens. Physiologische Antworten auf Liebig's Chemische Briefe*(Mainz 1852).

13 There is a paronomasia in the German text: '*highest* purposiveness' is '*höchste* Zweckmäßigkeit' and '*At the utmost* we could' is 'Wir können also *höchstens*' (italics by the translator).

Thereupon we marvel at the *complicated*[14] and conjecture (by human analogy) an extraordinary wisdom therein.

The marvelous for us is really organic life: and we call all means to preserve it purposive. Why does the concept of the purposive stop in the inorganic world? Because we have nothing but unities here, but not interacting parts belonging together.

The removal of teleology has a practical value. It all depends only on rejecting the concept of a *higher reason*: so we are already satisfied.

Esteem of teleology in its appreciation for the human world of ideas.

Teleology like optimism is an aesthetic product.

[555] The strict necessity of cause and consequence excludes ends from unconscious nature. Because the representations of ends do not originate in nature, they must be regarded as motives injected from external causality here and there; whereby the strict necessity is just continually interrupted. Existence[15] is perforated by miracles.

Teleology as purposiveness and consequence of a conscious intelligence still pushes ahead. One asks for the end of scattered intervention and stands in front of pure arbitrariness here.

There is no order and disorder in nature.

We attribute those effects to chance where we do not see its nexus with causes.

Much *funny* in Brockes.[16]

See Strauß, *Minor Writings*.[17]

Zeller, *On the Stoics*, vol. 4.[18]

Things do exist, therefore they must be *able* to exist, i.e. they must have the conditions of existence.

14 The German text states: “das *Complicirte*” (cf. *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 19).

15 The German text states: “Dasein”.

16 Barthold Heinrich Brockes (1680-1747) was a German poet who wrote lyrics on nature and man’s direction to God. Already in the 18th century he was rejected as a trivial and artless observer without any message by the German philosophers of the Enlightenment, like J. J. Breitinger or J. C. Gottsched.

17 David Friedrich Strauß: *Kleine Schriften, Neue Folge* (Berlin, 1866).

18 Eduard Zeller: *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Dritter Theil. Die nacharistotelische Philosophie, erste Hälfte* (Leipzig 1865).

If man construes something, i.e. wants to make it capable of existence,[19] he considers under which conditions this might take place. Later he calls the conditions of the existence of the finished work *purposive*.

[556] Therefore he calls the conditions of the existence of things *purposive*, too: i.e. only under the hypothesis they were originated like human works.

When a man draws a lot out of an urn and this time it is not the lot of death: then it is neither non-purposive nor purposive but, as man says, *random*, i.e. without previous consideration. But it states the condition of his ongoing existence.[20]

"The organization of nature is not analogous to any causality which we know"[21] (i.e. the organism) Kant says, *Critique of Teleological Judgment* [§ 65].

"An organism is that in which everything is an end and mutually also a means." [§ 66][22]

"Everything that lives, Goethe says, "is no individual, but a plurality: even insofar as it appears as an individual to us, it keeps a gathering of living independent beings." [*Formation and Transformation of Organic Natures. Introduction*][23]

Very important Goethe [*On natural philosophy in general, intuitional power of judgment*[24]] on the origin of his natural philosophy from a Kantian sentence.

[557] What understanding recognizes by its concept of nature is nothing but the effect of a moving force, i.e. mechanism. What is not purely mechanically recognized, that is no keen natural scientific insight.

---

19 The German text states: "existenzfähig".

20 The *Kritische Gesamtausgabe* adds another paragraph which seems to be taken out of context: "Is it *true* that *Democritus* claimed that *language emerged from convenience*?"

21 Nietzsche states page numbers which are out of time. Therefore the paragraphs of Kant's *Critique of Judgment* are given in the translation. The sentence is correctly quoted by Nietzsche: "Genau zu reden, hat also *die Organisation der Natur nichts Analogisches mit irgend einer Causalität, die wir kennen*." (Academy edition vol. 5, p. 375; italics by the translator, they indicate the part Nietzsche cited)

22 Kant's § 66 of the *Critique of Judgment* is entitled: 'On the principle of judging about the inner purposiveness of organized beings' ('Vom Princip der Beurtheilung der innern Zweckmäßigkeit in organisirten Wesen.'). Nietzsche quotes a part of the first sentence: "Dieses Princip, zugleich die Definition derselben, heißt: *Ein organisirtes Product der Natur ist das, in welchem alles Zweck und wechselseitig auch Mittel ist*. Nichts in ihm ist umsonst, zwecklos, oder einem blinden Naturmechanism zuzuschreiben." (Academy edition vol. 5, p. 376; italics indicate the part Nietzsche cited) Nietzsche confounds "organisirtes Product der Natur" with "Organismus".

23 The quotation of Goethe's *Bildung und Umbildung organischer Naturen* (1807) can be found in the introduction ('Die Absicht eingeleitet') to his *Morphologie* (printed in 1817): "*Jedes Lebendige ist kein Einzelnes, sondern eine Mehrheit; selbst insofern es uns als Individuum erscheint, bleibt es doch eine Versammlung von lebendigen selbständigen Wesen*, die der Idee, der Anlage nach gleich sind, in der Erscheinung aber gleich oder ähnlich, ungleich oder unähnlich werden können. Diese Wesen sind teils ursprünglich schon verbunden, teils finden und vereinigen sie sich. Sie entzweien sich und suchen sich wieder und bewirken so eine unendliche Produktion auf alle Weise und nach allen Seiten." (Hamburg edition, vol. 13, p. 56; italics indicate the part Nietzsche cited)

24 Cf. Goethe: *Zur Naturphilosophie im Allgemeinen, Anschauende Urteilskraft*, Hamburg edition, vol. 13, p. 30.

Explaining mechanically means explaining by outer causes.

Specification cannot be explained by outer causes. But nothing without cause. Therefore inner causes, i.e. ends, i.e. imaginations.

Perspective[25] is no cognition yet.

The principle of such a necessary perspective must be a concept of reason.[26]

The sole principle of this kind is natural purposiveness.

Through the concept of mechanical regularity the *architecture of the world*,[27] but no organism can be explained.

It is impossible to imagine natural purposiveness inhering matter.

Matter is only outer appearance.

The purposiveness of a thing can only be valid with respect to an intelligence the intention of which the thing conforms to. To wit, either our *own* [intelligence] or an *alien* [one] which underlies the thing itself.[28] In the last case the intention, which reveals itself in the phenomenon, the *existence* of the thing. In the other case only our imagination of the thing is judged as purposive. This last case of purposiveness refers only to the form [558] (power of imagination and intelligence harmonize in the simple contemplation of the object).

Only the mechanical way of originating of things is cognizable.

A sort of things is not cognizable.

We only understand a mechanism.

The mechanical origination of things is cognizable, but we cannot know whether there is a totally different one.

It is conditioned by our organization to understand only a mechanical origin of things.

Now there is, according to Kant, a necessitation in our organization that makes us believe in organisms, too.

From the standpoint of human nature:

> we only recognize the mechanism;
> we do not recognize the organism.

But now mechanism like organism is nothing that belongs to the thing in itself.

25 The German text states: “Betrachtungsweise”.

26 The German text states: “Vernunftbegriff”. Kant defines this term in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (p. B 367/A 310). His *Critique of Judgment* employs it several times; with respect to the definition of teleology, see especially § 61 (Academy edition, vol. 5, p. 361).

27 The German text states: “Weltbau”.

28 Nietzsche says “dem Dinge selbst” (the thing itself), not “dem Ding an sich” (the thing *in* itself), which could easily be mismatched in translation.

The organism is a form. Disregarding the form, it is multiplicity.

1. Organism as a product of our organization
2. Only the mathematical is recognizable
3.[29]

[559] The organic body is a matter the parts of which are composed purposively with each other.

Therefore we demand causes that are able to compose the parts of a matter purposively, i.e. Kant says[30] organizing causes which must be thought as effective by ends –

But herein a leap lies. It is only necessary to exhibit a coordinated possibility to remove the *constraining* of Kant's imagination.

Mechanism combined with casualism[31] provides this possibility.

What Kant demands, he demands it following a poor analogy: because according to his confession there is nothing similar to the relation of purposiveness of the organisms.[32]

The purposive originated as a special case of the possible: a welter of forms originates, i.e. mechanical compositions: among these innumerable [forms] there can be viable ones.

The precondition is that the living can originate from mechanism. Kant *denies* this.

In reality what is sure is that we can only recognize the mechanical. What is beyond our concepts is completely unrecognizable. The origin of the organic is insofar a hypothetical one: as we imagine a human understanding has been present.

But now even the concept of the organic is just human; one has to point out the analogous: the viable originates among a vast amount of non-viable. Therewith we come closer to the solution of the organism.

[560] We see that much that is viable originates and is preserved and see the method.[33]

Assuming the force which acts in the viable and in those things that originate and preserve to be the same: so this [force] must be very unreasonable.

But this is the presumption of teleology.

29 Only 1 and 2 are completed.

30 Nietzsche obviously contracts parts of the named paragraphs 65 and 66 of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, but a complete quotation cannot be found. Furthermore Nietzsche uses the German word "Materie" in a way that makes it appear as a synonym for 'object'.

31 The German text states: "Casualismus" (not "Causalismus"). Cf. Kant's *Critique of Judgment,* § 81.

32 The German quotation is: "nichts dem Zweckmäßigkeitsverhältniß der Organism Ähnliches giebt". But Kant himself does not employ concepts like "Organismus" or "Zweckmäßigkeitsverhältniß" in his whole *Critique of Judgment*. For Kant's understanding of the similarity ("Ähnlichkeit") between reality and imagination see §§ 77 and 80 there.

33 Nietzsche employs the collective form ("vieles Lebensfähige", "much"), not the countable one ("viele Lebensfähige", "many") avoiding the use of an ontology of individual `things´ in his expression.

The idea of the *effect* is the *concept* of the *whole*.

In the organism the effecting principle is the idea of the effect to bring forth.

But the concept of the whole is our achievement. Here the source of the imagination of an end lies. The concept of the whole does not lie in things, but in us.

But these units which we call organisms are multiplicities again.

There are no individuals in reality rather individuals and organisms are nothing but abstractions.

Into the units we made we carry the idea of an end afterwards.

We presume that the force which generates organisms of one *kind* is an integrated one.

Then the method of how this force creates and preserves the organisms is to be considered..

[561] Here it turns out that we just call purposive what is viable.

The secret is only 'life'.

Whether this is just an idea conditioned in the organization?

"The raving wastefulness astonishes us.[34] Schopenhauer (*World as Will and Representation* [vol. 2, second book, chap. 26]) says: "To nature works do not cost any efforts;"[35] therefore destruction is an indifferent will.

Schopenhauer means that there is an analogy to the organism (*World as Will and Representation* [loc. cit.]. "The will [is] the moving; what moves *it* [is] the motive (*causa finalis*)."[36]

34 The German text states: "Die rasende Verschwendung setzt uns in Erstaunen". It contracts the following passage of Schopenhauer's *World as Will and Representation*: "Wenn wir uns der Betrachtung des so unaussprechlich und endlos künstlichen Baues irgend eines Thieres, wäre es auch nur das gemeinste Insekt, hingeben, uns in Bewunderung desselben versenkend, jetzt aber uns einfällt, daß die Natur eben diesen, so überaus künstlichen und so höchst komplicirten Organismus täglich zu Tausenden der Zerstörung, durch Zufall, thierische Gier und menschlichen Muthwillen rücksichtslos Preis giebt; *so setzt diese rasende Verschwendung uns in Erstaunen*. Allein dasselbe beruht auf einer Amphibolie der Begriffe, indem wir dabei das menschliche Kunstwerk im Sinne haben, welches unter Vermittelung des Intellekts und durch Ueberwältigung eines fremden, widerstrebenden Stoffes zu Stande gebracht wird, folglich allerdings viel Mühe kostet." (Zurich edition, vol. 2, p. 384; italics indicate the part Nietzsche cited)

35 The German text contracts the passage that follows directly after his previous quotation: "*Der Natur* hingegen *kosten ihre Werke*, so künstlich sie auch sind, gar *keine Mühe*; weil hier der Wille zum Werke schon selbst das Werk ist; indem, wie schon gesagt, der Organismus bloß die im Gehirn zu Stande kommende Sichtbarkeit des hier vorhandenen Willens ist." (Zurich edition, vol. 2, p. 385; italics indicate the part Nietzsche cited)

36 The German text contracts the following passage: "Denn, was man auch zwischen den Willensakt und die Körperbewegung physiologisch einschieben möchte, immer bleibt hier eigenständlich der *Wille das Bewegende,* und *was ihn bewegt,* ist *das* von außen kommende *Motiv,* also die *causa finalis*; welche folglich hier als causa efficiens auftritt." (Zurich edition, vol. 2, p. 387; italics indicate the part Nietzsche cited)

Goethe's Experiments:

Metamorphosis belongs to the explanation of the organic out of the one of the *effectuating* cause.

Ultimately every *effectuating* cause bears on something inscrutable

(exactly that proves that this is the right human way).

Thus no one demands final causes in inorganic nature because there are no individuals but forces to be noticed;

i.e. because we can disintegrate anything mechanically and in consequence of this do not believe in ends anymore.

[562]

Only that much can be completely conceived as one can construe and effectuate by concepts oneself.[37]

A Wrong Opposition[38]

If only mechanical forces prevail in nature, so the purposive phenomena are only illusionary, too; their purposiveness is our *idea*.

The blind forces act unintentionally; therefore they cannot effectuate anything purposive.

The viable is configured according to a chain of failed and half successful trials.[39]

[563] Life, the organism does not prove any higher intelligence: no continuous degree of intelligence at all.

The existence of organisms only shows blindly effectuating forces.

1. Elimination of the extended imagination of teleology.

2. Borders of the concept. The purposive in nature.

3. Purposive equals capable of existence.[40]

4. Organisms as multiplicities and unities.

The *imagination* of the *whole* considered as cause is the end.

N.B. But the 'whole' itself is only an imagination.

37 See Kant: *Critique of Judgment*, § 68 (academy edition vol. 5, p. 384). Nietzsche quotes this sentence later again.

38 The *Kritische Gesamtausgabe* adds another paragraph before this subheading that seems to be taken out of context: It is about Nietzsche's teaching schedule.

39 The *Kritische Gesamtausgabe* adds another paragraph after this one that seems to be taken out of context: It is about Nietzsche's teaching schedule again.

40 The German text states: "existenzfähig".

Kant:

Possible that organisms emerged purely mechanically.

Impossible that we can deduce them mechanically.

Why?

Understanding is discursive, not intuitive.

It can comprehend and compose the whole only of the parts. But within an organism the parts are conditioned by the whole. Now the understanding tries to start with the whole which is not given in intuition but only in imagination. So the imagination of the whole is supposed to condition the parts: the imagination of the whole as cause, i.e. end.

[564] [If] the understanding is supposed to comprehend the whole from the parts, then it will proceed mechanically, [if] it is supposed to comprehend the given parts out of the whole, then it can only deduce them from the *concept* of the whole.[41][42]

Briefly, it lacks intuition.

Within an organism not only the parts are conditioned by the whole but also the whole by the parts.

So differently, if the organisms are emerged mechanically, then they must be deducible, too.

Admitted that we keep only one side in sight.

Now initially the parts are considered and decomposed in their parts: so one gets for instance to the cell.

On condition that the organisms emerged mechanically. But if a concept of a purpose was functioning, too, the creation took place by mechanism anyway (as Kant admits).

So a mechanism must be ascertainable.

A *generatio aequivoca* [is] unproved.[43]

Final causes as well as mechanisms are human ways of intuiting. Purely one only knows the mathematical.

The law (in inorganic nature) as a law is something analogous to final causes.

What in nature is not just mechanically constituted, this is no object of the

41 The German text puts an undefined conditional clause (without a subjunction). This style rhetorically implies the unsuccessfulness of the condition.

42 The *generatio aequivoca* is a scientific hypothesis that asserts an original origination of organic individuals from inorganic matter. For Nietzsche cf. Kant's *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* which contains the so called Kant-Laplace theory.

43 See Kant: *Critique of Judgment*, § 68 (academy edition vol. 5, p. 384).

understanding.

[565] Only the strictly mathematical in nature can be explained.

Explaining mechanically means explaining from outer causes / this definition is introduced to oppose the inner ones later.

On the contrary explaining mechanically means:

"Only that much can be completely conceived as one oneself can construe and effectuate by concepts."[44]

Therefore one can only completely conceive the mathematical (therefore formal understanding). For the rest one faces the unknown. To cope with this man invents concepts which however only aggregate a sum of appearing attributes, but do not come close to the thing.

Force, matter, individual, law, organism, atom, final cause all belong here.

These are not constitutive, but only reflect judgments.

Kant catches the meaning of mechanism as the world without final causes: the world of causality.

We cannot imagine crystallization without the idea of effect, either.

The emergence u and preservation of organic beings—in how far does it belong to the final causes?[45]

[566] Ends in nature: in siring, preservation of the individual and the species. Therewith compare § 62.[46]

Then Kant foists the concept of a *thing* (§ 63) and loses sight of the general forms of purposiveness.

The randomness of its form in relation to reason (which is found in the crystal, too).

"A thing exists as a natural end if it is a cause and effect on its own."[47] This proposition is not deduced. A single case is taken.

---

44 Nietzsche puts the question (the second part of the sentence) with a singular subject although there are two concepts given in the first place. Grammatically there can be no definitive decision which one of them is meant (or if he means both of them covered in rhetorical style).

45 See Kant: *Critique of Judgment*, § 65 (academy edition vol. 5, esp. p. 374), not § 62.

46 The quotation refers to: "Ich würde vorläufig sagen: *ein Ding existirt als Naturzweck, wenn es von sich selbst* (obgleich in zwiefachem Sinne) *Ursache und Wirkung ist*; denn hierin liegt eine Causalität, dergleichen mit dem bloßen Begriffe einer Natur, ohne ihr einen Zweck unterzulegen, nicht verbunden, aber auch alsdann zwar ohne Widerspruch gedacht, aber nicht begriffen werden kann. Wir wollen die Bestimmung dieser Idee von einem Naturzwecke zuvörderst durch ein Beispiel erläutern, ehe wir sie völlig auseinander setzen." (Academy edition vol. 5, p. 370-1; italics indicate the part Nietzsche cited). Nietzsche regards neither Kant's preliminary remark that this is only a provisory attempt nor his insertion that this is no univocal concept yet.

47 The German text states "Existenzfähigkeit".

The deduction, that organisms are the *sole* natural ends, has not been accomplished.

In nature already a machine would lead to final causes.

Concept of purposiveness: only the ability of existence.[48] Herewith nothing is testified about the degree of the herein revealed reason.

It is something different, Kant says, to consider a thing by its inner form as purposive and to regard the existence of this thing as an end of nature. —Therefore the inexpedient method of preservation and reproduction of an organism does not struggle with its own purposiveness by all means.[49]

Against this the same has to be said: this organism is purposive and this organism is viable. So not: the existence of this thing is the end of nature: but: what we call purposive is nothing but us finding a thing viable and following this, its conditions as purposive.

[567] Who complains about the method of nature to preserve as inexpedient regards now the existence of a thing as an end of nature.

The concept of an end of nature sticks only to the organism.

"But, Kant says, "this concept now leads necessarily to the idea of the whole nature as a system by the rule of ends.

"by the example, nature provides in its organic products, one is authorized to expect it and its laws to be nothing but what is purposive *in toto*."[50]

This reflection is only achieved by

1. discounting the subjective of the concept of purpose;
2. comprehending nature as a unit;
3. presuming it a unit of means, too.

"Now if one introduces the concept of God into natural science and in its context to make purposiveness in nature explicable, and needs this purposiveness hereafter again to prove that there is a God: then in none of both sciences is there any

48 Nietzsche refers to the following passage in Kant: "*Ein Ding seiner innern Form* halber *als* Naturzweck beurtheilen, ist ganz etwas anderes, als *die Existenz dieses Dinges für Zweck der Natur halten*." (Academy edition vol. 5, p. 378; italics indicate the parts Nietzsche presents). Anything about the 'inexpedient method' cannot be found in Kant's *Critique of Judgment* at all.

49 The quotation refers to Kant's *Critique of Judgment*: "*Aber dieser Begriff führt nun nothwendig auf die Idee der gesammten Natur als eines Systems nach der Regel der Zwecke*, welcher Idee nun aller Mechanism der Natur nach Principien der Vernunft (wenigstens um daran die Naturerscheinung zu versuchen) untergeordnet werden muß. Das Princip der Vernunft ist ihr als nur subjectiv, d.i. als Maxime, zuständig: Alles in der Welt ist irgend wozu gut; nichts ist in ihr umsonst; und man ist *durch das Beispiel, das die Natur an ihren organischen Producten giebt, berechtigt*, ja berufen, *von ihr und ihren Gesetzen nichts, als was im Ganzen zweckmäßig ist, zu erwarten*." (Academy edition vol. 5, p. 378-379; italics indicate the parts Nietzsche cited). The quotation is shortened and therefore a little reconverted but is in the main correct.

50 The word "substance" is given as the translation of the German "innerer Bestand".

substance[51] and an elusive vicious circle[52] brings each in uncertainness, through which they make their borders merge with one another."[53]

Chap. 1. Concept of purposiveness (as ability of existence).

" 2. Organism (the undefined concept of life, the undefined concept of individual).

" 3. The alleged impossibility to explain an organism mechanically (what does mechanically mean?)

" 4. The recognized purposelessness in nature in conflict with purposiveness.

[568] To infer the emergence of organisms at all out of the method of nature during preservation etc. of the organism: is not the Empedoclean view. But the Epicurean one indeed. But it presupposes that chance might be able to assemble motley organic beings: while here the point at issue lies. A tragedy can be pieced together out of letters (against Cicero), an earth out of meteor pieces: but it is questionable now what 'life' is, whether it is just a simple principle of order and form (like the tragedy) or something completely diverse: However one has to admit that within organic nature there exists no other principle for the behavior of organisms than within inorganic nature. The method of nature in treating things is equal, it is an impartial mother, hard towards inorganic and organic children in equal measure.

Chance rules by all means, i.e. the opposite of purposiveness in nature. The storm that carries the things around is chance. This is *conceivable*.

Here the question appears whether the force that makes things is the same as the one which preserves them? etc.

Within the organic being the parts are purposive for its existence; i.e. it would not live if the parts were inexpedient. But therewith nothing is arranged for the sole part yet. It[54] is a form of purposiveness: but it is not to make out that it is the only possible form. Hence the whole does not command the parts necessarily, while the parts necessarily command the whole.[55] Who asserts the first, too, [569] asserts the highest purposiveness, i.e. the highest purposiveness selected from the different possible forms of purposiveness of the parts: whereby he assumes that there is a sequence of steps of purposiveness.

Which is the idea of effect now? Life under the conditions necessary thereto? This is one idea of effect common to all organisms?

51 The word "vicious circle" is given as the translation of "Diallele".

52 See Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, § 68 (cf. Academy edition vol. 5, p. 381). The quotation is both correct and complete (word for word translated by TN).

53 "It" refers to "the sole part" and not the arrangement.

54 The verb "command" is given as the translation of the German "bedingen".

55 In German "life" and "to live" are literally indistinguishable ("Leben") although it can stand for a noun or a verb.

Life in a form under the conditions necessary thereto? But the form and the conditions coincide here, i.e. if a form is set as a cause, so the degree of purposiveness is thought right into the cause, too. Because life in one form is just organism. What else is organism than form, formed life?

But if we say about the parts of the organism, they were not necessary, then we say, the form of the organism is not necessary: in other words we place the organic into somewhere else than the form. But furthermore it is simply still life. So our proposition will be: for living[56] there are different forms i.e. purposivenesses.

Life is possible among an astonishing bulk of forms.

Each of these forms is purposive: but because a welter of forms exists, so there is a welter of purposive forms, too.

In human life we make a sequence of steps of the purposive: we set it equally 'reasonable' not until a very narrow choice takes place. If a human being finds the only purposive way in a complicated situation, so we say, he is acting reasonably. But if one wants to travel into the world and runs an arbitrary way, so he is acting purposively but not yet reasonably.

Therefore a[57] reason does not reveal itself in the 'purposive' organisms.

[570] Therefore what the cause of the effect is as an idea, that is only the form of life. Life itself cannot be considered as an end because it is assumed to act by ends.

Therefore if we talk about concepts of ends and final causes: so we mean: on a living and thinking being a form is intentioned in which it wants to appear.

In other words employing final causes we do not approach the explanation of *life* but only of *form*.

Now we do not conceive anything at all of a living but *forms*. The eternally becoming[58] is life; by the nature of our intellect we conceive forms: our intellect is too obtuse to apprehend the perpetual metamorphosis: that which is cognizable to it, it calls form. Truly there can be no form because in each point sits an infinitude. Each thought unity (point) describes a line.

A similar concept like form is the concept individual. So one calls organisms units, centers of ends. But there are only units for our intellect. Each individual has an infinitude of living individuals within itself. It is only a coarse intuition, maybe firstly taken from the body of the human being.

All 'forms' can be diced out, but life!

56 In German it is not clear whether Nietzsche wants to refer to the *one* reason or *a* reason at all.

57 `The eternally becoming´ ("Das ewig Werdende") will remind a German speaking reader to a very similar expression in Goethe's drama *Faust* (last verse of part 2) where he names the teleological force of the eternal process of being itself `the eternally feminine´ ("Das ewig Weibliche").

58 The German text states "sich selbst Organisiren" which could also be given in translation as `autopoiesis´.

The idea of the whole as cause: thereby it is said that the whole conditions the parts: nothing more: for that the parts construe the whole is self-evident.

[571] If one deals with final causes, one only means that in the building of the parts the form of the whole was in mind, that a form cannot have emerged mechanically.

Life along with procreation is that which is not enclosed among final causes. The 'act of self-organization'[59] is deduced arbitrarily in Kant.

Does one need final causes to explain that something is alive? No, only to explain how it lives.

Do we need final causes to explain the life of a thing?

No, 'life' is something completely dark upon which we can thus spend no light by dint of final causes, either.

We seek to make obvious only the forms of life.

When[60] we say 'the dog is alive' and ask now 'why is the dog alive?' it does not belong here. Because here we have taken 'living' equally for 'being'.[61] The question 'why is [there] anything' belongs to outer teleology and falls outside our area. (Childish anthropomorphic examples also in Kant).

We cannot explain the dog mechanically; that demands that he is a living being.

Form is all what appears from 'life' at the surface.

Therefore the inquiry into final causes is an inquiry into forms.

As a matter of fact we are even necessitated to look for final causes in an increasing crystal.

In other words: teleological inquiry and inquiry of organisms do not coincide

but

[572] teleological inquiry and inquiry into forms.

Ends and forms are identical in nature.

Therefore if the students of nature[62] opine, an organism could emerge from 'chance' i.e. not from final causes, so this has to be admitted as the form. It is only

59 The German text states "Wenn", which could also be translated as "if". I have chosen "when" because the next thought is introduced with "jetzt" ("now").

60 The German text opposes the two verbs "leben" ("living") and "dasein" ("being").

61 The German "Naturforscher" refers especially to those who employ empirical research.

62 Arthur Schopenhauer: *Über den Willen in der Natur* (1836).

questionable what 'life' is.

To read are

Schopenhauer, *On the Will in Nature*.[63]

Treviranus, *On the Appearance and Laws of the Organic Life*.[64]

Czolbe, *New Exposition of Sensualism*.[65]

"[66] *The Borders and the Origin of Human Cognition*.[67]

Moleschott, *Cycle of Life*.[68]

" *The Unit of Life*.[69]

Virchow, *Four Speeches on Life and Illness*.[70]

" *Collected Treatises on Scientific Medicine*.[71]

Trendelenburg, *Logical Inquiry*.[72]

Überweg, *System of Logic*.[73]

Helmholz, *On the Preservation of Force*.[74]

" *On the Interaction of Natural Forces*.[75]

---

63 Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus, *Beiträge zur Aufklärung der Erscheinungen und Gesetze des organischen Lebens*, 4 vols.(Bremen, 1831-1832).

64 Heinrich Czolbe: *Neue Darstellung des Sensualismus. Ein Entwurf*(Leipzig, 1855).

65 Nietzsche employs these quote marks to indicate that the text in question belongs to the same author as the previous line.

66 Heinrich Czolbe: *Die Grenzen und der Ursprung der menschlichen Erkenntnis im Gegensatz zu Kant und Hegel. Naturalistisch-teologische Durchführung des mechanischen Princips* (Jena, 1865).

67 Jacob [Jakob] Moleschott: *Der Kreislauf des Lebens. Physiologische Antworten auf Liebig's Chemische Briefe* (Mainz, 1852).

68 Jacob [Jakob] Moleschott: *Die Einheit des Lebens; Vortrag bei der Wiedereröffnung der Vorlesungen über Physiologie an der Turiner Hochschule am 23. November 1863 gehalten* (Giessen, 1864).

69 Rudolf Virchow: *Vier Reden über Leben und Kranksein* (Berlin, 1862).

70 Rudolf Virchow: *Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur wissenschaftlichen Medicin* (Frankfurt (Main), 1856).

71 Friedrich Adolf [Adolph] Trendelenburg: *Logische Untersuchungen* (Berlin, 1840) (later editions Leipzig).

72 Friedrich Ueberweg: *System der Logik und Geschichte der logischen Lehren* (Bonn 1857).

73 Hermann Helmholtz: *Ueber die Erhaltung der Kraft. Eine physikalische Abhandlung* (Berlin, 1847).

74 Hermann Helmholtz: *Ueber die Wechselwirkung der Naturkräfte und die darauf bezüglichen neuesten Ermittelungen der Physik. Ein populär-wissenschaftlicher Vortrag gehalten am 7. Februar 1854* (Königsberg 1854).

75 Wilhelm Wundt: *Vorlesungen über Menschen- und Thierseele* (Leipzig, 1863).

Wundt, *Lectures on the Human and Animal Spirit*.[76]

Lotze, *Polemics*.[77]

" *Medical Psychology*.[78]

Trendelenburg, *Monthly Reviews of the Berlin Academy*

November 1854
February 1856.[79]

[573] " *Historical Contributions to Philosophy*.[80]

Herbart, *Analytical Illumination of Natural Law and Morals*.[81]

Schelling, *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*.[82]

Herder, *Ideas for the Philosophy of History of Humanity*.[83]

Bichat, *Sur la Vie et la Mort,*[84] have to read

Joh. Müller, *On the Organic Life*.[85]

" *On the Physiology of the Senses*.[86]

Chap. 1. Teleological inquiry is inquiry by forms.

" 2. Forms (individuals) are appendant to and taken from the human organization.

" 3. Life force. = [87]

---

76 Rudolph Hermann Lotze: *Streitschriften* (Leipzig, 1857).

77 Rudolph Hermann Lotze: *Medicinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele* (Leipzig, 1852).

78 Friedrich Adolf [Adolph] Trendelenburg: *Über Herbart's Metaphysik und eine neue Auffassung derselben* (Monatsberichte der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin 1854); F. A. T.: *Über Herbart's Metaphysik und neue Auffassungen derselben. Zweiter Artikel. Eine Entgegnung* (Monatsberichte der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin 1856, p. 87-115; online at: *http://bibliothek.bbaw.de/ bibliothek-digital/digitalequellen/schriften/ anzeige/ index_html?band=09-mon/1856&aufloesung:int=1& seite:int=90*).

79 Friedrich Adolf [Adolph] Trendelenburg: *Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie* (Berlin 1846-1867).

80 Johann Friedrich Herbart: *Analytische Beleuchtung des Naturrechts und der Moral. Zum Gebrauch beym Vortrage der praktischen Philosophie* (Göttingen 1836).

81 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling: *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur* (1797).

82 Johann Gottfried Herder: *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1784-1791).

83 Marie François Xavier Bichat: *Recherches Physiologiques sur la Vie et la Mort* (Paris 1799/1800). Nietzsche cites the French title in the German text, too.

84 Probably Johannes Peter Müller: *Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen*, Koblenz 1837-40. Especially the first chapters deal with organic matter, the organism, and life.

85 Johannes Peter Müller: *Zur vergleichenden Physiologie des Gesichtssinnes des Menschen und der Tiere nebst einem Versuch über die Bewegungen der Augen und über den menschlichen Blick*, Leipzig 1826.

86 The German text states "Lebenskraft. =" but not the second part of the equation.

87 "Aspect of appearance" is given as the translation of "Erscheinungsweise" (instead of

Which right do we assume to comprehend the aspect of appearance[88] of a thing e.g. of a dog as preexistent? Form is something for us. Considering it as a cause thus we award a phenomenon the worth of a thing in itself.

'Purposive' is only said in relation to 'life'.

Not so in relation to the forms of life.

[574] Therefore recognition of rationality does not fall within the concept of purposiveness.

What is supposed to be cause as the idea of effect, cannot be 'life' but only form.

I.e. an aspect of appearance of a thing is considered as preexistent and as real.

A thing lives—therefore its parts are purposive: the life of a thing is the end of its parts.

But to be alive, there are infinitely different ways i.e. forms i.e. parts.

Purposiveness. Is not an absolute, but a very relative one: from another point of view, usually inexpedience.

Final cause means:

the idea of the whole denoted as a cause

i.e. a form of appearance denoted as real and preexistent.

The concept of the whole is only related to the form, not to 'life'.

1. Not "a 'life' shall be originated, therefore forms must be searched";

2. but "among the following forms a 'life' shall appear".

It is impossible to comprehend the concept of life: therefore it does not belong to the idea of the whole.

On the Possibility of an Emergence of the Organisms

from 'Chance', 'Inexpedience'. (Mechanism)[89]

"way of appearance") because on p. 574 Nietzsche uses the term referring to the epistemological "form" which is rather an 'aspect' of appearing than a 'way'.

88 I consider this line as a subheading, but it could probably also be read as an ordinary text line.

89 The German "Reich" is given as "realm" because there is no political notion here. The concept seems to refer to the neutral term "Reich der Natur" like "Pflanzenreich" ("plant world) or "Tierreich" ("animal world").

[575] Kant admits to the possibility, but disavows the possibility of cognition.

The method of nature is the same in organic and inorganic realm.[90]

So if there is the possibility of a mechanism, so there should be the possibility of cognition, too.

But our understanding is discursive. But even that is sufficient if the mechanism is explained.

Individual is an insufficient term.

What we see of life is form; how we see it, individual. What is behind it is unrecognizable.

Procreation is not included within final causes: because it asks: for which end shall this being become? This belongs to outer teleology i.e. in a system of the ends of nature.

A system of the ends of nature is opposed to the following theses:

1. The subjective of a concept of the ends in the organisms is taken objectively;

2. nature is taken as a unit;

3. and a unit of means is ascribed to it.

Is a thing not purposive hence, because it emerged mechanically?

Kant asserts this. Why is chance unable to beget anything purposive?

He is right: then the purposive is only in our idea.

'Life' occurs together with sensing: therefore we take sensation[91] for a condition of the 'organic'.[92]

'Living' is to exist 'consciously that is humanlike'.

[576] The question of the organism is this one: whence the humanlike in nature?

At the lack of self-awareness?

Kant, *Critique of Judgment*.[93]

90 "Sensation" is given as a Kantian translation of "Empfinden".

91 The German sentence is inverted; it is not clear whether Nietzsche wants to call sensation the one condition or one among others.

92 Immanuel Kant: *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 1790.

93 Jakob Friedrich Fries: *Die mathematische Naturphilosophie nach philosophischer Methode bearbeitet. Ein Versuch*, Heidelberg 1822.

Fries, *Mathematical Philosophy of Nature*.[94]

Schleiden, *On Materialism in Newer Science of Nature* (in Schleiden the mechanical explainability of organisms).[95]

C. Rosenkranz, *Schelling Lectures*.[96]

Sal. Maimon, *Berlin Journal of Enlightenment*, ed. by A. Riem, vol. 8, July 1790.[97]

Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism*.[98]

Oken, *The Procreation*.[99]

" *Primer to Natural Philosophy*.[100]

Carus, *Main Features of Comparing Anatomy and Physiology*.[101]

We cannot imagine 'life' i.e. the sensing, growing existence other than analogously to the human. Man recognizes several humanlike and human-alien[102] in nature and asks for an explanation.

I have observed that one constantly thinks asleep from time to time: an accidental awakening informs of it as there are still smithereens of the recent thoughts in the head.

Do we comprehend the unconscious cooperation of single parts for one whole?

[577] In inorganic nature, e.g. in the constitution of the universe there is regularity and purposiveness very well considerable as a consequence of mechanism.

Therein Kant saw an *orderly necessity*[103], the opposite of chance (Kuno Fischer

94 Matthias Jacob Schleiden: *Ueber den Materialismus der neueren deutschen Naturwissenschaft, sein Wesen und seine Geschichte*, Leipzig 1863.

95 Karl Rosenkranz: *Schelling. Vorlesungen gehalten im Sommer 1842 an der Universität zu Königsberg*, Danzig 1843.

96 Salomon Maimon published six articles in *Berlinisches Journal für Aufklärung* in 1790; these are: *Ueber Wahrheit. Schreiben des Herrn Maimon an Herrn Tieftrunk* (vol. 7/1, p. 22-51); *Baco und Kant. Schreiben des H. S. Maimon an den Herausgeber dieses Journals* (vol. 7/2, p. 99-122); *Ueber die Weltseele. Entelechia universi* (vol. 8/1, p.47-92); *Ueber Wahrheit, an den Herrn S. Maimon. Von J. H. Tieftrunk* (vol. 8/2, p. 115-158); *Ankündigung* (vol. 8/2, p. 186-192); *Antwort des Hrn. Maimon auf voriges Schreiben* (vol. 9/1, p. 52-80). Most of the articles can be read online at: *http://www.ub.uni-bielefeld.de/diglib/aufkl/berlaufk/berlaufk.htm*; the last one can be found at: *http://www.salomon-maimon.de/schriften/antwort.htm*.

97 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling: *System des transcendentalen Idealismus* (1800).

98 Lorenz Oken: *Die Zeugung*, Bamberg 1805.

99 Lorenz Oken: *Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie*, Zurich 1843 (this refers to the third and enhanced edition).

100 Carl Gustav Carus: *Grundzüge der vergleichenden Anatomie und Physiologie*, 3 vol., Dresden 1828.

101 The German text states "Menschenähnliche" and "Menschenfremde".

102 The German text states: "*Planmäßige Nothwendigkeit*", which cannot be found in any of Kant's writings but in the interpretation of Kuno Fischer: *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, Mannheim 1860, vol. 3, p. 130 (book 1, chap. 1, no. 4).

103 The quotation refers to the following passage of Kant's *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*, Second Part, Preface: "*Mich dünkt, man könne hier in gewissem* Ver-

[*History of the Newer Philosophy*, vol. 3, chap. 7, sect. 2]).

Most notable passage: “Me thinks one could say in a certain sense without any arrogance: give me matter, I will demonstrate you how a world shall emerge out of it” – – – etc.[104]

What Hamann says about Kant’s optimism (*Reflections on Optimism*) applies to optimism at all: “His ideas are like blind cubs fawn by a hasty bitch – – He appeals to the whole to judge about the world. But that belongs to a knowledge, which is no more a patchwork. To reason the fragments from the whole is just the same as [to reason] the known from the unknown”.[105]

Hamann, *Writings*, part 1.

It is hard for Kant to project alien philosophems.: what is very characteristic for an original thinker.

[578] Nice words against the theological standpoint on the occasion of teleology.

“For it is something very absurd to expect enlightenment from reason and however to predict it prior which way must necessarily result” (*Cr. o. Pur. Reas*. 2. sect.).

Translated and annotated by Th. Nawrath, Paderborn

stande *ohne Vermessenheit sagen: Gebet mir Materie*, ich will eine Welt daraus bauen! das ist, gebet mir Materie, *ich will euch zeigen, wie eine Welt daraus entstehen soll*. Denn wenn Materie vorhanden ist, welche mit einer wesentlichen Attractionskraft begabt ist, so ist es nicht schwer diejenigen Ursachen zu bestimmen, die zu der Einrichtung des Weltsystems, im Großen betrachtet, haben beitragen können.” (Academy edition vol. 1, p. 229 et seq.; italics indicate the parts Nietzsche quoted) The quotation is part of the preface. It is shortened, but apart from that almost correct; Nietzsche confutes “Verstande” with “Sinne” which might be of no harm here. But he does not consider that Kant’s text is from 1755 and belongs to Kant’s earliest period of work—about 25 years before the critical turn in 1781. Nietzsche seems to quote this passage of Kant from Kuno Fischer: *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, loc. cit., vol. 3, p. 132 (book 1, chap. 1, no. 4); different from Nietzsche Fischer quoted Kant correctly.

104 Johann Georg Hamann to Johann Gotthelf Lindner (12 October 1759): “Seine [= Kants] Gründe verstehe ich nicht; *seine Einfälle* aber *sind blinde Jungen, die eine eilfertige Hündinn geworfen*. Wenn es der Mühe lohnte ihn zu wiederlegen; so hätte ich mir wohl die Mühe geben mögen, ihn zu verstehen. *Er beruft sich auf das Ganze, um von der Welt zu urtheilen. Dazu gehört aber ein Wißen, das kein Stückwerk mehr ist. Vom Ganzen also auf die Fragmente zu schließen, ist eben so als von dem Unbekannten auf das Bekannte.*” (italics indicate the parts Nietzsche quoted) In: *Hamanns Briefe*, ed. by Walther Ziesemer and Arthur Henkel, 1955-1979, vol. 1, p. 425. Nietzsche seems to quote this letter of Hamann from Kuno Fischer: *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, loc. cit., vol. 3, p. 143 (book 1, chap. 1, no. 6).

105 Cf. Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 775; German quotation is completely correct.

Nietzsche Society 2010 Annual Meeting
32nd ANNUAL MEETING

Nietzsche Society: Call for Papers

in conjunction with the annual meeting of the
SOCIETY FOR EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Thursday November 4, 2010

9-12 Noon

Montréal, Québec, Marriott Château Champlain

Hosted by McGill University and Université de Montréal

No more than 3000 words

On a separate page, please include your name, address, and brief bio-bibliographical details

Submissions should be sent, by 30 March 2010
to:
Babich@fordham.edu

2010 Nietzsche Society Executive Program Committee:

David B. Allison, *State University of New York at Stony Brook*

Debra B. Bergoffen, *George Mason University*

Gary Shapiro, *University of Richmond*

ex officio: Babette Babich, *Fordham University*, Executive Director

The Agonist
A Nietzsche Circle Journal

Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy

written by: Vanessa Lemm (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009)
reviewed by: Yunus Tuncel (The New School, New York)



Nietzsche's texts are infused with animal symbolism. Nietzsche uses animal symbols to exemplify a quality; for instance when he refers to the agonistic Greeks as tiger-like in "Homer's Contest." In another context it is to show the necessity to be connected to the animal world, as he emphasizes the place of the satyr-chorus in Greek theater in *The Birth of Tragedy*. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, on the other hand, animals are not only essential to Zarathustra's cosmos, but they also embody a spirit that comforts and guides him. There are not many thinkers in the West for whom the animal in the human is revered as strongly as it is in Nietzsche, echoing an archaic reverence for the animal spirit. In *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy*, Vanessa Lemm not only explores the place of animality in Nietzsche within the context of important ideas and themes such as forgetfulness, creativity, overhuman, gift-giving, and forgiveness, but she also retrieves, via Nietzsche and others, the animal human from the place of oblivion that it has fallen into our "advanced" civilization. Below is a review of each of the six chapters of her book.

The first chapter, "Culture and Civilization," introduces an important distinction between culture and civilization, which is used throughout the book. According to this reading, culture stands for cultivation, freedom from moralization, and counter-memory, while civilization is understood as taming and breeding, morality of repression, and memory. These two different types of forces are in perpetual conflict that plays itself out in the antagonism between human life and animal life. Civilization is "…directed against the animality of the human being" (11), whereas culture is the liberation of the animal human. This distinction, which is supported by passages from Nietzsche's works (but as always Nietzsche is not consistent in the way he uses these two terms), provides a sound framework for the book from which many questions can be posed on the animality of the human and its status.

Another important theme of the book is how Nietzsche de-centers the human as

he retrieves animality or the animal human, which is also the project of culture. A passage quoted by the author from the *Anti-Christ* illustrates this project of culture in Nietzsche, which cannot be overstated. The de-centering of the human is a theme that runs from Nietzsche's earliest philosophical writings to the latest. The opening paragraph of "Truth and Lies," for instance, presents a *humbled* picture of the human, not in relation to animals but in relation to the whole universe. On the other hand, the author presents many examples to illustrate how the Nietzschean culture-project works regarding the "promising animal." Animals lead Zarathustra[1] toward the overhuman, as they embody the wisdom that he needs to overcome himself. Another example for Nietzsche's project is his frequent reference point and source of inspiration: the agonistic Greeks and how they kept alive the cruelty of the animal. Here Lemm makes insightful observations without providing any specific information on the place of animals in the agonistic practices of ancient Greeks. Two such important practices in relation to animals were the following: contestants and their judges had to be purified in pig's blood on the way to Olympia (otherwise they could not enter the sacred precinct) and animals (one hundred oxen for Zeus and a black ram for Pelops at Olympia) were sacrificed at the sites of contest. Through animals they were made sacred (because animals were considered sacred) and through them they were reminded of the perils, sacrifices, defeats, and deaths of the competitive journey. Both of these support the author's observation that for the Greeks "…animality is a source of their humanity" (16). Many other examples, including non-agonistic ones, can be given to demonstrate this point, which she makes here convincingly.

However, ancient Greek culture and its agonistic spirit which is in touch with animality, as it was in many archaic societies, did not prevail; the priestly type with his extirpation of animal passions became dominant. Lemm presents this event, the rise of morality, as a "false overcoming," a civilizing project. From the standpoint of animal philosophy, this is regarded as the "turning of the human animal against itself" (20). She illustrates it by way of two concepts, the over-animal and the over-human; although they both share the same prefix 'over-,' it does not give the same signification to them. In the case of the over-animal, the human being is placed as superior to animals, excluding the possibility of an agonistic encounter. By contrast, in the overhuman a space is created for such an encounter as the human and the animal are treated as equals. I did not assume here that the author was referring to an actual contest between humans and animals, but rather to an agonistic sustenance of the animal human within the human. Additionally, we can learn from animals how to become agonistic.

Moreover, the concept of the overhuman is integrally connected to the question of hierarchy in Nietzsche. The author rightly observes that Nietzsche's hierarchy should not be understood in a traditional way, but fails to elucidate the nature of the relationship (as in commanding and obeying) of the agonistic forces. Whether one likes to use the term 'domination' or not, in any agonistic struggle there are higher and stronger types and lower and weaker types. Nietzsche clearly states his

1 Many different kinds of animals appear in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, making it a rich text in animal symbolism. It is not the goal of *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy* to explore this symbolism, but rather animality in Nietzsche in general and its many dimensions. For animal symbolism in *Zarathustra*, one may consult with the relevant chapters of *A Nietzschean Bestiary*, ed. by C. D. Acampora and R. R. Acampora. This and other books are listed in the first footnote of the book.

reviewed by:
Yunus
Tuncel

version of the "sacred order" in many of his texts[2]. In a given game of contest, the contestants rule over each other during the game and at the end one ends up ruling over the other (*dominari*, the origin of domination, means to rule). In a sense, the winning side "commands" and the losing side "obeys." Therefore, in contest one force may be dominant over the other force. It should also be kept in mind that the Greek agon took place in a hierarchical world where gods and heroes ruled over the contestants mythically and symbolically, whereas priests and judges ruled over them in actuality and even physically (not to mention previous victors who won fame and were honored at the sites of contest); there would not be any agon if such a hierarchy did not exist. Agon is not only about two approximately equal contestants fighting. Yes, domination and submission exist in agon; however, Nietzsche's and the Greek version of domination does not create a stagnation or a stifling in the flow of agonistic forces. On the contrary it urges, organizes, and elevates them.

One last topic in Chapter 1 is the memory of culture. Unlike the memory of civilization that crushes animality, the memory of culture, rooted in dreams and illusions, opens up to animality. In this way humans are connected to the whole organic world and to forgetfulness. In this sense, animals too have memory, memory of instincts and the body, for example; and through this memory humans are connected to them and to the animal that they are. Without illusions there would not be any life or culture for Nietzsche, and we are mostly in touch with them in the states of forgetfulness, as in sleep and dream, the domain of the unconscious. For Nietzsche, the unconscious pertains not only to the psychic states but also the somatic ones. Therefore, humans come into contact with their animal selves mostly in their unconscious states, often symbolized by myths and acted out in animal-worshipping cult practices. The genius who appears as evil or demonic to the civilization (28), creates out of this well of forgetfulness, as the author observes: "…forgetfulness is the source of all noble and great actions" (26).

In Chapter 2: "Politics and Promise," Lemm makes another distinction, this time between the promise of civilization and the promise of culture, as she elicits an intriguing teaching out of Nietzsche related to this second distinction: "…the antagonism between human and animal life forces is the principal feature of human development" (30-31)[3]. Therefore, what humans do with the animal forces that they are or how they manifest themselves in the economy of their culture becomes an important question; this, according to author, shapes their lives, their *history*.

The promise of civilization stems from the memory of the will; it is the memory of universals (or concepts as opposed to metaphors). Civilization responds to a need, a need for self-preservation and protection, and this response takes the form of its promise. The memory of the will that underlies this response is a means of domination to keep societies together, but at bottom it is violent and cruel. According to the author, Nietzsche, like Machiavelli before him, understood this violent nature of the original political power. To achieve civilization's rule the animal must be tamed

2 TSZ II: "On Self-Overcoming."

3 There have been many thinkers who have reflected on this difficult topic since Nietzsche, although there is very little information about humanity's animal past. Levi-Strauss, for instance, focuses on the stages of humanity's development as every stage distinguishes itself from its animal past as in cooking and clothing. On the other hand, Bataille sees the rise of taboos on death and sexuality (not unrelated to Levi-Strauss' conclusions) as the distinctive features of early human beings.

and bred; in this way civilization treats everyone as belonging to a herd (this is the "leveling" effect of civilization), and the memory of the will, which subsumes all under universals, prevents the rise of great human beings. If, on the other hand, the animal resists this process of herd treatment, it will be considered a criminal, an outsider and eventually marginalized. In this scheme of the antagonism between civilization and culture, civilization ends up producing "overbred herd animals, animals that are too obedient and too tame…" (36)

In contrast, the promise of culture is based on the animal that makes promises, or the power of the promise-making of the sovereign individual that is rooted in animality. The sovereign individual, according to the author's reading of GM II, has individual self-responsibility, is free from domination and exploitation, and overcomes the morality of customs in the name of its own standard of value. The type of responsibility is amoral, unconscious, and instinctual. However, questions for the other two qualifiers emerge here that must be explored with Nietzsche's texts: is anyone really free from domination and exploitation according to Nietzsche? In the *Genealogy*, First Essay, Nietzsche says that the nobles designate themselves as superior, i.e. dominant and ruler (sec. 5), and it is their desire to overcome and become master (sec. 13). On the other hand, can the sovereign individual exist in isolation from the highest (i.e. collective) values of his/her epoch? How do these values fit into the scheme of the sovereign individual, if every society is shaped and held together by them?

Furthermore, the promise of culture is not a faculty understood in the Kantian sense, but a force of life, as the author claims. And, for Nietzsche, it is counter-institutional (38). Perhaps the author wants to say that this type of promise is not static, not bound by universals and pre-determined, but rather dynamic as life itself is. Kantian faculties aside, we may not assume that all institutions are cut off from life forces. Every human gathering under specifically agreed upon norms for some purpose is an institution. Can one say that every institution goes against animality and the promise making sovereign individual? I beg to differ here and give examples from Nietzsche where, for instance, he refers to ancient Greek cults (also in GM II) and agonistic formations (HC and elsewhere) as institutions. Perhaps we will have to split institutions into two, those that embrace animality and those that repress it.

The responsibility of the sovereign individual is agonistic, "…because it promotes a continuous resistance to the institutionalization of freedom" (41). As the author rightly observes, freedom evolves out of struggle and victory for greatness, and this is how she explains Nietzsche's call for a strong state in which a struggle for freedom can be sustained. However, her conclusion that the goal is to preserve the rivalry between the individuals and the state (42) can hardly be sustained. Neither the indirect reference to the Greeks (through agon) nor the quotation from the *Twilight of the Idols* could support this conclusion. In ancient Greece, the *polis* supported the contestants, and more than that, invested in their formation and success. And, in return, the victorious contestants honored their *polis* by dedicating their prizes to her. The primary rivalry in the Greek world was among the rival states in the political arena and among the rival political groups within a state and among the contestants in the field of agon. As for the quote from TI, freedom is measure according to the resistance and the overcomings of the individual, both of which produce the highest type of a human being. But why does this resistance have to be necessarily

against the state? The author elicits it out of the last part of her quote: "…five steps from tyranny, near the threshold of the danger of servitude" (TI, "Skirmishes" 38). However, if we read section 38 of the "Skirmishes", we shall see that Nietzsche is not referring to the individual's struggle against the state or tyranny, but rather the conditions, political or otherwise, that produce the highest types. Liberal institutions level mountain and valley and make humans small, cowardly and hedonistic, whereas war-like (and also agonistic) "institutions," in which there are difficulties, privations, and sacrifices, produce the highest types.

The following chapter, "Culture and Economy," presents other perspectives on animality, namely economics and politics of culture, which emancipate life forces. There are three important themes in this chapter that I would like to discuss. The first theme is wholeness in the diversity of forces or completeness; this is achieved through an "aristocratic" culture that produces great human beings. Human beings become complete again through these great types, and this is an antidote against the disintegration, or what the author calls 'incompleteness,' a malady of socialization and civilization (53). While the author observes that completeness is only an illusion, she also states that "…human animal life, whether under the rule of civilization or under the rule of culture, cannot be completed…" (54) However, their incompletenesses, as she states, are radically different. An interesting point which leaves the reader with many questions.

The second theme in "Culture and Economy" concerns the redemption of nature, which can happen by way of the pluralization of singularity through culture, precisely because it is culture that upholds the genius and privileges the singular over group and the herd. While the economy of culture opens up a free relationship to the other and releases a free expenditure unrestrained by utilitarian concerns, civilization has unleashed, as the author correctly diagnoses in agreement with Nietzsche, its own projects in the form of democratic movements and mass political ideologies. As a result we have two opposing currents, a counter movement as against the "new type of enslavement" (57) in contemporary society, and they play out their own battle, their own version of the battle between master morality and slave morality. And perhaps the battle is fought on that bridge that spans from the *Mensch* to the *Übermensch.*

The last and the third theme in "Culture and Economy" is about power and mastery. The "rule of higher culture" needs surplus of power and a public space where the exceptional types who are singular and who are in touch with their animality and forgetfulness can flourish. For an example the author gives the Greek agora where people or rather these exceptional types competed. Although the Greek agora was not a major site for contest, with 'agora' she must be alluding to the public aspect of the Greek agon. While such cultures are great, they are also short-lived, because they bring growth and ruin, life and death together and run on an excess of life and power. This is in agreement with Nietzsche, especially when he says or implies that the great age of agon died in the fifth century BC. However, one statement in this discussion was puzzling to me, which is when the author states: "culture exists beyond mastery and control…" (59). As she acknowledges, Nietzsche seems to call for the opposite. Why mastery would be excluded from the economy of great cultures has yet to be explained. Isn't it the mastery over oneself with or without the guidance of a master over oneself that leads to greatness? Ancient Greek athletes (and other types of

contestants) went through rigorous training under the supervision of their trainers at their gymnasia and later on were selected and judged by the judges of contest on the way to victory or defeat; this is how greatness was achieved. In many other cultural contexts we come across similar paradigms of master-disciple relationship. Or, perhaps another kind of mastery is meant by the author here, but it is not clearly defined.

In Chapter 4: "Giving and Forgiving" Lemm engages in an extensive discussion of Christian forgiveness and gift-giving virtue in Nietzsche, as she sees the latter to be Nietzsche's alternative to the problem of the former. First, I will summarize Nietzsche's critique of forgiveness as she presents it. Forgiveness does not break the cycle of revenge (on the contrary, it perpetuates it) and does not enhance human animal life. Since forgiveness depends on an external institution to forgive, it takes away the power to forgive from the individual (hence more emaciation of the human animal) in addition to the fact that it widens the gap between the forgiver and the forgiven. Since mediated revenge[4] is a sign of impotence for Nietzsche, the connection between forgiveness, on the one hand, and revenge and powerlessness, on the other hand, can easily be established. All of these points on forgiveness provoke one to ask the question as to who is forgiving whom and also the question as to in what power constellation the forgiving takes place. For Nietzsche, forgiving becomes a tool for the weak to exercise power and perpetuate their weakness. But the weak cannot *give*, and ultimately they cannot *forgive*. Finally, forgiveness presupposes a moral standard (i.e. God) and operates with guilt (the feeling of indebtedness and sin), punishment (a form of exercise of power), and free will (a tool in the hands of the priest to rule over the masses), all of which Nietzsche jettisons along with God and posits the innocence of becoming.

According to the author, a new notion of forgiveness can be re-constructed out of Nietzsche; she also brings Arendt and Derrida into the discussion. This new forgiveness, fueled by animal forgetfulness, must be a gracious gift, without any conditions attached to it. It signifies a new beginning between two singulars. And as such it stands for a political friendship; "…forgiveness is possible only among friends…" (72). For Derrida, this type of forgiveness is not verbal and not human; it is a silent, animal forgiveness. Mortals fight over words, but silence reigns over them as a noble presence; it is the silence of the human animal who feels speechless in the face of human comedy.

However, Nietzsche's alternative to forgiveness is the gift-giving virtue that is unique and incomparable. As opposed to a virtue that is given from top to bottom, this virtue is one's own invention; it is what makes one who one is: it is a singular virtue or the virtue of the singular. To give out of abundance and exuberance and to give to become a sacrifice and a gift underlie the gift-giving virtue, which the author sees as the primary motive as to why Zarathustra leaves his cave. He wants to shine upon those who will receive him as a gift. Ultimately gift-giving is an animal virtue that fluctuates in the tension between proximity and distance; one must keep a distance even to one's friend to be a gift and a sacrifice. In this context of gift-giving, the author raises the question of agonistic friendship in which the plurality of singular

4 In WS 33 Nietzsche makes a distinction between immediate revenge, which is based on self-preservation, and mediated revenge, which has the element of time (and is linked to the memory of the will).

friends is sustained and not subsumed under what is common to or what is shared by the friends; they are closest to and yet furthest apart from each other. Finally, the gift-giving virtue "…presupposes, suffering, struggle, and a striving for power" (82), all of which are agonistic functions and are embodied in agonistic friendship.

Chapter 5: "Animality, Creativity, and Historicity" deals with other important themes in Nietzsche's thought. Presenting a close reading of the second *Untimely Meditation*, she makes several observations. First, animal forgetfulness is prior to human memory, which also means that one remembers because one can forget. Second, Nietzsche decenters the human and changes the hierarchical relationship between the human and the animal. Third, Nietzsche rejects, in favor of the unhistorical, both the suprahistorical and the historical perspective on life (92). It would be more accurate to say that they are rejected by Nietzsche insofar as they deny the unhistorical. Otherwise, for Nietzsche they are all *equally* important and needed in their proper doses. As for the historical and the unhistorical, Nietzsche says that they "…are necessary in equal measure for the health of an individual, of a people and of a culture."[5] As for the suprahistorical, this is what the visionary needs to have one foot in memory and the other in forgetfulness; as a notion it foresees the rise of the eternal recurrence. However, it is clear that Nietzsche privileges forgetfulness over memory, as the author claims. Forgetfulness is the ground of all great deeds; it is the seat of illusions and myths on which all history-making is based.

Therefore, history is an interpretation, it is a *fabrication* just like any other myth; it is primarily based on animal forgetfulness, and she gives the Greeks as an example for "unhistorical animal sensibility" (102). We can also say that for the ancient Greeks myth and history are so fused together that they are difficult to separate; this is how one can explain why moderns have difficulty approaching the Greeks with their ultra-historical perspective. This is also why history for Nietzsche is not a science but an art, according to the author: "Accordingly, the artifacts of history should be recognized as interpretations rather than truths…" (99) Here the author relies on Nietzsche's earlier thoughts on the division between concept and metaphor, science and art, as in "Truth and Lies," but does not discuss Nietzsche's new conception of science as it is presented under *la gaya scienza*. Does not Nietzsche present a novel way of *knowing* with this conception, a new science, so to speak? In this sense, can one not say that Nietzsche may regard history both as art and as science at the same time? The author ends this chapter by giving Nietzsche's later prefaces as examples of his artistic historiography. By writing these prefaces, she claims, Nietzsche overthrew an old book, disrupted memory, created tensions within himself between his old self and his new self in order to inspire a new life. In this re-invention of his self, one sees Nietzsche's own agonistic struggles within himself.

In the final chapter of the book, "Animality, Language, and Truth," Lemm starts with a discussion of three types discourse on truth in Nietzsche: 1) theoretical, 2) practical, and 3) bio-political. In the first one, what emerges as significant is the idea of truth as singularity. Nietzsche does not deny all types of truth, as she observes, but the metaphysical conception of truth that prioritizes the concept over the metaphor, that separates the abstract from the concrete, and that severs the human from the animal. By contrast, intuited metaphors, *Anschauungsmetapher*, which Nietzsche

5 UM II, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," tr. by R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983): sec.1, p.63.

discusses in "Truth and Lies," have to do with picture thinking, *Bilderdenken*, which we share with animals; one may also add sound-thinking here, two senses Nietzsche emphasizes in his essay, or even sense-thinking in general. Picture thinking and animal forgetfulness confirm the continuity between human and animal life. In addition to the singularity that underlies intuited metaphors (the metaphorical activity that Nietzsche sees at the origin of creation of words pertains to singulars), the author considers animal silence as significant for singular truth in Nietzsche who "…separates truth from language and, aligning the former with silence, associates it with the animals" (115). The silence of the animals is not any kind of silence, but constitutes an alterity that stands opposed to conceptual language, or that which cannot express itself in conceptual language; this is why there will always be a rift, an unspoken, incommunicable rift, that separates the silence of metaphorical picture-thinking from the noise of abstract thinking. Therefore, "pure and honest drive for truth" that often appears in Nietzsche's text and spirit must start with a denial of metaphysical truth and proceed towards a revival of metaphorical, singular truth that is in touch with the animal human.

In the practical treatment of truth, one finds Nietzsche's social criticism; here the author likens him to an Enlightenment thinker and claims that Nietzsche renews the tradition of Enlightenment by recovering the intellect's ability to critique society. She diagnoses this renewal in the shift from *Vorstellung* to *Verstellung* in Nietzsche's thought, a shift that is accompanied by the shift from the critique of metaphysics to social criticism. However, the author falls short here for not acknowledging the following: a) that Nietzsche's critique of all highest values (including Western metaphysics) has its ramifications in all areas of culture including religion, art, philosophy, and science as well as social and political institutions (which she emphasizes); and b) that for Nietzsche the intellect is not the only force that critiques society or that contributes to the transformation of the society. Here the author falls at odds with the basic premise of her book, the recovery of the animal in human. In the third and last treatment of truth, namely the biopolitical, the central question for Nietzsche, according to the author, is: what value does truth hold for life? Rather than seeing the intellect as an instrument of knowledge, Nietzsche considers the intellect as an instrument of dissimulation in the service of life.

More than a century after Nietzsche, the philosopher of the animal human, we still do not *know* what to do with the animal that we are. Moralists of the old school still perpetuate the model of human being as a weak, emaciated animal with a pretension of fake Biblical superiority of the human over the animal (this superiority may be an expression of the animal in the human that is repressed, emaciated and sick, ultimately an expression of the fear of animality). Then there are those who, fueled by the modern zeal for self-preservation of the many at all costs, are experimenting on animals that are silent witnesses to human meekness. And finally, there are the weak-hearted utilitarians who feel sorry for the animals, forgetting that it was a similar world-view that placed the animals under the chopping block of the scientist to maximize the happiness of the many. Nietzsche, on the other hand, stands at a different threshold regarding animality and who human beings are as animal beings. Vanessa Lemm explores this subject from a variety of perspectives, as she raises many questions to reflect over. I highly recommend her book, *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy*, to anyone who is brave enough to open up and embrace the question of animality in the face of contemporary problems.

reviewed by:
Yunus
Tuncel

SPECIAL 30% DISCOUNT

Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy

Culture, Politics, and the Animality of the Human Being

By Vanessa Lemm

The "animal philosophy theme in Nietzsche is an interesting one that should appeal to a wide audience both inside and outside the field of Nietzsche studies."
—Steven Hicks, Queens College

Lemm's book is not only an original and convincing interpretation of Nietzsche's thought, but it also opens up a new perspective on the meaning and future of an affirmative biopolitics. Contrary to what an old humanist tradition has asserted, it is precisely the biological continuity between human being and animal that withholds the secret of a resistance to disciplinary mechanisms as well as the potential for a radically new development of individual creativity. —Roberto Esposito, Italian Institute of Human Sciences



Vanessa Lemm received her PhD in the New School for Social Research. She is director of the Institute of Humanities at Universidad Diego Portales. She published Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy: Culture, Politics and the Animality of the Human Being (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009) and several articles on Nietzsche and contemporary political thought in English, Spanish and German.PROMOTIONAL CODE: GOS09

PROMOTIONAL CODE: LEMM09

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY PRESS

www.fordhampress.com | 800-996-6987

256 pages

978-0-8232-3027-3 ~ Cloth ~ $65.00

978-0-8232-3028-0 ~ Paper ~ $24.00

978-0-8232-3029-7 ~ Ebook ~ $17.00

The Agonist
A Nietzsche Circle Journal

Ellipsis: Of Poetry and the Experience of Language after Heidegger, Hölderlin, and Blanchot

written by: William S. Allen (New York: State University of New York Press, 2007. Pp. xiii + 239.)

reviewed by: Gerald L. Bruns



The aim of William S. Allen's book is to trace the development of Heidegger's thinking with respect to language from the early lectures on logic and Aristotle to the later texts in *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, with their apparent emphasis on the *materiality* of language ("It is just as much a property of language to sound and ring and vibrate, to hover and to tremble, as it is for the spoken words of language to carry a meaning").[1] Poets are known to inhabit this "protosemantic" region of language.[2] The question is: what would it be for a philosopher to experience this materiality, much less appropriate it in his or her own writing? The difficulty, as Heidegger himself says, is that philosophy itself, with its "metaphysical-technological" explanations designed to make everything transparent to view, defeats the possibility of such an experience. So what sort of transformation must the philosopher undergo in order to be open to such a possibility? For Allen the answer to this question is to be found in the kind of change that took place in Heidegger's thinking (and writing) as a consequence of his encounter with Friedrich Hölderlin's poetry—or, more exactly, Hölderlin's *paratactic* textuality.[3]

"Parataxis" is a distinctively *modernist* way of putting words together, namely by way of juxtaposition rather than through logical arrangements of syntax and the rule

1 "The Nature of Language," On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971): 98.

2 See Steve McCaffery, *Prior to Meaning: The Protosemantic and Poetics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001); and Julia Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, trans. Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

3 See Theodor W. Adorno, "Parataxis: On Hölderlin's Late Poetry," *Notes to Literature*, Vol. Two, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992): 109-49. Allen nowhere mentions Adorno, but one can read his book as a rejoinder of sorts to Adorno's critique of Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin, to wit: "Heidegger glorifies the poet supra-aesthetically, as a founder [*Stifter*], without reflecting concretely on the agency of form. It is astonishing that no one has been bothered by the unaesthetic quality of these commentaries, their lack of affinity with their object" (114).

of identity (*s* is *p*).[4] Hence the title of Allen's book: an ellipsis (…) is a paratactic figure of interruption; its temporality is not that of consecutive reasoning but rather that of the caesura, the pause or *entretemps* in which the past recedes and the future never arrives. At the same time, an ellipsis is also a figure of circularity, or that which turns back on itself without, however, arriving anywhere, as in the doomed tautology of the echo.

The figure of ellipsis also explains the conceptual importance of Maurice Blanchot for Allen's project. Blanchot is at once a philosopher and poet of fragmentary writing. In an essay on René Char's poetry—for example, *Le Poème pulvérisé* (1945), *La Parole en archipel* (1962): the pulverized poem, speech as archipelago—Blanchot speaks of

> A new kind of writing not entailing harmony, concordance, or reconciliation, but that accepts disjunction or divergence as the infinite center from out of which, through speech, relation is to be created: an arrangement that does not compose but juxtaposes, that is to say, leaves each of the terms that come into relation *outside* one another, respecting and preserving this *exteriority* and this distance as the principle—always already undercut—of all signification. Juxtaposition and interruption here assume an extraordinary force of justice.[5]

Basically Allen's book asks us to imagine, after Heidegger, a way of thinking (and writing) about language that would be elliptical in this fragmentary sense, that is, a way that is both open and finite, as in Jean-Luc Nancy's conception of thinking without *archē* and *telos*, which is to say without (among other things) concepts, categories, and logical procedures—a thinking that takes us to the limits of intelligibility by engaging existence (including language) as a region of what is absolutely singular and irreducible: resistant, like Heidegger's *Ding*, to subjectivity conceived in terms of rationality and control.[6]

Indeed, what we learn from Heidegger, particularly if, like Allen, we read Blanchot alongside of Heidegger as a kind of stand-in and interpreter, is that our relation to language is not one of mastery but one of incompetence in which our efforts to make sense of things—to take hold of them discursively—are always brought up short. As

4 See Jean-François Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, trans. Georges Van Den Abeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988): 66: "Conjoined by *and*, phrases and events follow each other, but their succession does not obey a categorical order (*because*; *if-then*; *in order to*; *although*…). Joined to the preceding one by *and*, a phrase arises out of nothingness to link up with it. Paratax thus connotes the abyss of Not-Being which opens between phrases, it stresses the surprise that something begins when what is said is said." In contrast to Lyotard Heidegger regarded parataxis as the distinctive form of early Greek thinking. See *What is Called Thinking?*, trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968): 182-93.

5 "The Fragment Word," *The Infinite Conversation*, trans. Susan Hanson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971): 308.

6 See Nancy, "A Finite Thinking," trans. Edward Bullard, Jonathan Derbyshire, and Simon Sparks, A Finite Thinking, ed. Simon Sparks (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003): 3-30. See Heidegger's critique of conceptual or propositional thinking with respect to things in "The Origin of the Work of Art," *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971): esp. 24-25.

Allen argues in his first chapter, this failure was precisely Hölderlin's experience in his later poems—a failure that Blanchot articulates (in a way that Heidegger did not) in his early essay on Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin, in which, interestingly, Blanchot contrasts Heidegger's "confidence in the words of his language, the value he gives to their more or less secret interconnectedness," with Hölderlin's experience of the resistance of language and the impossibility of writing.[7] Poetry is just this experience of impossibility; that is, it is not a *work* of language but an event in which language ceases to function as a form of mediation. The paradox is that the ontological significance of poetry consists precisely in this worklessness (*désœuvrement*), where words and things impinge upon us precisely by refusing to hang together in any intelligible form.

Blanchot himself came to this insight not by way of Heidegger but from his reading of Alexandre Kojève's famous lectures from the 1930s on Hegel's *Phenomenology* in which the dialectic of negation and signification (or speech for short) is figured as a kind of murder that annihilates the singularity of things by subsuming them into concepts.[8] In his essay, "Littérature et le droit à la mort" ("Literature and the Right to Death," 1948), Blanchot writes: "In a text dating from before *The Phenomenology*, Hegel, here the friend and kindred spirit of Hölderlin, writes: 'Adam's first act, which made him master of the animals, was to give them names, that is, he annihilated them in their existence (as existing creatures).' Hegel means that from that moment on, the cat ceased to be a uniquely real cat and became an idea as well" (*The Work of Fire*, 323). Mediation is death. For Blanchot, however, poetry is the reversal or interruption of this dialectic of negation and signification:

> In speech what dies is what gives life to speech: speech is the life of that death, it is 'the life that endures death and maintains itself in it' [Hegel]. What wonderful power. But something was there and is no longer there. Something has disappeared. How can I recover it, how can I turn around and look into what exists *before*, if all my power consists in making it into what exists *after*? The language of literature is a search for this moment which precedes literature. Literature usually calls it existence; it wants the cat as it exists, the pebble *taking the side of things*, not man but the pebble, and in this pebble what man rejects by saying it.... (*The Work of Fire*, 327).

How to take the side of things? "My hope," Blanchot writes, "lies in the materiality of language, in the fact that words are things, too, are a kind of nature.... Just now the reality of words was an obstacle. Now it is my only chance. A name ceases to be the ephemeral passing of nonexistence and becomes a concrete ball, a solid mass of existence; language, abandoning the sense, the meaning which is all it wanted to be, tries to become senseless. Everything physical takes precedence: rhythm, weight, mass, shape, and then the paper on which one writes, the trail of ink, the book" (*The Work of Fire*, 327).

7 "The 'Sacred' Speech of Hölderlin," *The Work of Fire*, trans. Charlotte Mandell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995): 114.

8 *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969): esp. 200-201.

reviewed by:
Gerald S. Bruns

It is not immediately clear what Heidegger would have made of this. The word *Gelassenheit* comes to mind. Allen thinks that Heidegger "is nothing but 'modernist' in his understanding of art" (*Ellipses*, 223 n9), but it seems more plausible to think of him as one of the "last romantics" for whom poetry remains an event of world-making—not, to be sure, on the model of the manufacture of objects, but rather that of a primordial (decidedly non-Hegelian) *naming* that calls things into being without turning them into concepts. Allen is certainly right when he remarks that when Heidegger first takes up the subject of poetry in "The Origin of the Work of Art," his conception of poetry "has nothing to do with the region of literature associated with poems" (*Ellipsis*, 80). And this remains the case in the later writings as well, in which poetry is never mere *praxis* but is subsumed by "the higher rule of the word" that lets things be things (*On the Way to Language*, 151).[9] For Heidegger, the materiality of the poem consists not in thinglike words but in words whose sounds are echoes of "an inexpressible Saying" (*On the Way to Language*, 150). The difficulty is that these are not sounds we can actually hear, just as poetry is not meant for reading ("The sound rings out in the resounding assembly call which, open to the Open, makes World appear in all things. The sounding of the voice is then no longer of the order of physical organs. It is released now from the perspective of the physiological-physical explanation in terms of purely phonetic data" [*On the Way to Language*, 101].) Imagine Heidegger listening to sound poetry!—Hugo Ball's *lautgedichte* or Henri Chopin's *poésie sonore*.[10]

Allen's argument, however, is that, for all of Heidegger's emphasis on listening to what is soundless, there is in his later writings "a stronger if more discreet presence of the textual, material underside of language" (*Ellipsis*, 179). (Curious that Allen should place textuality *discreetly* on the *underside* of language.) Much of Allen's argument turns upon a certain way of reading the following from "Das Wesen der Sprache": "The essential nature of language makes itself known to us as what is spoken, the language of its nature. But we cannot quite hear this primal knowledge [*Ur-Kunde*], let alone 'read' it. It runs: The being of language: the language of being" (*On the Way to Language*, 76). Allen takes *Ur-Kunde*, not as "primal knowledge," but as "'original' documentary evidence, *archē*-tidings. (*Urkunde*: a 'writ,' 'scrip,' or 'certificate,' from *Kunde*, 'tidings')" (*Ellipsis*, 179). Allen does not take up Heidegger's *Was heisst Denken?*, which repeatedly and almost obsessively dissociates language from anything actually spoken or written: "For whatever is put into language in any real sense is essentially richer than what is captured in audible and visible phonetic conformations, and as such falls silent again when it is put into writing" (*What is Called Thinking?*, 206). Just so, the materiality of *Ur-Kunde* is not so much physical or corporeal as *abyssal*. If, as Allen says, the textuality of *Ur-Kunde* "is confirmed by Heidegger's dismissal of our possibility of 'reading' it," this is because *Ur-Kunde* is at the same time an event of *désœuvrement* or worklessness—writing that "has the compelling and frustrating presence of being both near and far, unavoidable and ungraspable: it is *essentially* fragmentary" (*Ellipsis*, 181-82).

In the spirit of *désœuvrement*, Allen's final chapter bears the title, "Fragmenting:

9 See Marc Froment-Meurice, *That is to Say: Heidegger's Poetics*, trans. Jan Plug (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998): esp. 80-101.

10 See McCaffery, "Voice in Extremis," *Prior to Meaning*, pp. 161-86; and Gerald L. Bruns, "The Transcendence of Words: A Short Defense of (Sound) Poetry, *The Material of Poetry: Sketches for a Philosophical Poetics* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2005): 39-75.

L'iter-rature of Relation," where *l'iter-rature* is a paratactical pun that turns "literature" into a word for the kind of elliptical thinking (about language, but perhaps also about much else, including how philosophy should be written) that Allen believes should be taken up "after Heidegger," namely thinking that is both fragmentary and at the same time endlessly turning back on itself without forming any self-relation or totality. Allen refers us to Blanchot's fragmentary writing (*L'Attente l'oubli*, *Le Pas au-déla*) and Jacques Derrida's elliptical essay on poetry, "Che cos'é la poesia," as examples of what he has in mind, but his principal accomplishment in this chapter is performative. For better or worse he takes it upon himself to put *l'iter-rature* into play by way of self-reflexive writing:

> I cannot speak without being misheard; I cannot write without being mis-read, even by myself. Already I have lost my intention and your attention. I cannot speak and yet, that is all there is to say. Never can I say what I mean, although I mean everything that I say. I cannot speak, and that is why I do. I can neither speak nor write, and yet that is what is going on. There is speaking and writing here but my relation to them is no relation at all. What is happening here is impossible, and yet it persists. It is the limit of all that I can do, the end, the edge, the period. It is finitude, and yet it is itself infinite, an endless repetition of ending, an infinite finitude, a repeating period: an ellipsis. What is this ellipsis? A pause, which appears between other pauses, although it doesn't appear for there is nothing there to appear. Language is nothing but this endlessly repeated encounter with its own limits, an ellipsis in which and as which it persists (*Ellipsis*, 208).

One recalls Habermas's effort to save us from this sort of thing by affirming—against Heidegger, Derrida, and the "leveling [of] genre distinctions between philosophy and literature"—the propositional style of philosophical argument.[11] In defiance of the protocols of communicative reason, Allen's concluding paragraph gives us this parting shot: "Writing is the chattering of edible words" (*Ellipsis*, 216).

reviewed by:
Gerald S. Bruns

11 See *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990): esp. 185-210.

The Agonist
A Nietzsche Circle Journal

QUOTES:

Morgenröthe

Gedanken über die moralischen Vorurtheile.

selections by Keith Ansell-Pearson

114.

Von der Erkenntniss des Leidenden.—Der Zustand kranker Menschen, die lange und furchtbar von ihren Leiden gemartert werden und deren Verstand trotzdem dabei sich nicht trübt, ist nicht ohne Werth für die Erkenntniss, —noch ganz abgesehen von den intellectuellen Wohlthaten, welche jede tiefe Einsamkeit, jede plötzliche und erlaubte Freiheit von allen Pflichten und Gewohnheiten mit sich bringen. Der Schwerleidende sieht aus seinem Zustande mit einer entsetzlichen Kälte hinaus auf die Dinge: alle jene kleinen lügnerischen Zaubereien, in denen für gewöhnlich die Dinge schwimmen, wenn das Auge des Gesunden auf sie blickt, sind ihm verschwunden: ja, er selber liegt vor sich da ohne Flaum und Farbe. Gesetzt, dass er bisher in irgend einer gefährlichen Phantasterei lebte: diese höchste Ernüchterung durch Schmerzen ist das Mittel, ihn herauszureissen: und vielleicht das einzige Mittel. (Es ist möglich, dass diess dem Stifter des Christenthums am Kreuze begegnete: denn die bittersten aller Worte „mein Gott, warum hast du mich verlassen!“ enthalten, in aller Tiefe verstanden, wie sie verstanden werden dürfen, das Zeugniss einer allgemeinen Enttäuschung und Aufklärung über den Wahn seines Lebens; er wurde in dem Augenblicke der höchsten Qual hellsichtig über sich selber, so wie der Dichter es von dem armen sterbenden Don Quixote erzählt.) Die ungeheure Spannung des Intellectes, welcher dem Schmerz Widerpart halten will, macht, dass Alles, worauf er nun blickt, in einem neuen Lichte leuchtet: und der unsägliche Reiz, den alle neuen Beleuchtungen geben, ist oft mächtig genug, um allen Anlockungen zum Selbstmorde Trotz zu bieten und das Fortleben dem Leidenden als höchst begehrenswerth erscheinen zu lassen. Mit Verachtung gedenkt er der gemüthlichen warmen Nebelwelt, in der der Gesunde ohne Bedenken wandelt; mit Verachtung gedenkt er der edelsten und geliebtesten Illusionen, in denen er früher mit sich selber spielte; er hat einen Genuss daran, diese Verachtung wie aus der tiefsten Hölle heraufzubeschwören und der Seele so das bitterste Leid zu machen: durch dieses Gegengewicht hält er eben dem physischen Schmerze Stand, —er fühlt es, dass gerade diess Gegengewicht jetzt noththut! In einer schauerlichen Hellsichtigkeit über sein Wesen ruft er sich zu: „sei einmal dein eigener Ankläger und Henker, nimm einmal dein Leiden als die von dir über dich verhängte Strafe! Geniesse deine Überlegenheit als Richter; mehr noch: geniesse dein Belieben, deine tyrannische Willkür! Erhebe dich über dein Leben wie über dein Leiden, sieh hinab in die Gründe und die Grundlosigkeit!“ Unser Stolz bäumt sich auf, wie noch nie: es hat für ihn einen Reiz ohne Gleichen, gegen einen solchen Tyrannen wie der Schmerz ist, und gegen alle die Einflüsterungen, die er uns macht, damit wir gegen das Leben Zeugniss ablegen, —gerade das Leben gegen den Tyrannen zu vertreten. In

diesem Zustande wehrt man sich mit Erbitterung gegen jeden Pessimismus, damit er nicht als Folge unseres Zustandes erscheine und uns als Besiegte demüthige. Nie ist ebenfalls der Reiz, Gerechtigkeit des Urtheils zu üben, grösser, als jetzt, denn jetzt ist es ein Triumph über uns und den reizbarsten aller Zustände, der jede Ungerechtigkeit des Urtheils entschuldbar machen würde; —aber wir wollen nicht entschuldigt sein, gerade jetzt wollen wir zeigen, dass wir „ohne Schuld“ sein können. Wir befinden uns in förmlichen Krämpfen des Hochmuths. —Und nun kommt der erste Dämmerschein der Milderung, der Genesung—und fast die erste Wirkung ist, dass wir uns gegen die Übermacht unseres Hochmuthes wehren: wir nennen uns darin albern und eitel, —als ob wir Etwas erlebt hätten, das einzig wäre! Wir demüthigen ohne Dankbarkeit den allmächtigen Stolz, durch den wir eben den Schmerz ertrugen und verlangen heftig nach einem Gegengift des Stolzes: wir wollen uns entfremdet und entpersönlicht werden, nachdem der Schmerz uns zu gewaltsam und zu lange persönlich gemacht hatte. „Weg, weg mit diesem Stolze! rufen wir, er war eine Krankheit und ein Krampf mehr!“ Wir sehen wieder hin auf Menschen und Natur—mit einem verlangenderen Auge: wir erinnern uns wehmüthig lächelnd, dass wir Einiges in Bezug auf sie jetzt neu und anders wissen, als vorher, dass ein Schleier gefallen ist, —aber es erquickt uns so, wieder die gedämpften Lichter des Lebens zu sehen und aus der furchtbaren nüchternen Helle herauszutreten, in welcher wir als Leidende die Dinge und durch die Dinge hindurch sahen. Wir zürnen nicht, wenn die Zaubereien der Gesundheit wieder zu spielen beginnen, —wir sehen wie umgewandelt zu, milde und immer noch müde. In diesem Zustande kann man nicht Musik hören, ohne zu weinen. —

179.

So wenig als möglich Staat! —Alle politischen und wirthschaftlichen Verhältnisse sind es nicht werth, dass gerade die begabtesten Geister sich mit ihnen befassen dürften und müssten: ein solcher Verbrauch des Geistes ist im Grunde schlimmer, als ein Nothstand. Es sind und bleiben Gebiete der Arbeit für die geringeren Köpfe, und andere als die geringen Köpfe sollten dieser Werkstätte nicht zu Diensten stehen: möge lieber die Maschine wieder einmal in Stücke gehen! So wie es aber jetzt steht, wo nicht nur Alle täglich darum glauben wissen zu müssen, sondern auch Jedermann alle Augenblicke dafür thätig sein will und seine eigene Arbeit darüber im Stiche lässt, ist es ein grosser und lächerlicher Wahnsinn. Man bezahlt die „allgemeine Sicherheit“ viel zu theuer um diesen Preis: und, was das Tollste ist, man bringt überdiess das Gegentheil der allgemeinen Sicherheit damit hervor, wie unser liebes Jahrhundert zu beweisen unternimmt: als ob es noch nie bewiesen wäre! Die Gesellschaft diebessicher und feuerfest und unendlich bequem für jeden Handel und Wandel zu machen und den Staat zur Vorsehung im guten und schlimmen Sinne umzuwandeln, —diess sind niedere, mässige und nicht durchaus unentbehrliche Ziele, welche man nicht mit den höchsten Mitteln und Werkzeugen erstreben sollte, die es überhaupt giebt, —den Mitteln, die man eben für die höchsten und seltensten Zwecke sich aufzusparen hätte! Unser Zeitalter, so viel es von Ökonomie redet, ist ein Verschwender: es verschwendet das Kostbarste, den Geist.

reviewed by:
Gerald S. Bruns

329.

Die Verleumder der Heiterkeit. —Tief vom Leben verwundete Menschen haben alle Heiterkeit verdächtigt, als ob sie immer kindlich und kindisch sei und eine Unvernunft verrathe, bei deren Anblick man nur Erbarmen und Rührung empfinden könne, wie wenn ein dem Tode nahes Kind auf seinem Bette noch seine Spielsachen liebkost. Solche Menschen sehen unter allen Rosen verborgene und verhehlte Gräber; Lustbarkeiten, Getümmel, fröhliche Musik erscheint ihnen wie die entschlossene Selbsttäuschung des Schwerkranken, der noch einmal eine Minute den Rausch des Lebens schlürfen will. Aber dieses Urtheil über die Heiterkeit ist nichts Anderes, als deren Strahlenbrechung auf dem düsteren Grunde der Ermüdung und Krankheit: es ist selber etwas Rührendes, Unvernünftiges, zum Mitleiden Drängendes, ja sogar etwas Kindliches und Kindisches, aber aus jener zweiten Kindheit her, welche dem Alter folgt und dem Tode voranläuft.

CAMBRIDGE

Outstanding New Scholarship on Nietzsche from Cambridge!



Friedrich Nietzsche

A Philosophical Biography

By Julian Young, *Wake Forest University, North Carolina*

"Julian Young brings together his fine scholarly skills, his delightful writing style, and a solid grasp of Nietzsche's thought to produce a philosophical biography that will be unparalleled for years to come. Especially valuable is Young's way of showing how events in Nietzsche's life hooked up with intellectual developments in this multi-faceted philosopher. A pleasure to read and a valuable source of information."

--Charles Guignon, University of South Florida

In this beautifully written account, Julian Young provides the most comprehensive biography available today of the life and philosophy of the nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. Young deals with the many puzzles created by the conjunction of Nietzsche's personal history and his work: why the son of a Lutheran pastor developed into the self-styled "Antichrist"; why this archetypical Prussian came to loathe Bismarck's Prussia; and why this enemy of feminism preferred the company of feminist women. Setting Nietzsche's thought in the context of his times – the rise of Prussian militarism, anti-Semitism, Darwinian science, the "Youth" and emancipationist movements, as well as the "death of God" – Young emphasizes the decisive influence of Plato and of Richard Wagner on Nietzsche's attempt to reform Western culture. He also describes the devastating effect on Nietzsche's personality of his unhappy love for Lou Salomé and attempts to understand why, at the age of forty-four, he went mad. This book includes a selection of more than thirty photographs of Nietzsche, his friends and his work sites. Seventeen of the philosopher's musical compositions, which are key to a deeper understanding of his intellectual project are available online.

To listen to Nietzsche's compositions, visit: http://www.cambridge.org/us/nietzschemusic

676 pages • Hardback • ISBN: 978-0-521-87117-4 • ~~List Price: $45.00~~ • Disc.: $36.00 •
Now Available



Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism

By Dirk Johnson, *Virginia Commonwealth University*

Friedrich Nietzsche's complex connection to Charles Darwin has been much explored, and both scholarly and popular opinions have tended to assume a convergence in their thinking. In this study, Dirk Johnson challenges that assumption and takes seriously Nietzsche's own explicitly stated "anti-Darwinism." He argues for the importance of Darwin for the development of Nietzsche's philosophy, but he places emphasis on the antagonistic character of their relationship and suggests that Nietzsche's mature critique against Darwin represents the key to understanding his broader (anti-)Darwinian position. He also offers an original reinterpretation of the *Genealogy of Morals,* a text long considered sympathetic to Darwinian naturalism, but which he argues should be taken as Nietzsche's most sophisticated critique of both Darwin and his followers. His book will appeal to all who are interested in the philosophy of Nietzsche and its cultural context.

248 pages • Hardback • ISBN: 978-0-521-19678-9 • ~~List Price: $85.00~~ • Disc.: $68.00 •
Available from September 2010

PROMOTIONAL CODE: **NIETZS10**

SPECIAL 20% DISCOUNT

Order Dept. • Cambridge University Press • 100 Brook Hill Drive • West Nyack, NY 10994
Toll Free (800) 872-7423 / Fax: (845) 353-4141

View our catalog at **http://cambridge.org/us/philosophy**

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Friedrich Nietzsche