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

Nietzsche & Psychoanalysis

Special Issue with Dr. Jared Russell

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Editors' Introduction

"Among the most enduring of all discoveries is the pathogenic impact of the society on the individual, revealed to science by Nietzsche…I therefore presume to approach Freud's discoveries in these areas as the direct continuation of Nietzsche's research." – Otto Gross, *On The Inferiority Complexes*

We are excited to bring you a special issue of the Agonist on Nietzsche and Psychonanalysis. From October of last year to March 2017 several members of the Nietzsche Circle met and engaged with many practicing psychoanalysts at the National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis (NPAP) in New York on a variety of topics, including Nietzsche's complex relationship with Freud and the psychoanalytic movement in general. We were hoping to publish papers and talks presented at these events, however, we could only finalize one piece for this publication; a dialogue between Dr. Jared Russell and Dr. Yunus Tuncel on the former's recent book, *Nietzsche and the Clinic*. There is no need to reiterate what is in this interview, which is longer and more comprehensive than the version that transpired at the event at NPAP. We hope that this book and the dialogue we started will provoke many debates and open new vistas in this interaction between theory and practice regarding regimes of the soul and its healing.

We would like to thank Dr. Jared Russell for his contributions to the Nietzsche Circle and hope to work with him again in the future, as well as the NPAP for giving us this opportunity. We also look forward to hearing from our readers whether it is their thoughts on content or their suggestions for future topics.

The Editorial Board
October 2017

Interview

An Interview with Jared Russell

Yunus Tuncel

The following interview was conducted before an audience at the National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis (NPAP) in New York City on March 3rd, 2017. The occasion was to celebrate the publication of Russell's book *Nietzsche and the Clinic: Psychoanalysis, Philosophy, Metaphysic*s (Karnac, 2016).

Yunus Tuncel: How did you arrive at this project, why Nietzsche and psychoanalysis, and more generally why psychoanalysis and philosophy?

Jared Russell: First let me say thank you, Yunus, both to you and to the Nietzsche Circle for hosting this event, and to NPAP where I've just become a member. This is a good sign that I've found the right intellectual home for myself here. Yunus and I met in this room only six months ago, at a conference on Nietzsche and Psychoanalysis. And it was just so strange that I spent all this time working in complete isolation on a book that I wasn't sure would ever really find an audience, only to discover that audience right then in the few weeks just before it was set to appear. So, you're all functioning as good signs for me tonight. That is very much appreciated.

I have to emphasize from the beginning that this was a book written with a clinical audience in mind. I'm relieved that Nietzsche scholars have given it their approval, but it's not an academic book, it's for people who are engaged in the everyday practice of psychoanalysis, or any form of psychotherapy, and who probably have no real exposure to Nietzsche's thinking beyond a passing appreciation and curiosity. It contains clinical material that an academic audience will not be used to, but hopefully academics will find this interesting as well.

So why Nietzsche, and why philosophy and psychoanalysis? I first encountered psychoanalysis as a student of philosophy. I'd learned about it in psychology classes, but it didn't come alive for me until I was introduced to it through a philosophical lens, and that's how it has always appeared to me. I came to New York as a graduate student in philosophy, but I always had deep reservations about an academic career. I began taking classes in Psychoanalytic Studies, in which I eventually got my Master's degree, and I was introduced to professional analysts, many of whom were very encouraging of my curiosity about a clinical career. I had no experience of personal analysis or any form of psychotherapy myself, so it was all very new to me. Eventually I attended the Respecialization Program at the Institute for Psychoanalytic Training and Research (IPTAR) here in New York, and from there I went on to train in their Adult Psychoanalytic Program.

I was simultaneously working towards my PhD in philosophy at this time. So I was living in two different worlds: studying and teaching philosophy, and then training as an

analyst and building a private practice. I worked like a maniac back then, I honestly don't know how I did it. But it always made sense to me that the work I was doing in philosophy and the work I was doing clinically were naturally integrated. I quickly discovered just how alone I was in thinking this way. Academics, even those who were obsessed with psychoanalytic theory, told me I was wasting my time doing clinical work, while analysts looked at me like I had two heads when I told them I was pursuing a degree in philosophy instead of psychology or social work. So the book turned out to be an attempt at demonstrating why these projects inherently go together. My readings in philosophy—especially Nietzsche and Heidegger—were always much more helpful to me in thinking about my clinical experience than most of the mainstream psychoanalytic literature that I was being exposed to in my analytic training. I wanted to demonstrate how and why that was the case.

YT: How can Nietzsche be relevant to the crisis of psychoanalysis you speak of in your book? Also, can you briefly state what you mean by "metaphysics," and why would psychoanalysis have something to say about it?

JR: I'll start with the second part of the question in formulating a brief answer. Metaphysics, for Nietzsche, is a way of thinking based in the fantasy of an unchanging, eternal essence that exists outside time—whether this appears in the form of the Cartesian subject, the Good or any other Platonic Idea, or the creator God of monotheism. These are not simple ideas but complex structures that require and that reinforce distorted understandings of phenomena like causality, freedom, and human agency (the will). The effort to prioritize a notion of some eternal, unchanging Being over and against time and becoming is rooted in a deep seated resentment over the tragic nature of finite human life; it breeds nihilism as an effort to spread sameness and mediocrity as against hierarchy, nobility, and difference.

Why would psychoanalysis have something to say about this? I give plenty of specific examples where psychoanalysis has found itself thinking along these very Nietzschean lines. But the most general way to think about metaphysics from a clinical perspective is to recognize that the symptom as psychoanalysis conceives of it—as a defensive compromise formation—is intrinsically a kind of personalized "metaphysical" structure. The symptom is the expression of an unconscious effort to resist difference and change, and analysis is an attempt to open up that which keeps us stuck in the mode of empty repetition even though it sometimes causes an unbearable amount of suffering. Putting aside for a moment everything psychoanalysis has to say about how and why the mind makes itself sick, about the kinds of mental content that people have a tendency to get stuck on, analysis is an attempt to help us think through that which we cannot think—basic unquestioned prejudices we hold and that we don't necessarily know we hold. That's what Nietzsche's attempt at overcoming metaphysics ultimately comprises.

How can Nietzsche's thinking be relevant to the crisis of psychoanalysis today? Nietzsche can help analysts build bridges across the various theoretical schools, to overcome the terrible fragmentation that the field suffers from today, and to formulate a critique of those trends that form the basis for the "mental health industry." Today metaphysics expresses itself in the form of positivism, of which those approaches that dominate contemporary therapeutics—cognitivism, pharmaceuticals, the fetishization of anything attached to the prefix "neuro-"—are a part. Of course, there are deeply metaphysical

tendencies embedded in psychoanalysis itself, beginning with Freud, but the crisis of psychoanalysis today stems from the fact that it is not metaphysical *enough* for an industry that oversees a patient population trained to judge everything in positivistic, quantitative (i.e., nihilistic) terms.

YT: Close to the beginning of your book you make an observation on Nietzsche's and Deleuze's views on consciousness as being reactive, associated with the spirit of gravity, whereas for Freud conscious thought is an effect of subordinated action. Can you expand on this thought? Why is consciousness reactive?

JR: There's no question in my mind that Deleuze's Nietzsche book is the most important in all the voluminous secondary literature. For me this is the "go to" book for understanding Nietzsche, and it's determined my reading of Nietzsche for many years, so I have a prejudice here. This isn't to say that I agree with it on every point, but on the critique of consciousness, yes, this is irreducible. Deleuze is at his best when he's elucidating Nietzsche and Spinoza on this point. I wish he had been kinder to Freud.

The way I understand Nietzsche, it's not that consciousness itself is reactive. Consciousness is rather innocent. But consciousness can be deployed reactively, and metaphysics is an effort to organize and to reinforce this way of thinking about and cultivating consciousness. So it's not that consciousness intrinsically "is" reactive, but when it takes itself to be an underlying causal agency or ground, as the origin of action or decision or will—that's when we witness consciousness as a figure of negativity. There's certainly nothing intrinsically reactive about being aware of something. But when I take my awareness, rather than my action, to be the cause of something, this is what Nietzsche is trying to critique: not consciousness as such but a certain figure of consciousness that falsely imagines itself to be an underlying active agent or ground. Consciousness is reactive in the sense that it's an effect, not a cause. When we take our consciousness to be a cause, we're reacting against vulnerability and openness, against chance and difference. Going back to your previous question, this is what "defense" or "resistance" describes in a clinical context.

YT: Nietzsche does not treat the ego as "an adaptive agency but as an ecstatic, perspectival multiplicity" (p.17). I take this as a critique of Freudian psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis, however, moved away from this position and is closer to Nietzsche's position, as in Lacan. What is the significance of the treatment of the ego in psychoanalysis today, and in your own practice?

JR: Here I think we have to proceed slowly. In my experience, "Freudian psychoanalysis" is a vexed term. There are many Freuds, just as there are many Nietzsches. I consider myself a Freudian analyst, but I want nothing to do with much of what passes itself off under that heading— especially the psychiatric version of Freud, which is unrecognizable to me.

I don't think the history of psychoanalysis is unidirectional. It's not as if first Freud insisted on the priority of the ego, and then Lacan successfully superseded this perspective. There's a Freud that embraces normative adaptation, maybe the Freud of "The Ego and the Id." But there's also a Freud that critiques this adaptive effort quite radically, like the Freud of the "Group Psychology." Lacan knew this, and that's why he insisted on a *return* to Freud, not an effort to go beyond Freud like you find in everything from Jung to the relationalists.

Lacan advocated a return to what was radical in Freud's thinking. But Freud's thinking is not always radical, far from it. Some Lacanians would have us believe that Freud was consistently non-normative, and that's just as naive as thinking that Freud was always in favor of adaptation in the service of the ego.

For me, what Nietzsche potentially offers is a way of balancing these two tendencies, the normative and the non-normative. If one were really to write the ultimate volume on Nietzsche and psychoanalysis (it would have to be several volumes, by someone more competent than myself), I think you would have to have a long chapter on Nietzsche and someone like Heinz Hartmann, on Nietzsche as a forerunner of ego psychology. There has to be that kind of tendency in our thinking, it's not something we can just be done with, it's a passage we have to continuously return to, traverse, and critique. Adaptation and transgression go hand in hand, you can't have one without the other: Hartmann *avec* Lacan, so to speak.

As for the treatment of the ego in my own practice, honestly I don't think about it much, unless I'm working with people who are on the psychotic spectrum, in which case it's something one has to be very sensitive to. The theoretical question about the ego is always whether it contains a non-conflictual dimension. This is not an academic question, it leads to extremely different clinical approaches. If you think, like Nietzsche does—and in a way that strangely makes him the forerunner of conservative analysts like Jacob Arlow and Charles Brenner—that all is conflict, that everything is the differential interactions of multiple forces, this would lead to a theory of interpretation and of clinical practice in general that would be very different from those put forward by everyone from Klein to Balint and Kohut, and, again strangely in this sequence, Lacan. But as for my own practice, and I think this is what ultimately makes me a Freudian, because I think Freud thought this way: for the most part you're dealing with the ego, but there are moments when something much more profound is made accessible. These are the moments when the unpredictable occurs, and when transformation gets underway.

YT: In your reflections on Nietzsche's perspectivism, you make a distinction between interpretation and explanation. This seems to be crucial for your Nietzschean version of the clinic. Why is that so?

JR: Yes, this is absolutely crucial to my project. In fact, I hope that if there is any single idea in the whole book that clinicians take away from it, it's this one: that to interpret a patient's symptom is not to explain it away. The practice of interpretation in a clinical setting is not like the practice of interpretation in other settings, in pedagogy for instance, where you tell someone what something really means, or where you show that something is really a representation of something else. Explanation is a reductive procedure, whereas interpretation is meant to be generative. To use Nietzsche's vocabulary: explanation is reactive, interpretation is active. Explanation closes down, interpretation opens up.

To trace an idea back to its ultimate historical origin or ground, to trace a wish, a symptom back to the moment or context in which it first arose—this is a metaphysical interpretation of interpretation. No one understood this better than Nietzsche. It's not that we can dispense with that way of thinking, it's valid and it has its place, but it has to be the basis for a movement towards a different kind of thinking or else it becomes entrenched in the same baggage or spirit of gravity. If you've seen Hitchcock's "Spellbound"—that's the

metaphysical version of interpretation, the recovery of a lost memory that explains everything, that allows meaning to circulate fully and freely. In a clinical context, that can feel very good, and it can be a powerful condition for positive transference, and for the analyst's narcissism, but I don't think it leads to real lasting change today in the way it might have in Freud's day. Here I do follow Lacan quite closely: the unconscious changes alongside the cultural history in which it's embedded, and psychoanalysis has to adapt itself constantly to these changes.

YT: You consider the will to power to be agonistic, as multiple and self-differentiating; although I work on this topic of agonism, could you explain what you mean? What is 'agonistic' to you?

JR: The best way to answer this question is to state that agonism in Nietzsche has to be distinguished from competition in an ordinary sense. If Nietzsche had meant "competition," he would have said "competition." He was too aware of the vulgar valorization of market-based competitive practices as the purest expression of self-destructive nihilism to have sought out an alternative word for thinking about this. Commercial competition is not intrinsically agonistic. Fighting and warfare are not intrinsically agonistic. Agonism is not antagonism, which isn't to say these are completely separable from one another, but they shouldn't be equated. (I'm thinking here of Chantal Mouffe's work in political philosophy, which I admire a great deal.) If anything, antagonism, vulgar competition, as enforced by a hatred of what is other, by the need to win no matter what the cost or how empty and worthless the victory—Nietzsche's sense of agonism could not be more different. It's this dull sense of competition as an effort at "winning" that Nietzsche is always at pains to overcome and finally to be rid of. This is why he thinks agonism in terms provided by the Greeks. We have no contemporary models of agonism, at least none that I can think of. Agonism implies individuality, but an individuality forged in our relations with others, which is why I wrote about "individuating-relational processes." Antagonism and competition, which are what our culture today celebrates or wallows in, implies group thinking and the dissolution of individuality and of what is unique.

I have mixed feelings about the word "multiple," but "self-differentiating," yes, that expresses the point. To be agonistic is not to oppose someone else, but to be internally differentiated, which is to say, to be open, to be uncertain and unsure, to be constantly in agony and opposed to yourself, but in a way that moves one forward. I'm thinking here of Andre Breton's polemics against "miserabilism." The antidote to miserabilism isn't happiness, but agonism. To be tormented by and miserable over the weakness and stupidity of the world, and to be able to use this as an inspiration to have to fight and to create—I think that's what Nietzsche in part meant by agonism. Agonism isn't just an expression of defiance, it's an expression of feeling agonized by the current state of things; it implies horror, incomprehension and despair. Antagonism or competition is a way of being relieved of this feeling, by colluding with what produces it. "If you can't beat them, join them"—this is purest expression of what Nietzsche calls weakness, reactivity, stupidity. Agonism is the opposite effort—the effort to keep struggle ongoing and alive, to remain open. Even if it kills you, as in Nietzsche's case it did.

YT: Although they are related, would you make a distinction between revenge and *ressentiment* in Nietzsche?

JR: This is a very important question. Of course there's a distinction between revenge and *ressentiment*. But it's not a semantic distinction, it's not just about the different meanings of two different words. In an everyday sense, which is to say from within the framework provided by metaphysics, "revenge" sounds like it refers to action, whereas "*ressentiment*" sounds like it has only to do with thinking or feeling: I "take" revenge; I "feel" *ressentiment*. At stake between the two words is the metaphysical distinction between active and passive. Nietzsche uses the word "*ressentiment*" to convey a way of thinking beyond this opposition, beyond what classically and uncritically opposes the passive and the active, or emotion and activity. I think this is why he stays with the French word.

So, yes, revenge and *ressentiment* are intimately related, and yet they're to be rigorously distinguished. To express *ressentiment* is in a sense to exact revenge upon oneself, because one isn't in a position to direct aggression outwards. But I think what Nietzsche is asking after is: what is a self that can revenge itself upon itself? A self that can fantasize—endlessly even, to the point of fantasizing about suicide, of not committing the act so as to extend endlessly the satisfaction intrinsic to the ability to fantasize about it—about revenging itself not just upon other selves that have antagonistically aggressed against it, but upon or against itself. I think Nietzsche interrogated himself relentlessly around this question. But he did so in a way that wasn't paralyzing, as it is for so many people these days.

YT: Nietzsche is not a nihilistic thinker, as you observe, but there are different forms of nihilism in his writings. Could he be said to be a nihilist in one of these forms, as an active nihilist, for instance?

JR: Again, to say that Nietzsche "is" either something or other, that he consistently holds some position independent of some particular context, is, I think, a misreading. Of course there are moments in Nietzsche's work where he affirms nihilism, where nihilism is called for, or at least where it's inescapable for any thinking person. What intelligent person wouldn't be disgusted with the world we live in today? But the point for Nietzsche is that we constantly have to work through this, that we need a healthy dose of hatred for the stupidity of human beings, but we can't let ourselves get stuck there.

So no, I wouldn't say that Nietzsche is nihilistic in any determinative sense, but yes, of course he worked through this position in many of its forms across his texts and throughout his life. To point out that Nietzsche tackles different forms of nihilism throughout his work and throughout his life is different from saying that he "is" a nihilist. The difference at issue here may once again be that between interpretation and explanation. I don't pretend to explain Nietzsche. I don't think one can. That's his genius. One can explain Plato, or Kant, or Hegel. But not Nietzsche. And this limit of conceptual understanding is what marks the blurred boundary between the theoretical and the clinical.

YT: On the role of transgressive-creation: you present an interesting dichotomy between the Enlightenment goal of "education and care" and Nietzsche's concern and demand for transgressive creation. In this context you also discuss the

"criminal." Can you elaborate on this? Do you suggest that Nietzsche's free thinker or free spirit is ultimately transgressive?

JR: Well, my point there was that… not so much that there's a dichotomy between education and care on the one hand, and transgressive creation on the other… I mean, first let me say that I think that, yes, the Nietzschean free spirit is intrinsically transgressive, but I don't believe that transgression inherently makes one a Nietzschean free spirit. The false avant grade always believes Nietzsche to be on its side, but rarely is that the case. I think it was Deleuze who said that it's not for nothing that Nietzsche made Zarathustra's companion an ape, that he understood his work would serve as a magnet for the hopelessly confused, that the weak will always want to claim him as one of their own. No doubt Steve Bannon will soon speak about Nietzsche, comparing him with a buffoon like Julius Evola, and as an exemplar of the Judeo-Christian spirit. [Editor's note: at the time of the interview, major news outlets were reporting that Donald Trump's advisor Steve Bannon had once made reference to the fascist spiritualist author Julius Evola in a speech before the Vatican.] At some point the failure to understand goes from being frustrating to being pathologically pathetic, and this weighed on Nietzsche to no end.

So if the Nietzschean free spirit is transgressive, and transgressive in an intrinsically creative way, and vice versa—this isn't by deliberation, such a breakthrough cannot be calculated in advance, either artistically or clinically. Real transgression isn't a gesture of provocation. The true criminal always sets out in the spirit of innocence—and this is why I didn't mean to oppose transgression to education and care. To care is a deeply transgressive act these days, and to appreciate what this means requires that we begin to think care outside the framework of Christian love. This is why I wrote that psychoanalysis needs to be more rigorous and true to itself in thinking about what exactly "empathy" means in a clinical context. To do this requires our thinking beyond a metaphysical, subject/object framework.

YT: There is a lengthy discussion of perspectivism in your book. In one place, you define perspectivism as "the instinct of creation" and see it in opposition to the status quo. How would you view interpretations that are status quo? Aren't they also perspectives of and on life?

JR: What I said there was, I think, or at least what I intended, was that Nietzsche discusses "the instinct of creation"—which is a very general, if not naive, concept—in an early text, and then he later refines and distills this into the concept of "perspectivism," which is his own and is much more subtle and complicated than is often appreciated. I think we do Nietzsche a disservice if we associate perspectivism with subjectivity, as if he meant we should be capable of viewing events from multiple perspectives or points of view, appreciating the world inclusively from several different perspectives. This is a liberal, Hegelian version of Nietzsche that I don't agree with, that I don't think is faithful to the spirit of his work.

The lengthy discussion of perspectivism—and you're right, it pervades every aspect of the book—is an attempt to distinguish Nietzsche's way of thinking from scientific positivism, as the contemporary form of metaphysics, of Platonism, and of Christianity as a form of "Platonism for the people." Nietzsche was not the first to grasp this genealogy. The first to understand that scientific positivism wasn't a break with medieval Christianity but

had actually refined its most basic framework was Spinoza. The Platonic opposition of the material and the ideal becomes the Christian opposition between heaven and earth, which then becomes the secular opposition between the subjective and the objective. What Nietzsche adds is the understanding that this is a moral project, that it's not just a failure to escape a certain set of intellectual prejudices. This way of thinking constitutes the framework for an enormous set of power relations by means of which weakness and stupidity prevail over against the cultivation of what is most rare and distinct in human life, which is to say, strength.

And here, I might have thought to associate metaphysics with another term that I did use at some point but that I wish I had insisted on: fundamentalism. Metaphysics is in a sense a way of describing what is popularly called fundamentalism. Positivism is a kind of scientific fundamentalism. The culture wars, which have given rise to the discourse about STEM fields in the universities and the denigration everywhere of the humanities—this is the effect of a certain radical positivist fundamentalism that is just as, if not more, dangerous than all forms of religious fundamentalism we face today, because it's so basically tied to questions about political economy. For me, this is why Nietzsche—as well as a psychoanalytic thinking informed by his project—is relevant and necessary today, well beyond both the academy and the clinic.

YT: On the essence of metaphysics, belief in causality, unity, Being and permanence: would you say that metaphysics in the classical sense is a socio-cultural pathology?

JR: No, I wouldn't, not at all. I mean, there are many ways I could interpret that question, and what you mean by a "socio-cultural pathology." But my initial reaction was that you're asking if I think metaphysics is a product of society and culture, and if it can be transformed or overcome by simply changing social and cultural institutions (maybe that's not what you meant, but that's what I'll respond to). I think—and I think Nietzsche tried to demonstrate to us—that the exact opposite is the case. Metaphysics is not the product of socio-cultural formations; socio-cultural formations are the products of metaphysics or, rather, metaphysical thinking. Now of course, the opposition between thought and cultural institutions is not altogether stable or clear and needs constantly to be challenged, but my point is that this is not a local problem, it's not culturally determined. If you change social institutions without changing the underlying basic assumptions that give rise to those institutions, then you've only initiated very superficial shifts. This is where, for me, psychoanalysis as a clinical project, and not just as a theory, becomes very powerful.

My point is that, the belief in causality, unity, Being and permanence which you cite—these are basic tendencies of the human mind: to flee the realities of time, becoming, and difference, which are intrinsically threatening and anxiety-provoking. "Strength," in Nietzsche's sense, is the ability to confront these realities without fleeing into metaphysics, into the soothing fantasies of harmony, eternity, and equality. All social and cultural organizations are efforts either to cultivate resistance to or to abandon oneself to these tendencies. But I'm very strongly opposed to any interpretation that sees metaphysics as a merely cultural phenomenon. If metaphysical thinking defines the "Western" mindset (and it most certainly does) this does not mean that one can work oneself out of this way of thinking by simply adopting the belief systems of other cultures. Deciding to escape the

disastrous psychology of the Western world by becoming a Buddhist, for example, is a response that I think generates no real difference or change. "Metaphysics" refers to very deeply ingrained patterns of thinking and behavior that one cannot simply opt out of. We must work through these tendencies at a very personal, intimate level. And they're tendencies that discourage the cultivation of personality or intimacy, so this makes the project of self-overcoming today even more extraordinarily difficult.

YT: You speak of power relations in clinical settings throughout your book, which is a broad topic. If we can zoom into one area, where you discuss the split between "neutrality" and the "empathic" relationship, you conclude: "empathy, neutrality, and interpretation are in this way split apart" (p.62). If I understand you correctly, you are arguing for a holistic approach in which the necessary empathy does not prevent interpretation or neutrality. And both the "as-if" and the "concrete" power relations prevent such a holistic approach. I hope I am on the right track here. You accept that there is a hierarchical power relationship in the clinic, and a problem emerges where this hierarchical relationship is reduced to a democratic relationship between equals, either by the analyst or by the analysand.

JR: You're completely on the right track, and I appreciate that you feel maybe you don't quite understand where clinical practice is concerned, but actually you've grasped the point rather well. Clinical practice is always and irreducibly the site of a certain hierarchy, or rather of multiple hierarchies that are always shifting and transforming and reversing themselves. In terms of my reading of Nietzsche, when hierarchy is embraced as irreducible yet always shifting, reversing, and transforming, you're onto a different thinking about power, of power as something other than simple oppression, and of resistance as something other than mere liberation—of power as difference, hierarchy, and command, which are not conditions that we should seek to cure ourselves of.

It's difficult today (for me, at least) to imagine the cultural context in which one first encountered the critical projects of Foucault, or of someone like R.D. Laing, where psychoanalysis is concerned. The revelation that psychoanalysis is actually a power relationship—when was that ever concealed? When I read the classical psychoanalytic literature, it always seems to me that this is quite obvious, that everyone knew this, and that they were working very hard to establish psychoanalysis as a power relationship in the service of liberation, having grasped that without power there is no liberation—that one does not liberate *from* power but *with* power. This puts psychoanalysis much closer to Nietzsche than to Marx or to the liberation movements of the 1960s.

Of course there is a hierarchical power relationship in the clinic. That's what the clinical frame *is*. The worst thing you can do—and I think these ultimately amount to the same gesture—is either to fetishize this relationship and to set this difference up as immutable (which is what pharmaceutical psychiatry amounts to), or to try and eliminate it altogether (as in most versions of American interpersonalism). The more we model psychoanalysis on idealized versions of democratic equality, the more its potentially exploitative dimension comes to the fore. Freud knew this very well. He never ceased trying to distinguish psychoanalysis from practices of suggestion. This was something he was never satisfied with having achieved, knowing that this effort fails at every instance it thinks the matter settled.

But more specifically, I'm glad you asked me about that particular passage, where I describe neutrality, empathy, and interpretation being split apart. I think it's precisely this splitting that the contemporary clinical field suffers from. I tried to move a thinking about neutrality away from a formulaic practice of cold, "blank screen" depersonalization. I tried to show that this is not at all what analytic neutrality involves, linking it instead to what Nietzsche meant by "nobility." I tried to distinguished empathy in a clinical context from metaphysical notions of "genuineness." And I tried, as we've already discussed, to rigorously distinguish between interpretation and explanation. When you put these three efforts together, you get, I think, a very different version of psychoanalysis. And not one that I claim to have invented by applying Nietzsche's ideas to the clinic, but one that you can find traces of everywhere in the contemporary literature, and that I think Nietzsche provides us with the resources to draw together and to make explicit.

Against prevailing tendencies in all forms of psychotherapy today, Nietzsche understood that to be empathic is not necessarily to be supportive, that to be neutral is not necessarily to be withdrawn, and that to interpret is not necessarily to provide understanding. Although I treat those moments in the work of the major figures in the history of psychoanalytic thinking (Klein, Winnicott, Lacan) where this seems to come to the fore, I think the truly Nietzschean analytic thinkers are minor (in comparison) contemporary figures like Christopher Bollas, Jacques-Alain Miller, Dana Birksted-Breen, several others I could mention, who, building on the shoulders of giants, have seen what psychoanalysis must become if it's to remain relevant in treating the pathologies of the twenty-first century.

YT: On weakness and strength: Why does Nietzsche contradict himself when he posits the intrinsic value of strength over and against weakness while at the same time denouncing metaphysics "as faith in opposite values"? (p.75). Are you suggesting that Nietzsche himself is using a dualistic metaphysics when he opposes strength to weakness?

JR: A superficial reading of Nietzsche is quickly going to assert that, if Nietzsche is constantly criticizing all logics of opposition and calling them "weak," but if in order to do so he's relying on a basic framework that opposes the weak and the strong, then he is contradicting himself in a way that threatens his entire project. This is not unlike the way in which Foucault was challenged for having presupposed causality in elaborating an archeology of causality, which as you know presented a major problem for him.

All I was trying to point out was that Nietzsche knew very well what he was doing, and that the apparent opposition between strong and weak wills is only a rhetorical strategy. I highlight a passage where he admits this, that there are no "strong" and "weak" wills properly speaking, that this is itself only a necessary form of interpretation. And this is what those who misread Nietzsche and appropriate him for a traditional discourse of power will never understand: that power is not might; that strength is not strong in the ordinary, vulgar sense; that Nietzsche only appears to be speaking their language, as a way of dismantling it from within and hopefully once and for all.

YT: This is the distinction between empathy and pity in Nietzsche. Although I agree with your analysis, we have to keep in mind the textual difficulty here because of the single word in German, *Mitleid*, which stands for a variety of terms in English,

including pity, empathy, and compassion. *Mitgefühl* covers another semantic field. Nietzsche's critique of pity is often misunderstood as though he simply does not care, as though there is no room for relating to other people's sufferings. But this is far from being the case.

JR: Absolutely. To read Nietzsche as someone who doesn't care, who believes that might makes right, for whom other people's suffering is a source of indifference—one has to be practically illiterate to read this in Nietzsche. To criticize the stance of pity is not to reject empathy or compassion. To push for a more rigorous understanding of what empathy comprises has nothing to do with rejecting its orientation. To reject compassion when it interferes with enjoyment is not to advocate for callousness and resentment. One can hear in Nietzsche a tremendous suffering over the paucity of our ethical and affective vocabulary. Nietzsche expresses affects for which we have no names, in any language. He attempts to describe emotional experiences that make no sense within a metaphysical framework that subordinates passion to reason. The *Mit-* of *Mitleid* and *Mitgefühl* is the launching pad or falling point for an experimental practice of relationality beyond the subject/object opposition that structures all metaphysics today. I've tried to show where psychoanalysis has happened upon this same experimental project, and where it can recoup its potential for therapeutic and scientific efficacy by tending to this intimately relational yet non-metaphysical dimension.

YT: You make an interesting case against academic education by way of Lacan. Other than the commercial and practical aspects of academia today, you highlight the fact that academic education is not specific to the individual. Would you say that our academic institutions are in crisis right now, and where can we go from here? You also bring up Nietzsche in this context, his later critique of academia in *Beyond Good and Evil,* and you question whether Nietzsche is writing out of *ressentiment*. This may be the case, but Nietzsche had made an earlier critique of academic education that he delivered in a series of talks at Basel University. I assume that his later harsh critique of academia would still be there whether or not he had once been a professor. On a different note, it seems like Nietzsche was not expecting to have career as a professional academic, according to Daniel Blue's recent book, *The Making of Friedrich Nietzsche*. It sort of happened to him.

JR: I'm looking forward to reading Blue's book. I've just ordered it on your recommendation. Having academia "happen" to you was exactly my experience with academia, where I languished for some time. Academia is a very self-destructive, corporate culture, and for this reason it can be very seductive and addictive. I see academics in my practice often. They're suffering and they're very desperate and very alone, they have nowhere else they can turn to make a living once they've become so deeply embedded in that system. This was not the case for previous generations, where an academic position was a stepping stone towards a more influential and lucrative position in business or government. Today academia is a dead end, and both the consumers and the producers of academic services are acutely aware of this. Nietzsche took note of this already almost 150 years ago.

Now, in the paragraph that you cite, I was not seriously suggesting that Nietzsche was writing from a position of *ressentiment*. Nor was I making a case against academic

education. What I was suggesting is that psychoanalysis concerns something that the university is inherently incapable of providing—and this is to affirm what Lacan meant when he said that psychoanalysis is not a "university discourse." The parallel I drew was to Nietzsche, for whom philosophy also does not belong in the university. For Lacan, psychoanalysis is an anti-institutional—which is to say an anti-authoritarian—practice. Nietzsche said the same thing about philosophy. So did Socrates, for that matter. And until Kant no major philosophical figure was able to integrate his project with efforts at making a living in the practice of educational administration. In this sense, Lacan's insistence that he was not a philosopher but against the philosophical tradition actually situates him more essentially within the philosophical tradition, which is not coincident with the history and traditions of the university.

What Lacan argues, very cogently—and if there's anything that ties together all the phases of his teaching, it's this—is that clinical practice is to be situated within the domain of epistemology, but not a universalist epistemology. Like psychoanalysis, philosophy is about meaning, and about what makes meaning possible. But philosophy takes meaning to be something essentially shared, something that forms the basis for conscious understanding. Lacan's approach—and whatever one thinks of Lacan, this truly is radically original, even if it was anticipated by Nietzsche, and to some extent by Freud and Heidegger—is to demonstrate that the psychoanalytic clinic has to do with a different kind of knowledge, one that is not transmitted from a master to a disciple, one that isn't absent before it's present and that can't be thought from within the framework of these simple alternatives. The commercial dimension of the university now threatens universal education by prioritizing administrative systems that have nothing to do with education but rather with financial calculation and control. The student is no longer anything more than a consumer of services, the professor just a salesperson worried about how management assesses her productivity. Both Nietzsche and Lacan demonstrated against this situation decades before it had become the bloated tick that it is now.

The psychoanalytic clinic, on the other hand, is something rather different, and perhaps it offers an antidote to this situation. It always disturbs me how much people will insist that it makes sense for their children to take on the crippling, lifelong effects of student loan debt to pay for a college degree that ultimately does not distinguish them from anyone else, that signifies no marketable skills. The thought of spending $200,000 on four years of college makes sense in our culture for some reason, but the idea of spending $10,000 on the intimacy generated by a four times per week analysis appears deeply troubling and irrational, a poor investment compared to what everyone else is getting for their money, despite the demonstrable lack of returns. And that's the point: what I pay for in an analysis is not something that everyone else can get for the same price. It may take more time, it may take less time; it may cost more money, it may cost less money; none of this can be calculated in advance because it doesn't have to do with what suits the financial needs of some institution or industry. It has to do rather with the unpredictable emotional needs of the individual who's looking to further individuate herself. Our institutions today cultivate what is common in individuals, in order to perpetuate themselves. This is true of the educational industry, the entertainment industry, the pharmaceutical industry, and so on. To care for what is individual in the individual is a transgressive and forbidden act these days.

Book Reviews

Nietzsche and the Clinic: Psychoanalysis, Philosophy, Metaphysics—**Jared Russell**

Richard J. Elliott

"To cultivate laughter on the grand scale that is needed today in the face of so much destructiveness...a joyful – non-metaphysical – science. Does psychoanalysis have something to say about this possibility?" (148). In *Nietzsche and the Clinic,* Jared Russell argues that it most certainly does. Russell's claim is that contemporary psychoanalysis could gain much from an engagement with Nietzsche. In this, Russell is correct. Russell's argument benefits from the use of clinical examples, drawn from his background in private practice as a psychoanalyst. Russell writes for an intended audience of psychoanalysts, or those with clinical experience, who are either unfamiliar with Nietzsche, or coming to him for the first time through Russell's study.

Russell wishes to demonstrate an avenue for psychoanalysis out of what he perceives to be a point of stagnation, and indeed of crisis (xiv). He hopes to "move beyond a merely theoretical orientation in order to take up the everyday practice of psychoanalysis in ways that facilitate an appreciation of what clinical practice actually consists in- and not to determine once and for all what this might mean, but rather to appreciate its essential openness and indeterminacy." Russell sets his colours to the mast towards psychoanalytic methodologies, one that rallies against the perceived overt objectivism and scientism (along with a belief in economic forces pressuring psychoanalysis as a discipline to conform in this way) of much current psychoanalytic practice (xiii). Russell's claim is that Nietzsche is a "powerful resource" (xiii) for "thinking through the difficulties – clinical, epistemological, and political – that our discipline encounters everywhere today." He claims in the Preface to the book that Nietzsche's critique of philosophy shares affinities with the critique of this scientistic mindset and its pressures for "results" and "evidence" (xiv).

Although a psychoanalytic appreciation of Nietzsche is not in and of itself new, Russell wishes to propose a novel direction with his comparison in attempting to break the Freudian proximity to Nietzsche. Rather than seeing Nietzsche as a proto-Freudian philosophical contribution to psychoanalytic theory, Russell argues for Nietzsche's status as, ironically, a *post*-Freudian figure (xv), not least for Russell's claim that for Nietzsche, "it is not the subject who interprets, but the drives themselves" (6). In doing so, Russell wishes to lend further support to psychoanalysis as a buttress against those who would seek to its efficacy on scientific, or perhaps scientistic, grounds.

Russell is, wisely, not seeking to claim that within Nietzsche's work lays anticipations of exact solutions to psychoanalytic problems (in fact, Russell's argumentation would balk at such terminology). Rather, he makes the claim that Nietzsche, particularly in his critique of metaphysics and his project to psychologise and naturalise the unconscious motivations that

contribute to accepting metaphysical schema, offers an "economy (which is something other than a system) of such ideas, by demonstrating that...they belong to a common discourse at the bottom of which lies a concern with affirming the reality of unconscious processes" (xviii).

The first chapter focuses on Nietzsche's perspectivism. Instead of rehashing the objectivist/relativist debate in metaphysics, Russell claims that it is only by accepting the oppositions of traditional metaphysics, of which Nietzsche rejects and critiques, that such a debate is coherent in the first place (pp. 3 – 6). Russell claims that Nietzsche attacks "positivism" for fostering "a scientific attitude by reducing conditions of subjectivity in favor of increasing conditions of objectivity", claiming that for Nietzsche, positivism is a disposition clinging to universalized, objective truths (4). In contrast to this, Russell views Nietzsche's perspectivism as a challenge to "the positive version of science that opposes the objective and the subjective" (Ibid.). This is significant in rejecting any form of 'ego psychology', regnant in the tradition of Western metaphysics as well as in all Freudian theory, since to argue that "everything is subjective" in opposition to the reality of objective truth is not Nietzsche's intention. Rather, in Russell's view, Nietzsche wishes to dissolve the confusion that interpretation is "merely the activity of an underlying subject" (5). Russell writes: "The positivist claim that there are 'only facts' is guided by a resentful negativity that Nietzsche's assertion that there are 'only interpretations' actively intends to counter and to overturn. Nietzsche is not insisting that there is no truth, but that truth is not what science in its contemporary form interprets it to be" (4-5).

Russell's book is at its best in its discussions of the unconscious motivations behind particular metaphysical schema. Russell links subjectivism within the context of metaphysics since Kant as complicit with "postmodern, nihilistic relativism, for Nietzsche" (6). In opposition to this, Russell posits Nietzsche's perspectivism as the "practice of interpretation. The world is knowable not because it has *a* meaning, but countless meanings...Unlike positivism, perspectivism is not nihilism in that it does not deny meaning (value) to experience, rather it refuses to split meaning and experience apart in the first place. Interpretation is...the pre-subjective projection of a multiplicity of meanings or possibilities" (6).

Russell claims that his reading of Nietzsche offers a prescient directive for reconfiguring the aims and intentions of psychoanalytic methodology: we cannot arrive at truth through interpretation, neither can we ascertain objective knowledge of a scientific basis about the structure of the mind (6). Russell's discussion of the potential for projection and countertransference, paying heed to Nietzsche's perspectivism, is illuminating. His discussion of Nietzsche's tenets of the will to power, perspectivism and interpretation, "[i]rreducibly linked in a conceptual economy", is neat, even if the way it is described paints a more systematic picture of Nietzsche's thought than perhaps Nietzsche would have liked.

Nietzsche ties the development of consciousness as a fantasy spawned by worldly anxiousness; from the inability to 'master' the world, "the result is the elaboration of an 'I think...' itself no more than an organizationally more sophisticated and more tenacious form of fantasy." (10). In this respect, Russell's analysis marks an interesting contribution to the discussion of the role of consciousness in Nietzsche by expanding upon the unconscious/conscious divide in Nietzsche's picture of the human mental economy with reference to psychoanalytic mechanisms of reactive fantasy (as opposed to creative activity): the cogitative 'I' as a revenge against time. In other words, Nietzsche's description of the

"four great errors" of metaphysics demonstrates how they irreducibly manifest the symptoms of this revenge. In one particularly striking passage, Russell writes, "Meaning-making becomes an effort at creating a moral case against the perceived injustice of the influx of chance and difference" (11), suggesting that the mere possibility of a metaphysics, as a means of explaining suffering, is itself an attempt at an unconscious theodicy.

Russell too specifies Nietzsche's genealogical method as crucial to a more expansive understanding of the self. Russell claims that the positivist method, which he infers Nietzsche has in mind when he criticizes the 'historical explanation', reduces and abbreviates mental phenomena, as a result of a wish to feel secure in its determination. Instead, Russell offers genealogy as an interpretive practice. However, Russell, instead of claiming that the genealogical approach lends itself to uncovering anything closer to the truth of the matter, produces a 'knowledge' (Russell's scare quotes) that "is radically singular- *perspectival*". I find it very difficult to read this interpretation of genealogy in any way other than to relativize the phenomena in question.

Russell offers a long section on Nietzsche's concept of *ressentiment*, which possesses much merit. Identifying *ressentiment* as a central concept for Nietzsche's psychological account, Russell states that it "reflects life turning against itself by refusing difference and variation". There is value to reading at least a component of ressentiment in this way: the 'slave moralist' is an absolutist in their condemnation of the masters. Also of great interest is Russell's discussion of the notion that perspectivism renders *ressentiment* superfluous in the fostering of a more affirmative condition of life (25). Russell's picture of Nietzsche here is both Derridean and Deleuzian in its attribution. He pits Deleuze and Derrida against Nehamas's aestheticist reading of Nietzsche as someone whose normative program recommends "multiplying perspectives simply for their own sake, for the purpose of cultivating a beautiful soul" (23). Instead, Russell offers perspectivism as a therapeutic device "to neutralize *ressentiment*" (Ibid.). But it is unclear why these ideas must be pitted against each other: Russell does not expand further than this as to why Nehamas's account is either misguided, or why it should be inherently opposed to the insights Russell reads from the more contemporary French thinkers he appropriates here. Indeed, as his discussion of perspectivism and *ressentiment* continues, it alludes to a crucial component of Nietzsche's thinking that passes by without proper discussion within the book, namely, Nietzsche's normative program for human flourishing. He identifies the 'pathos of distance' and 'nobility' as integral to Nietzsche's understanding of perspectivism. Russell posits perspectivism as an embrace of "the phenomenal surface of experience as the play of multiple, indeterminable meanings (values)" (34). But if variation and difference are inherently positive dispositions without this account for the normative significance of nobility, distance and "order of rank" alongside, then it is unclear how Russell's psychoanalytically pluralist reading of Nietzsche is to be understood without falling into a relativistic picture, the kind which Russell claims he wishes to avoid. Indeed, while Russell is correct to note that Nietzsche rejects moral (in a pejorative sense) absolutism as a signifier of human weakness, and that he praises individuation as a sign of great human strength, it is not clear that this leaves Nietzsche as a pluralist in regards to a positive ethical system.

Russell's discussion of Nietzsche and custom, and its divergence from the Kantian-Freudian theory of mind that dominates in psychoanalysis, is important. He rightly criticizes the simplistic picture of human liberation that the Freudian line of psychoanalytic theory adopted from Kantian metaphysics. Instead, Russell postulates Nietzsche as a figure

concerned not with liberation, but "elevation". This is surely correct: through Nietzsche's often referentially confusing attacks on free will, we see him postulate a higher sense of freedom and mastery that frees itself from the free will versus determinism debate, both sides of which are permeated with reactive dispositions against life.

In discussing Deutsch's famous concept of the 'as-if personality' (44 – 48), and in turn Bass's discussion of it in relation to clinical neutrality (62 – 66), Russell argues that the reaction to clinical treatment by a patient with such a pathological disposition results in "a form of treatment that is at once as stagnant as it is potentially endless" (45). But isn't this an apposite diagnosis of the shortcomings of such a pluralistic mindset towards clinical practice of the kind Russell advocates? Indeed, in Russell's discussion of the 'as-if' disposition in relation to "positivism" in psychoanalytic praxis, he writes, "positivism in Nietzsche's sense of the term, is precisely what these pseudo-individuals demand in the everyday clinical encounter: explanatory reductions of experience to unambiguous conscious fact" (46). But the tone here polemically implies that so-called 'objectivist' accounts of psychoanalytic methodology aim to provide such a reductionist environment. But who provides analysis this crass? Russell should, so to speak, 'name and shame' those whom he believes are guilty of this reductionism to inform the reader who he refers to in his critique, and to outline a robust criticism of such reductionists. Otherwise, he risks the charge that he attacks a straw man.

Further, though there is much to gain from a close reading of Russell's account of Nietzsche's perspectivism, in discussing cases of 'as-if' individuals, or "concrete patients" in the clinical environment, he claims that "the analyst's interpretations are treated as fragmented objects- units of ideation, subjective opinions, 'mere perspectives' – rather than as aspects of an ongoing process that both discloses and constructs symbolic meaning" (63). But given Russell's reading of Nietzsche's perspectivism as pluralist by nature, can he offer a differentiation between 'mere' perspectives of this sort and Nietzschean, authentic perspectives? I leave this an open question, but my suspicion is that some objective arbitration may be required for such a differentiation.

The third chapter is a sophisticated and fascinating dialogue between Nietzsche's genealogical method, his psychological analysis of *Mittleid* and the will to power among others, and Melanie Klein's account of the phenomenology of infancy. It is the strongest in the book, and is worth reading by Nietzsche scholars and psychoanalysts alike. Russell convincingly argues that a Nietzschean bearing upon Kleinian insights should be considered to possess serious psychoanalytic insights, in discussing Klein's discussions of the infantile ("primitive") psychology of freedom, egoism and envy. I have problems with Russell's characterization of Nietzsche's nuanced account of free will, as well as some reductivism about Nietzsche's admiration of a particular form of egoism: nevertheless, the chapter provides brilliant comparisons on *ressentiment* in the infant's phenomenology and unconscious phantasy in "projective identification", as well as the positive effect that conflict (or *agon*) possesses for the individual (90) between the two figures.

Chapter Four is also very productive in its discussion of both Nietzsche's and Winnicott's discussions of 'play' as a characteristic of normative health. While Russell is guilty of 'watering down' Nietzsche's self-confessed immoralism (95), the chapter's wider discussion of understanding Nietzsche's ideal of agential 'health' in the context of free and creative play by joyfully accepting the 'innocence' of Becoming (anti-teleological by definition) and its affinities with the notion of play in Winnicott is important and insightful.

Russell rightly emphasizes Heraclitus's significance for Nietzsche's agonistic imperatives in his discussion of play (97 – 101) and its important reactive character to the traditional place of logic and non-contradiction within metaphysics. While there are some claims about the status of the will to power that appear bolder than warranted (98), Russell's identification of Nietzsche's argument that logic (or "dialectics", as he put it in his attack on Socrates in *Twilight of the Idols*) embodies the spirit of revenge is worth reading, particularly in the context of Nietzsche's comments on childhood (as "a sacred Yes") that beg a psychoanalytic appropriation.

Russell concludes that a reading of Nietzsche's conception of play locates a psychoanalytic methodology as "an experimental practice...not a formal procedure – it is a playing, not a doing" (108). What it consists of is "the analyst responding to the patient's free associations with free associations of her own, recognizing and responding to connections as they surface in the patient's material by means of an evenly hovering attention. Of course, this cannot be what is always going on in the analytic relationship, but it is at these 'ideal points' [Rosengrant, 2005] that Winnicott situates the mutative value of an interpretive approach" (109). But once again, we seem to run the risk of a methodological impasse within clinical treatment, should this be employed in the manner it is described here. With the free associations of the analyst being an integral part of the dyad, might this not sully the treatment with its own form of confirmation bias, and worse still (likely in Russell's eyes), become guilty of the encroaching power dynamic in the clinical dyad that he earlier on, and indeed in this chapter (114) chastised? In other words, one should treat the concept of play carefully, lest it be employed in a manner that overtly distorts the analysis. Perhaps this is a criticism of Winnicott more than Russell; but given its endorsement here of a Nietzschean bent, it would appear to apply. Nevertheless, Russell's discussions of the 'anti-metaphysical' nature of psychoanalysis (i.e. in the context of Nietzsche's deconstruction of the 'I') and the implications this has for a positive normative role for 'play' is illuminating.

The fifth chapter is, however interesting and readable a discussion of Lacan it provides, rather thin in a distinctly Nietzschean vein of argument to support the wider claims of Russell's book. Past the first couple of pages and until the beautifully written last two pages of the chapter (of which the opening quote of Russell's which opened this review is to be found), Nietzsche is treated as an afterthought for the bulk of this chapter. Mention of Nietzsche is relegated to a few scant remarks on what Nietzsche thought metaphysics was, or what Nietzsche would have said about Lacan's Heideggerian leanings, and the like. In this respect, it is difficult to view this chapter as a substantial development of the book's main contention. The clinical example contained within the chapter, however, is very moving, even if is unclear how distinctly 'Nietzschean' it is in character.

The most significant problem with Russell's book is the confused picture it paints of science, both within the Nietzschean corpus and within psychoanalysis itself. Russell aligns the normative aspect of Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics with a psychoanalytic critique of what he perceives to be the excessive scientific leanings within psychoanalysis, claiming that what Nietzsche offers is lost upon "those branches of psychoanalysis eager to align themselves with cognitivism and with the neurosciences" (p. xviii). He then makes considerable ties between a number of issues, including authoritarianism, scientism, the "economic marketplace", and geo-political concerns ("a world violently bent on realizing spectacular forms of self-destruction"). Russell in turn acknowledges a slight polemical

tendency in his presentation, which certainly comes through at times throughout the discussion.

In this respect, Russell wishes to make the link between his own perceived anti-scientism and what he argues are Nietzsche's anti-scientific tendencies. However, it is not at all clear that these two positions align in the manner that Russell wishes them to. We see Nietzsche appropriate from scientists throughout his productive life, at multiple stages of his corpus (not just the more explicitly 'positivist' works, in particular *Human, All Too Human*): one need only consider figures such as Boscovich, Ernst Mach, Goethe's work on optical perception and colour, and many other scientists whose work Nietzsche valued and considered exemplary of the normative ideals he wished to promote. Nietzsche's hope was, in a similar manner to his position towards the study of history, the promotion and utilisation of science in the service of life. The object of Nietzsche's criticism is in reality directed at scientists whom absolutize scientific inquiry (whom he views as guilty of perpetuating the Christian-moral will to truth for its own sake) as well as those who view scientific inquiry as the new arbiter of moral standards for a secular humanistic worldview. In other words, Nietzsche is not anti-science in the way in which Russell wishes to assert. This claim, rather central to the book, would appear to be undermined if this would be the sensible way to view Nietzsche's remarks on science.

Russell claims that Nietzsche's critique of the will to truth actually encompasses all attempts at knowledge, while he instead views knowledge as "dysfunctionally self-protective" (20). If this were correct as an assessment, then Russell is right to claim that this puts Nietzsche "thoroughly at odds with classical theories of therapeutic action": but it is not a given that we should accept this reading of Nietzsche. It would be closer to regard Nietzsche's critique as an assessment of an absolutist mindset that views truth at all costs to be an unconditional pursuit. This is not equivalent to saying that knowledge in itself is self-protective and dysfunctional in the manner Russell assumes. Indeed, one could offer the alternative reading that Nietzsche's genealogical method is precisely to uncover the real ('real' meant in some objective sense) motives behind our pursuit of knowledge: when Nietzsche claims in the preface to the *Genealogy of Morals* that we are "strangers to ourselves", it is more fitting to read Nietzsche as saying not that we should proffer a total skepticism about knowledge, but rather that he haven't yet known the *real* account of ourselves that guides our agential dispositions.

Russell is right to (29) raise Nietzsche's attack on causality as crucial to his critique of the psychological mindset that engenders metaphysics, but only if we understand causality as an absolute principle of life. Russell claims that "modern mechanical science" is a shadow of God in that it reinforces the Christian-moral worship of objectivity, something outside of the world. He raises Newtonian physics in this regard, as something which wants to abolish the normative significance of the personal (30). He claims that Nietzsche's perspectivism is in this respect "a form of science beyond metaphysics". These are bold claims indeed. While Russell is correct to acknowledge the importance of illusions, uncertainty and ignorance for Nietzsche's perspectivism, it is unclear how this necessarily correlates with scientific method, nor is it obvious that we should accept Russell's reading of Nietzsche here as attacking all modern science in this way (30).

Likewise, Russell portrays Nietzsche in his own absolutist terms, as an anti-cognitive thinker whose emphasis on the physiological (and normative love of the 'body' over and above the 'soul') renders the path to "understanding" obsolete. But while there is obvious

truth in emphasizing Nietzsche's wish to in some sense return to physiology, it is not obvious why we shouldn't read this merely as a rejection of the absolutism prevalent in the Christian-moral tradition of the 'soul' and the Cartesian ego, rather than a rejection of all cognitive functioning in human agency, as well as the normative importance that such functioning may have. Nietzsche at many times discusses how exemplary forms of human agency is underpinned by an 'organizing idea' (*Ecce Homo*, II, 9) which arises on the surface of consciousness: this suggests the garnering of a perspective towards life that guides, or perhaps rather *imbues* cognitive functioning with normative meaning. Russell's account of Nietzsche's perspectivism rejects self-reflection and all forms of self-understanding as having any ethical significance for Nietzsche, but one should be wary of viewing Nietzsche in this way. Nietzsche's exemplary individual is *not* the blond beast of old whose actions were devoid of agential considerations. Rather, any hope that Nietzsche instills in his exemplary figures recognizes the thoroughly cognitive aspect to their own respective models for self-creation.

Further, it is unclear where Russell's claim that Nietzsche's affirmation of life says 'yes' to "countless meanings" (25) leaves psychoanalytic practice in its reality. Russell characterizes the true cause of psychoanalysis as providing "a technical framework for this agonistic encounter with hierarchy and difference, rather than a merely supportive, humanistic-interpersonal approach to the other as object" (38). But is this a fair characterization of Russell's psychoanalytic (for want of a better word) opponents? Does a humanistic-interpersonal approach necessarily denote treating the other as 'object'? Does the aspiration to an objective understanding of the dynamics of the unconscious, while maintaining a deep sense of the importance of both the dyadic relationship and also the humane aspect of psychoanalytic practice, deserve to be criticized in this way? I am not sure it does: it seems an unfair caricature, both of this aspiration and the hope that it may be rooted in some sense of 'scientific' grounding.

Russell is correct that Nietzsche was railing against the "progressivist ideals of positivist science" (38), at least certainly in his so-called 'mature' works. But why not limit it to this, instead of encapsulating the scientific enterprise as such? He claims (38) that recognizing the lack of rooting of this ideal, and employing a Nietzschean normative disposition does not imply "some position of potency or mastery" (38). But one would have to attribute the charge of gross and overt hyperbole to Nietzsche, not just once but throughout every text he produced, to suggest that Nietzsche's talk of 'mastery' is consistently meant in this way.

I do not mean to be unfair on this matter: there is much of great value in what Russell denotes from Nietzsche's texts, as well as a positive force they would be should they be appropriated for psychoanalytic purposes. But the question of what Russell calls "radical openness" to the other seems to suggest to me only further evidence that the picture of Nietzsche Russell paints cannot escape the charge of fuzzy relativism within the remit of the clinical environment.

Russell appropriates a quote of Nietzsche's, "We want to serve history only to the extent that history serves life" (42 of Russell). I would suggest that this is the best way to understand Nietzsche's position on truth and knowledge, also: he is neither an objectivist, nor a relativist, and his statements either way are not substantially enough supported throughout his texts to argue either way wholeheartedly. Instead, Russell makes the claim for Nietzsche that "knowing is a pathology of certitude. It insists that what is actual and real is

only what I can see before me or factually understand right now. For Nietzsche, this is another form of valorizing consciousness and local causal relations..." (51) But this is a strong claim, one that (as I've already argued) doesn't necessarily possess a Nietzschean reminiscence to it. The book contains insightful discussions into the ability to tolerate truth and its relation to perspectivism (52), and much of the psychoanalytic discussions in Russell's book are very agreeable. But I fail to see how particular psychoanalytic methodological examples, such as Malcolm and Bion on "reversible perspective" (as featured on 54 - 58), that Russell recommends as robust and more correct ways of practicing clinical engagement must necessarily be rejected by those so-called objectivist, 'scientistic' psychoanalytic practitioners whom Russell opposes.

Herein exposes the polemical streak to Russell's book: he extends an apparent flaw in psychoanalytic methodology (which I agree exists), namely the overt objectivism of much psychoanalytic practice, and claims that it "drives the marketplace of modern technological science". Framing his criticism in such a way only serves to makes him sound like a polemical Heideggerian, without a substantial argument to support this claim as to a) why this is the inherent drive of modern technological science, or b) why this should be described in correlation with the economically loaded term, 'marketplace' (43). Further, Russell describes "the crisis of psychoanalysis today" as associated with "demands for cognitive, pharmaceutical, and other 'evidence-based', 'results-oriented' interventions..." and "the casual self-destructiveness encouraged everywhere by the pervasive nihilism of contemporary culture" (69). Likewise, Russell writes of "the will to factual knowledge of positivist science, and as what tends toward the overcoming of reactive logics of domination, opposition, and difference", as well as the overlap between methodological objectivity and particular economic determinations (151). While we may chortle and see great stylistic flair into Nietzsche's own polemical treatment of particular issues, it would be unfair to treat an attempt at a rigorous exposition of Nietzsche's potential contribution to psychoanalysis in the same manner.

Overall, while Russell's aim to establish psychoanalysis as a "non-metaphysical science" at heart (154) may be contestable, his central contention that Nietzsche be viewed as a valuable, even integral resource for the progression of psychoanalytic methodology is to me convincing in its. The book makes several questionable claims, but this should not put off the discerning intended reader from uncovering the distinctive and numerous merits of its discussions that they, as a psychoanalyst without an established background in Nietzsche studies, would certainly profit from.

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Individual and Community in Nietzsche's Philosophy—**Julian Young**

Tom Hanauer

Although *Individual and Community in Nietzsche's Philosophy* is an excellent collection of papers on a highly neglected—and presently very relevant—dimension of Nietzsche's thought (the individual, the community, and the relationship between them), I imagine some readers might initially consider this volume superfluous. Isn't Nietzsche's stance abundantly clear? The "herd" has no intrinsic worth; only the *Übermensch* or the "genius" or the "higher man" is of any significance. Isn't this a well-established scholarly consensus? This volume, however – along with Young's 2006 book, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Religion* – happily opens the debate anew.

Julian Young's opening essay argues that Nietzsche was a communitarian through and through. According to Young, the flourishing of community was Nietzsche's central concern or highest value from first to last. Young traces Nietzsche's communitarianism back to Wagner's Left Hegelian roots. Nietzsche's communitarianism, he explains, is clearest in *The Birth of Tragedy*, where he advocates for the creation ("rebirth") of a German community, unified and fueled by the mythical powers of Wagnerian art, as a palliative for the nihilism of modernity. But, then, what about Nietzsche's seemingly obvious aristocratic emphasis on the exceptional individual in his later works? Young answer's that even exceptional individuals ultimately have value for Nietzsche only insofar as they contribute to the welfare of the community. The exceptional individuals serve in part an *adaptive* purpose: in the absence of a "creatively dissenting minority … the community cannot evolve to meet the challenges of an ever-changing human and natural environment" (25).

Ken Gemes and Christopher Sykes argue in their "The Culture of Myth and the Myth of Culture," like Young, that Nietzsche's early and middle period were concerned with the creation of a new and life-affirming "myth" that will rejuvenate German culture. They provide an excellent discussion of Nietzsche's account of myth and they argue for the (neglected) influence of Wagner and the Romantics on the development of Nietzsche's ideas about the redemptive power of artistic "illusion [*Wahn*]". *Contra* Young, however, they argue that the later Nietzsche (from *Zarathustra* onwards) seems to have abandoned his communitarian leanings in favor of promoting an aristocratic myth that was designed to cultivate, inspire, and promote the flourishing of exceptional individuals alone.

While it might seen uncontroversial that Nietzsche's early work is communitarian in its aim and spirit, the arguments in favor of this position fail to incorporate discussion of certain remarks that Nietzsche makes in his early notebooks and unpublished essays. For instance, in an unpublished preface that is addressed to Wagner, Nietzsche writes, "You

know how utterly I abhor the misguided belief that the people, let alone the state, should be an 'end in itself' … Neither the state nor the people nor mankind exist for their own sake; the goal lies in their peaks, in the great 'individuals' … who would doubt that the world of the Greeks heroes existed only for the sake of one Homer?" (WEN, 81; cf. "The Greek State").[1] As evidenced by this reflection, Nietzsche's aristocratic tendencies seem to have already been present when he was writing *The Birth of Tragedy*.

Maudemarie Clark and Monique Wonderly provide a compelling middle path between communitarianism and aristocratism in their "The Good of Community." Their claim is that Nietzsche values both the exceptional individual and the community for their own sakes *and* for their instrumental roles. Perhaps the most interesting argument in Clark and Wonderly is that Nietzsche valued communities for their "formal features," e.g., for the type of hierarchical structure they exhibit. As an example, they cite Nietzsche's praise for the formal magnificence of the Roman Empire (A §58). The communities Nietzsche values, on this account, are analogous to beautiful or sublime artworks. Clark and Wonderly's interpretation is attractive, but it raises a complicated question about the relation between culture and community: is Nietzsche expressing his admiration for the community or is he expressing his admiration for the *culture* when he praises the Romans or the Renaissance or even the Tragic Greeks? Is there even a relevant or clear distinction between the two for Nietzsche? Perhaps Nietzsche's concern was not primarily with the community and its well-being, but only with the maintenance of the *form* or *style* that the community takes and which is embodied in its culture. In other words, perhaps it's the preservation of the culture that fundamentally matters to Nietzsche, not the well-being of the ordinary individuals who (as a community) merely happen to *give rise to* that culture. The ordinary individuals might be entirely replaceable insofar as their replacement doesn't negatively affect the aesthetic integrity and brilliance of the culture itself.

Nietzsche's frequent advocacy of egoism is one obvious hurdle for the communitarian reading.[2] This is the subject of Ivan Soll's contribution. Nietzsche, Soll argues, recommends that we abandon our moral pretensions and fully commit ourselves to the egoistic project of self-creation. But Nietzsche endorses egoism, Soll interestingly claims, partly because he thinks it is beneficial for the advancement of the human "type." The advancement of humanity, however, should not be understood as a matter of elevating the "common good" but rather as a matter of reaching (and then surpassing) the echelons of splendor and greatness that are only possible for exceptional individuals.

The issue of egoism is picked up again by Christine Swanton, who argues for the more modest position that Nietzsche's individualism is compatible with communitarianism. Nietzsche's positive conception of the mature "collective individual" (HH I §94) allows us to see how this is possible. The mature collective individual is someone who, owing to certain virtues, manages to "work for her fellow men" while simultaneously cultivating her own personal good. Swanton provides an intricate discussion of the sense in which the mature collective individual manifests the virtues of benevolence and justice, but she unfortunately doesn't spell out the substantive ways in which the collective individual actively and positively promotes the wellbeing of the community as a whole.

[1] Andrew Huddleston's essay, "'Consecration to Culture': Nietzsche on Human Dignity and Slavery" (2014) is a very

[2] Some examples of Nietzsche's endorsement of egoism can be found in GS 21 and TI, "Skirmishes," 33.

John Richardson's wonderful essay is concerned with the kind of relationship between individual and community that Nietzsche advocates. His answer is that Nietzsche favors a relationship that doesn't erase the individual and her uniqueness but rather allows her to "stand out" within the community "in the right way" (215). Language, Richardson says, is the medium that paradoxically both constrains and enables the emergence of such a relationship; language is the "battleground" between the individual and the community (215). First, language is (often) the direct expression of the herd's perspective and its morality—it strives to reduce people and their experiences to commonalities, or to make everything "equal." This perspective eventually gives rise to a *sham* sense of individuality: the Kantian agent whose "good will" is a façade that "conceals communal control" (231). But, second, it's possible for the individual to take an "active" stance towards language—as Nietzsche himself does in his writing—and to infuse one's "individual qualities" into the sphere of the common without thereby completely abandoning one's authenticity (239).

The relationship between individual and community is further investigated by Jeff Malpas, who offers a "topographical" reading of Nietzsche, or a reading that examines the philosophical significance of Nietzsche's meditations on particular places, like Venice and Sils Maria, and his use of geographical metaphors, like "sea" and "land" (GS §124, §343). Malpas suggests, for example, that "For Nietzsche, Venice … symbolizes the duality of the world, but also the possibility, even if it be an illusion, of the overcoming of that duality" (205). Malpas' topographical reading seems to emphasize the "agonistic play" between individual and community (210). I think Malpas is right to flag the topographical elements in Nietzsche, but it requires a lot of interpretive work to show their philosophical import. For instance, the death of God is explained in GS §125 through many topographical metaphors, not just the sea and land, but also the marketplace, the Copernican "unchaining" of the sun, and a general sense of disorientation. It's clear that these place-related images play an important role for Nietzsche, but it is much less clear whether they're crucial for a proper understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy.

Kathleen Higgins and Jessica Berry explore Nietzsche's positive conceptions of community in their essays. Higgins explains that Nietzsche's preferred community—like the one he outlines in UM III §6—emphasizes the "reciprocity of the individual and the human collective" (80). The "herd" and the "rabble" are collectives that originate from weakness and the self-interested and myopic need for survival; they invariably exercise a constraining force on individuals. The herd and the rabble do not constitute a *real* community. For Nietzsche, a real community is united by a shared and freely chosen ideal, which in Nietzsche's case involves a commitment to the cultivation (rather than the constraint) of individuality. The community Nietzsche envisions is motivated by "a longing to create something beyond themselves" and by a "love" for those individuals who have "traveled farther toward perfection" than all their predecessors (82).

While Higgins' focus is quite general, Berry's focus is much more specific. She provides an account of Nietzsche's ideal *scientific* community. The scientific community Nietzsche envisages is united not by any shared theory or method, but rather by a shared set of values. Berry makes a persuasive case that, for Nietzsche, these values are most clearly exemplified in Goethe's scientific practice and thought, especially in his refusal to model his work on the sickly and impersonal ascetic ideal of "scientific objectivity" that dominates modern science (broadly construed) according to Nietzsche.

Finally, Hans Sluga's essay examines Nietzsche's diagnosis in *Human, all-too-Human* of

the "political crisis" facing modernity. The crisis is (of course) rooted in nihilism, which Sluga understands not as the loss of all values or as anomie, but as the "loss of a hierarchy and order of values and, with this, their justification" (33). The modern democratic state, Nietzsche claims, is the embodiment of this condition: it has traded hierarchy for equality. The "nihilism" of modern democracy constitutes a political crisis because it is inherently unstable insofar as it generates conflicts between values, encourages individuals to pursue their self-centered interests, and discourages them from laboring in the service of great but temporally distant communal goals.

In sum, the essays in Young's volume convincingly demonstrates that Nietzsche's views and reflections on community, individuality, and their interrelations were far more complicated and far less superficial than Anglophone philosophers since Bertrand Russell have typically assumed. In this sense, this volume is a wonderful and novel addition to the Nietzsche scholarship. Moreover, the volume has the additional virtue of producing a surplus of new questions and directions of research, e.g., what's the relation between culture and community in Nietzsche's philosophy? Does Nietzsche have an account of the wellbeing of communities and ordinary individuals that is separable from his normative commitments? What is Nietzsche's standard for assessing the "greatness" of a community? How does it compare with his standard for assessing great individuals? Does Nietzsche have anything to say about relationships *between* communities? And how might Nietzsche's communitarianism bear on central ideas in his work, like the will to power and the eternal return, or on his philosophy of mind and his perspectivism? I hope, then, that the novel positions and approaches that the authors develop in this volume will prove to be fruitful for much future research on this important topic.

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Naturalizing Heidegger: His Confrontations with Nietzsche, His Contributions to Environmental Philosophy—**David E. Storey**

Nolan Hatley

Storey's book, as the title naturally suggests, chiefly deals with the philosophy of Martin Heidegger but warrants attention from serious Nietzsche scholars for two principal reasons. First, the book articulates clearly why Heidegger misinterprets and misappropriates Nietzsche for his own philosophical aims. The book also critically assesses the possible contributions that the work of each might make to environmental philosophy, which in the case of Nietzsche, is undeservedly unexplored, nor fully understood or developed in the scholarly literature. I will introduce and focus here primarily on the book's arguments concerning Nietzsche. Nonetheless, the whole book is worth attention for Nietzsche scholars, for even the aspects of Heidegger's thought not clearly influenced by Nietzsche invite rich and meaningful comparisons.

In the earlier chapters of the book, chapters 1-2 and 4 respectively, Storey argues that some of the earlier work of Heidegger, e.g. the early lecture courses on Aristotle and the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, provides the best resources for a positive contribution to environmental philosophy. Here Heidegger gestures towards understanding the natural world and animals as ontologically continuous with human beings before an emphasis on human particularity in *Being and Time*, the subject of chapter 3, that prefigures his later strands of anti-naturalism. Environmental philosophers tend to look at the later work of Heidegger – those writings after the mid-1930s – for inspiration, but Storey argues that the poetic view of nature articulated there is vague, ambiguous, and remote from the best explanations of the natural sciences concerning animals and other living organisms. Here Heidegger, particularly in his emphasis on poetic dwelling, offers no determinate judgments on the tough questions of environmental ethics, for example, weighing and securing the competing interests of different species, or even among individuals of the same species against any putative value accorded to the species as a whole. Heidegger's account, then, fails to guide action concerning the environment. Storey advances these criticisms in chapter 5. Storey's admirable pluralist approach is evident in his overall narrative concerning Heidegger. Storey develops a critical approach emphasizing the need for clarity in both argument and explanation, particularly concerning the issue of making practical deliberations or ethical judgments concerning the environment, in addition to a default continuity to the best work of the natural sciences, while also detailing the merits of a phenomenological approach in understanding the results of the life sciences, which assists in understanding the continuous interiority that humans share to some extent with other forms of life. This latter aspect of his approach also keeps his defaulting to the natural sciences from bottoming out

in an unconvincing mechanistic reductive naturalism and so opting instead for the nonreductive naturalism that Storey champions throughout the text. His book then is a refreshing example of employing interpretation in the service of present philosophical concerns.

Storey successfully critiques Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche in chapter 6. First, Storey criticizes Heidegger for characterizing the will to power solely through the account of the "the last men" of modernity, which Nietzsche himself obviously criticizes. Heidegger appropriates Nietzsche's pejorative account and then critically employs it against him, but without any clear or sufficient interpretative justification for this move. In this, Heidegger disregards Nietzsche's discussion of the many different types of manifestation of power. Second, and more importantly, Heidegger wrongly interprets Nietzsche as subscribing to the view that value is only there in the world because it is projected there by human beings. This fails to recognize that Nietzsche views all life as valuing. Storey argues that Nietzsche views value like a naturalist, i.e. as coextensive with living creatures' conditions of enhancement and preservation. According to Storey, Nietzschean values are organic conditions, not merely subjective projections of the mind. Finally, Storey argues that Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche (in the initial inception of his alleged metaphysical philosophizing) – as anthropomorphically proliferating an uncritically presupposed Cartesian subjectivity amidst the plural perspectives of the body – is ultimately unconvincing. Such an interpretation fails to do justice to Nietzsche's critique not only of the Cartesian *ego* but the traditional Western notion of the will. Here, Heidegger tries to square Nietzsche with his own meta-narrative of the history of Western philosophy. Predictably, this narrative presents Heidegger as the first true genuine critic of metaphysics – after Nietzsche, whom he casts as the "the last metaphysician".

Nietzsche scholars will certainly want to spend more time on chapters 7 and 8, where Storey presents his own interpretation of Nietzsche in order to mobilize Nietzsche's philosophy for the use of environmental ethics. Storey, building off the work of John Richardson, argues that Nietzsche develops a theory of natural value from his philosophical understanding of biology; this theory, in turn, suggests a conception of natural hierarchy. Although Nietzsche unfortunately does not fully understand Darwin and even suggests a commitment to Lamarckism, he nonetheless presents a substantial philosophical account of life that prefigures some important trends in contemporary theoretical biology. Story praises Nietzsche's account for its potential to contribute to a non-reductive naturalist approach to environmental ethics. Nietzsche develops an understanding of living organisms as "relatively stable configurations of drives that in some sense produce themselves," anticipating similar contemporary accounts of autopoiesis, the activity of the organism that maintains or advances its health or ability to survive (201). Nietzsche also attributes a "thin intentionality" to all forms of life (201), as argued for by Richardson. Nietzsche explains biological phenomena in terms of drives, which manifest a primitive, non-cognitive sense of directedness towards ends. A complex biological system of drives develops a response system with the external environment, and it is in this very thin sense of an automatic response system to external factors that accounts for the ascribed interiority and intentionality of living organisms. For Nietzsche, this supports an "immanent," emergent teleology as fundamental to the ontological status of life (202). Storey interprets Nietzsche as attempting to navigate between the extremes of mechanism on the one hand, and vitalism or panpsychism on the other. Furthermore, this conception of life underwrites Nietzsche's

theory of natural value. As functional systems of organization, complexes of drives manifest perspectives of value, i.e. as organic conditions of enhancement and preservation. Furthermore, more complex organisms, which function through the incorporation of ever more complex arrangements of drives, naturally increase their total extent of value. For Storey, this culminates in a natural hierarchical axiology that can guide judgments concerning the environment, while avoiding the extreme pitfalls of anthropocentrism and misanthropy.

Hierarchical biocentrism, as presented by Storey, recognizes the ethical significance of all life forms insofar as they harbor values. On such a picture, the real constitution of ethical significance emerges with the first primitive living organisms. This view also refuses to disavow that certain forms of life embody more value, such as chimpanzees, dolphins, and, of course, human beings. This relationship between "higher" and "lower" forms of life is not merely exploitative but may naturally manifest a system of values in which the "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" or "ecological value" of each link in the "chain" is best realized. Storey implies that "intrinsic value" can be reinterpreted as the value that a living organism realizes as part of its own functional system. In the case of Nietzsche's account then, such a value emerges through its own system of drives. "Extrinsic or ecological value" then refers to the value the living organism produces for other living organisms or for an entire ecological system. Storey employs the work of David Ray Griffin on Whitehead's ecological outlook to flesh out this conception of natural value. Lower forms of life with less intrinsic value often confer greater ecological benefits, and vice versa; higher forms of life with more intrinsic value do not confer greater ecological benefits. Therefore, a hierarchical biocentrism like Nietzsche's can capture both the insight that all life matters, because all living organisms presuppose values from their own perspective, and that more advanced complex species with greater diversification of drives matter more in a different way.

Storey develops a plausible and coherent reading of Nietzsche, particularly in arguing that Nietzsche's axiology is grounded upon his philosophical biology. He also articulates the potential relevance of Nietzsche to environmental ethics by presenting the merits of Nietzsche's ascribed hierarchical biocentric position. Although Storey provides plenty of textual support for his interpretation of Nietzsche's axiology – and although there is no lack of evidence for such an interpretation in Nietzsche – Storey does not provide enough evidence that Nietzsche applies that axiology in specific ethical directives toward non-human species. He also does not address long-term aspects of Nietzsche's view of culture, probably one of the most promising aspects of Nietzsche's work concerning environmental ethics given the long-term effects of anthropogenic climate change. Furthermore, there is little engagement with Schopenhauer, a decisive early critic of anthropocentrism and the early Nietzsche's "educator." Of course, this is to be expected in a work primarily devoted to the other end of the historical spectrum, engaging Nietzsche backwards through the prism of Heidegger and the work done on his own philosophical engagement with the natural environment.

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Nietzsches Befreiung der Philosophie—Werner Stegmaier

Dirk R. Johnson

In recent years, research on Nietzsche has become internationalized. Scholarly communities are active around the world, which has resulted in an explosion of studies, but has also led to increased fragmentation and specialization. Anglo-American scholarship has achieved a certain dominance due to the status and magnitude of its academic community, the hegemony of English as lingua franca of scholarship, and a resurgence of interest in Nietzsche in the United States and Great Britain. Of course, Nietzsche continues to inspire scholarly output in the country of his origin. But it has become more difficult for contemporary German paradigms on Nietzsche, i.e., post-Heidegger, to get an audience in the English-speaking world. The monograph under review is an example of the excellent work being done on Nietzsche in German today.

Werner Stegmaier, professor at the University of Greifswald and one of the foremost scholars working on Nietzsche today, has for years edited *Nietzsche Studien*, the premier professional journal in the field. He has published countless articles and volumes on various facets of Nietzsche's work. An impressive synthesis of his research labors can be found in this ambitious, large-scale monograph *Nietzsches Befreiung der Philosophie* ("Nietzsche's Liberation of Philosophy," De Gruyter, 2012), an over 600-page "contextual interpretation" of the Fifth Book of the *Gay Science*.

Nietzsche published the *Gay Science* (*Fröhliche Wissenschaft*), originally encompassing four books, in 1882. He then completed a literary work that marked a radical departure from his previous writings, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1882-84). After publishing *Beyond Good and Evil*, in 1885, Nietzsche compiled five new prefaces to his earlier works that were meant to boost sales of his under-performing titles and to present his prior texts as stages of a single philosophical development that was now, looking back, becoming clearer to him as a whole (54).

At this time, Nietzsche also composed a collection of 40 + 1 aphorisms that he planned to append to the *Gay Science* as a Fifth Book. When the latter was republished with Fifth Book and a new preface in 1887, Nietzsche did little to dispel the impression that the original had been published with all five books. Even today, many scholars are unware of the unusual circumstances of the work's publication history (58). In fact, Stegmaier states, the independent Book V breaks up the standard chronological periodization of Nietzsche's work into middle—*Zarathustra*—and late, given that Book V was composed in the so-called "late" period, after *Zarathustra*, while reconnecting with the prior middle period (58).

For Stegmaier, *Gay Science*'s Book V stands on its own merits, and his monograph is devoted to a close analysis of this final book. With this appended work, Stegmaier sees

Nietzsche reaching a new level of stylistic perfection and philosophical maturity (28). He is particularly impressed by the way in which the collection of aphorisms achieves a well-balanced inner harmonics, how the motifs and major themes of his philosophy resonate throughout. The compositional style of the work reflects a newly attained wisdom that is non-metaphysical, ungrounded and playful towards life and human knowledge. Rather than point towards a philosophical "system," Nietzsche's aphorisms—in their content, inner resonances, and stylistic nuances—represent a philosophical undertaking unique to Western thought. Stegmaier's Nietzsche has little to do with doctrines or rules for living; rather, Nietzsche here stands for a totally open-ended paradigm of thinking, one where life itself becomes the great experiment against which individuals must measure themselves.

Stegmaier's monograph covers all aspects of the Fifth Book, starting with its title—"of all Nietzsche's irritating titles," he writes, "it is the most irritating" (43). He shows how even the words "fröhlich" (joyful/gay) and "Wissenschaft" (science) are multivalent, and how Nietzsche takes aim at the cultural suppositions of his time—namely, that "science" must not be joyous, but earnest and grim. Further, the title pays homage to the "gaya scienza" of the medieval French troubadours, who apotheosized the "amour passion" and served as an inspiration for the "free thinker" (35-38). Everything in the work, starting with its title, was set up in contrast to his age, which accepted the ascetic pose of the scientist as the only possible stance for the seeker of "truth" and knowledge.

The Fifth Book is composed of lengthier aphorisms. Due to his poor eyesight and the limits that imposed on his reading and writing, Nietzsche early on gravitated toward the aphoristic form as the best one suited to his needs (9). While necessity might have led him to it, it eventually became the dominant style of his philosophizing; the form alone made a metaphysical grounding more difficult, encouraging instead intertextuality and open-endedness. Further distinguishing the aphorism is its "terseness, level of penetration, and power to express much in a few words" (10). It can make a summary point, produce startling thought associations, liberate terms from their usual contexts and open them up for unusual new ones. As such, the aphorism represented the ideal medium for a revaluation of values (10).

Stegmaier's primary focus is on the "means of contextualization" within the chain of aphorisms, that is, the intertextuality of passages (12). They are not meant to be read in isolation but always with an ear for their internal resonances, which produce a harmonics not unlike that of a complex symphonic work. To this end, Nietzsche employs a variety of literary, musical, even "painterly" techniques. For example, he varies his *literary* strategies and registers; he constantly changes the flow among aphorisms, sometimes speaking directly to the reader, sometimes inserting dialogues or speeches to himself (13). From a *musical* point of view, he changes the tempi of his texts (e.g., "presto", "lento" or "staccato") and the "tone" within individual passages; the latter can alternate between neutral, serious, ironic, or joyous and playful. Finally, he meticulously arranges the collection of aphorisms in the manner of a cubist painter, placing them in a way so that startling new perspectives emerge and unexpected associations suddenly become apparent (14).

Stegmaier inserts sections into his analysis, titled "Nietzsche's Literary Methods," that examine the various stylistic techniques Nietzsche employs in composing and arranging his aphorisms. For example, he devotes a section on Nietzsche's use of quotation marks, which he places on certain terms to problematize them or to displace their standard definitions while freeing them up for new meanings or associations (291-2). Or he examines

Nietzsche's repeated use of the dash and ellipsis to engage in direct communication with his reader while encouraging further thought and more suggestive insights (175). Also, Nietzsche introduces an ebb and flow of themes within the chain of aphorisms, such as repeatedly returning to the question of science, in order to insert the concepts into always new contexts and to historicize them, thus liberating them from their standard metaphysical connotations (124-5).

Stegmaier himself composes his monograph in the manner of a cubist. While he pursues the various threads of Nietzsche's arguments and makes his case for a contextual reading, Stegmaier also displays his vast scholarly knowledge of both the secondary literature on Nietzsche and Nietzsche's place in the philosophical tradition. As such, this monograph is an idiosyncratic blend of scholarship and deep meditation on the suggestive power of Book V. He inserts lengthier sections in smaller font that discuss other influential interpretations or digress on various terms or controversial topics within the scholarship. An example of such an overview is his discussion of the work's title, in which he presents a broad summary of scholarship on the *Gay Science* and interpretations of its title and possible meanings (47-9). The monograph, as befitting a scholarly text, includes numerous footnotes (as well as an extensive bibliography), where he pursues further lines of inquiry and reveals his knowledge of the relevant scholarship.

But all of these strategies are pressed into service for Stegmaier's main objective: to offer a close examination of each section of the Fifth Book. He refrains from imposing a single master narrative on the collection of aphorisms but rather carefully analyzes each section's motifs and proceeds from the language of the text outwards, trying to capture moods and shifts in meaning, particularly through cross-textual comparison. One could call it a *kaleidoscopic* approach, whereby different patterns and constellations emerge when the shaft is turned in new rotations. (This would explain his selection of Jackson Pollack's artwork, *Introspection*, as cover image for the German edition.)

The true merit in this study, however, comes from Stegmaier's intellectual rigor and analytic precision, combined with his vast knowledge of the oeuvre, which will produce flashes of insight in any veteran reader of Nietzsche. This reader might have thought about a particular subject in a similar way but could never have put into such lucid terms. Even if one wishes, at times, for a more guiding hand, a more taut thread of interpretation, the reward of this study is in its rich *detail*—the brilliant fragments, which, like shards of colored glass, one can appreciate apart from the context as a whole.

But that "fragmentary" approach is part of Stegmaier's strategy—to resist the tendency, rather common in Nietzsche studies from the beginning, to search for overarching messages or explicit doctrines. By insisting on the heterogeneity of the texts and, above all, by appreciating his use of language, his *style*, Stegmaier presents Nietzsche as great experimenter, the Promethean *artist* and promoter of open-ended vistas, who refuses to be pigeonholed or held down by any single interpretation. It comes as a bit of a surprise, then, that Stegmaier adopts a particular framework in examining these texts: he returns repeatedly to a term—"orientation"—with which he means to capture the essence and the singular quality of Nietzsche's philosophy, without diminishing its suggestiveness.

Stegmaier never explicitly lays out what he means by the latter, though he keeps on circling around it throughout the narrative. What I can infer is that Nietzsche's texts force us to question our traditional orientations in life—those imposed by religion, politics, ethnicity, gender, social class, etc.—and to push us out into a new, possibly threatening, environment,

where we will have nothing firm left to grasp onto, no "Halt" (hold). This will require us to configure new "orientations," but ones that are now liberated from their prior contexts. Stegmaier seems to believe that the search for orientation is a deeply ingrained human need (if I am reading him correctly), one that Nietzsche is determined to destabilize. But to me, at least, it is unclear if such a "need" exists at all or whether that, too, is what Nietzsche challenges at a most fundamental level. In short, I am not quite certain if the framework of "orientation" is adequate, or even necessary, for Stegmaier's project, and I wonder if it might run at cross purposes to the overall aims and intentions of this study, which purports to resist any form of systematization.

Stegmaier's work is an excellent example of a "new Nietzsche" that is crystallizing (perhaps an appropriate word in this context) in the German-speaking world. (Another example is Andreas Urs Sommer's recently published *Nietzsche und die Folgen* ["Nietzsche and His Consequences"; De Gruyter 2017]; Sommer and Stegmaier share many of the same underlying premises.) The hallmark of these works is their focus on language, on style, on resonances and their resistance to a search for central meanings. They embrace Nietzsche's multiplicity and plurality, though not in the postmodern understanding of the word, and they push back against master appropriations of Nietzsche by thinkers such as Heidegger, but equally against recent co-options, such as by the "naturalist school" predominant in Anglo-American scholarship today (who align Nietzsche with the analytical tradition). "Their" Nietzsche is playful—though not lacking in seriousness; a great de-systematizer—but not a proponent of "anything goes"; a master of style and thus a *literary* figure—but nonetheless a philosopher whose position in the canon is uncontested and yet, oddly, still undetermined.

There is much to be welcomed in this major new study of Nietzsche's Fifth Book of the "Gay Science"—and, in general, with the "German" perspective it represents. If anything, it decisively puts into doubt all attempts to fashion a "complete" Nietzsche, one where the "doctrines" of the overman, the will to power, the eternal return merely serve to stymy further questioning and to distract readers from the ambiguities and "Orientierungslosigkeit" ("lack of orientation," to use Stegmaier's concept) that are characteristic of Nietzsche's texts.

Despite the repeated deconstruction, over the years, of the many troublesome myths surrounding Nietzsche and his works—such as believing in the "Will to Power" as autonomous text or seeing *Zarathustra* as the platform for *Nietzsche's* "doctrines" or believing the *Nachlass* is where the "actual" philosophy resides, etc.—old myths die hard. There seems to be a residual resistance to accepting the truth that these deconstructions expose: that Nietzsche's texts do not offer us a sense of interpretative closure or finality. Certainly, that does not mean that some readings might not present a richer, more resonant interpretation. But such an interpretation must proceed *from* the texts, from the richness of the texts themselves. It is the great merit of this study, and ones like it, that they help to clear the clutter, to keep it at bay, and, above all, that they compel us to *listen* to the text—while urging caution against reductive overarching metanarratives. That would suggest to me a truly Nietzschean virtue. And one that we should all be able to endorse.

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Biographies

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- A 250-word bio, the length of your manuscript/submission, and a short list of prior publications.

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5. Please note that page numbers go into the upper right hand corner with your last name.
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As noted above, references to Nietzsche's writings are to be included in the body of the essay using the standard English title abbreviations indicated below. With reference to translations, Roman numerals denote a standard subdivision within a single work in which the sections are not numbered consecutively (e.g., On the Genealogy of Morals), Arabic numerals denote the section number rather than the page number, and "P" denotes Nietzsche's Prefaces.

Unless the author is translating, the published translation used should be indicated with a

footnote to the initial citation reference.
References to the editions by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari take the following forms:

Kritische Gesamtausgabe (KGW) (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967—) is cited by division number (Roman), followed by volume number (Arabic), followed by the fragment number.
Kritische Studienausgabe (KSA) (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980) is cited by volume number (Arabic) followed by the fragment number.

Briefwechsel: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (KGB) (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1975—) is cited by division number (Roman), followed by volume number (Arabic), followed by page number.

Sämtliche Briefe: Kritische Studienausgabe (KSB) (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1986) is cited by volume number (Arabic) followed by page number.

References to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* list the part number and chapter title, e.g., (Z: 4 "On Science").
References to *Twilight of the Idols* and *Ecce Homo* list abbreviated chapter title and section number, e.g., (TI "Ancients" §3) or (EH "Books" BGE §2).

References to works in which sections are too long to be cited helpfully by section number should cite section number then page number, e.g., (SE §3, p. 142), with the translation/edition footnoted.

A = *The Antichrist*
AOM = *Assorted Opinions and Maxims*
BGE = *Beyond Good and Evil*
BT = *The Birth of Tragedy*
CW = *The Case of Wagner*
D = *Daybreak / Dawn*
DS = *David Strauss, the Writer and the Confessor*
EH = *Ecce Homo* ["Wise," "Clever," "Books," "Destiny"]
FEI = "On the Future of our Educational Institutions"
GM = *On the Genealogy of Morals*
GOA = *Nietzsches Werke* (Grossoktavausgabe)
GS = *The Gay Science / Joyful Wisdom*
HS = "Homer's Contest"
HCP = "Homer and Classical Philology"
HH = *Human, All Too Human*
HL = *On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life*
KGB = *Briefwechsel: Kritische Gesamtausgabe*
KGW = *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*
KSA = *Kritische Studienausgabe*
KSB = *Sämtliche Briefe: Kritische Studienausgabe*
LR = "Lectures on Rhetoric"
MA = *Nietzsches Gesammelte Werke* (Musarionausgabe)
NCW = *Nietzsche contra Wagner*
PPP = *Pre-Platonic Philosophers*
PTA = *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*

RWB = *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*
SE = *Schopenhauer as Educator*
TI = *Twilight of the Idols* ["Maxims," "Socrates," "Reason," "World," "Morality," "Errors," "Improvers," "Germans," "Skirmishes," "Ancients," "Hammer"] TL = "On Truth and Lies in an Extra-moral Sense"
UM = *Untimely Meditations / Thoughts Out of Season*
WDB = *Werke in drei Bänden* (Ed. Karl Schlechta)
WP = *The Will to Power*
WPh = "We Philologists"
WS = *The Wanderer and his Shadow*
WLN = *Writings from the Late Notebooks*
Z = *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*